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ABSTRACT 
 
COMPANIONS IN MISSION: PRACTICING THE VIRTUE OF SOLIDARITY IN 
CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
Daniel P. Justin 
Advisor: Jane E. Regan 
Readers: David Hollenbach, S.J., Michael James 
 
 
In Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987) Pope John Paul II proposes solidarity as a social virtue 
for our fragmented yet interdependent world. This lens raises several important questions, 
but also suggests new opportunities for moral formation and the promotion of 
institutional charism in the context of Catholic higher education. Employing a praxis 
methodology, this dissertation begins by analyzing contemporary declines in social 
capital and the rise of atomistic individualism. The philosophical writings of Alasdair 
MacIntyre and Charles Taylor help us to understand the moral and spiritual roots of these 
sociological trends. With the context established, the dissertation next traces the 
development of solidarity in the Catholic social tradition and attempts to locate the virtue 
within a Thomistic moral framework. Closely related to both charity and justice, the 
vision of solidarity advanced is linked to Aristotle’s notion of civic friendship, perfected 
in its origin (the dignity of the human person) and goal (the common good). Constructive 
proposal are grounded in the concept of social practices developed by MacIntyre and 
adapted by religious educators and practical theologians. Beyond textual analysis, this 
dissertation includes a national survey of 87 senior mission leaders at Catholic colleges 
and universities. From these findings, concrete recommendations are offered for the 
practices of mission leadership and service-learning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Ruined for Life’ 
 
 As far as marketing slogans go, ‘Ruined for Life’ hardly seems like the sort of 
motto that an organization would embrace. Yet, for decades, this has been the rallying cry 
of the Jesuit Volunteer Corps, a national and international post-graduate full-time 
volunteer program grounded in the Ignatian tradition. Its origins trace back to Jack Morris 
S.J., widely remembered as the founder of JVC.1 In the early years, whenever he would 
hear of a volunteer who walked away from a degree in marketing or changed career 
trajectories to be closer to those on the margins, he would shake his head, sigh, and 
lament, “Another one! Ruined for life!” The phrase ‘Ruined for Life’ still captures much 
of the JV experience. The commitment usually lasts only a year, yet through the 
experience, commonly held definitions of a successful or meaningful life lose all appeal. 
Volunteers’ hearts are broken, and new visions of human flourishing emerge.  
 The experience is not limited to Jesuit volunteers. The language finds resonance 
with volunteers from any number of programs, as well as those returning from intensive 
                                                 
1 A title that he would argue more rightly belongs to the Sisters of St. Anne that first 
began inviting college students to Copper Valley Alaska. Nevertheless, his legacy is 
undeniable: giving JVC its name, initial structure, mission of volunteer formation. Much 
of what follows simply belongs to the oral tradition and lore of JVC; however, the 
definitive record of JVC’s history and spirituality can be found in: Simon J. Hendry, S.J., 
“‘Ruined for Life’: The Spirituality of the Jesuit Volunteer Corps” (Dissertation, 
Graduate Theological Union, 2002). 
 2 
immersion programs or participating in service-learning classes. Indeed, for many 
potential volunteers, ‘Ruined for Life’ articulates a vision that they have not experienced 
yet feel inexplicably drawn toward. They cannot fully name their motivations, and have 
little sense of what the year will hold; yet these words awaken a longing and spiritual 
hunger within them for a different sort of life. It is only after several months in the 
program that they begin to realize the full weight of these words. 
 Part of the appeal of this slogan resides in its ambiguity. Ruined how, and by what 
measures? Undoubtedly, volunteers realize that they can no longer abide by the standards 
of success that they have inherited from Western culture and mass media. The American 
dream is no longer theirs. Often, the rift is far more personal, realizing that these new 
commitments put them at odds with the expectations of their family and friends. Yet at its 
deepest levels, a rupture occurs in the heart of the volunteer. The experience leads them 
to not simply adopt a new moral framework and sense of vocation. They realize that the 
easy comfort of subjective well being can no longer be a part of their daily routines and 
aspirations. They simply cannot be happy the way they were before, and have no wish to 
be so.  
 It is possible to identify some mechanisms of this conversion. Volunteers receive 
an extensive education in Jesuit spirituality and Catholic social teaching. They make at 
least three retreats over the course of the year, and many begin regular spiritual direction. 
Yet, it is not this intentional formation that they point to when they chart their life’s 
journey. Indeed, these formative activities are only successful because they give 
volunteers a vocabulary that helps them make sense of what they have already 
experienced. Many of the more difficult concepts are only introduced later in the year, 
 3 
when volunteers have had enough time to experience the triumphs and struggles of life in 
community and committed to the poor. 
 Far more common for volunteers is their sense that after having lived a distinctive 
sort of life, they cannot go back. Jesuit volunteers are immersed into a way of living 
marked by the four values of Justice, Simplicity, Spirituality, and Community. More than 
abstract ideals, these values structure the patterns and practices of the year. From weekly 
community and spirituality nights to struggling to negotiate a limited household budget 
and modest monthly stipend, these values articulate the volunteers’ shared commitments. 
Yet these pillars’ function within a community is always tenuous. Mutual commitment to 
a particular value is no guarantee that a community would agree upon its nature and 
demand. Likewise, the ordering and relative importance of one value among others is 
never settled. Values conflict; and there is no easy way to measure or negotiate their 
claims.  
For Jesuit volunteers, there is no scale that could weigh the simplicity of not 
owning a television against the community built by binge watching old episodes of “24” 
after dinner. Whether the values demand buying bulk at Costco or organic at Whole 
Foods has yet to be settled. Committing to a particular set of ideals did little to resolve 
conflicts within a community; but it reminded volunteers that these clashes are rooted in a 
shared desire for the good, and struggling with these tensions remains central to the 
volunteers’ formation. 
  Yet for many volunteers, to be ruined went beyond even this conversion to a new 
and distinct way of life. Rather, it was rooted in the relationships that they had built, 
particularly with the communities and clients they serve. To be ruined meant that they 
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could never again settle into a complacent comfort that is inaccessible to those they had 
encountered. As long as poverty and struggle remain part of our world, they must be a 
part of the volunteer’s horizon. To seek any form of happiness or the good life that does 
not incorporate these relationships is no longer a life worth living. Rather, the good and 
meaningful life is redefined as one of suffering with and struggling beside those on the 
margins. To be ruined ultimately signifies letting go of even the desire for a solitary and 
autonomous form of happiness. It meant realizing that one’s flourishing is never one’s 
own. 
 It is this juxtaposition between the good life and the ruined life that is at the center 
of this dissertation and (I want to suggest) the heart of solidarity as a virtue. To be in 
solidarity is to realize that one’s own flourishing is inextricably linked to another’s. As an 
alter ego, we experience the suffering, struggles, and triumphs of our neighbor as our 
own. Solidarity, therefore, is not commitment to the common good as an abstract 
principle; rather it is a commitment to concrete persons and a union of wills toward a 
common end. Developing a definition of solidarity rooted in the virtue of friendship first 
articulated by Aristotle and later developed by Aquinas, this dissertation advocates 
structures and practices of solidarity as essential to the mission of Catholic higher 
education in a contemporary American context marked by atomism, relativism, and 
secularism. Many of the challenges we face are rooted in our steady decline in social 
capital and civic engagement. If we are to face them we must begin to recognize our 
interdependence and the irreducibly social nature of many of the highest goods we seek.  
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It is helpful, perhaps, to begin with my own narrative – not because it is unique, 
but because it is so common today, particularly among millennials seeking a meaningful 
life in our secular age. I was never a Jesuit Volunteer, yet long before I became executive 
director of JVC: Midwest, I had come to appreciate the contours of this ruined life. 
White, male, and middle-class, I began my undergraduate studies at Creighton University 
largely shielded from the struggles and structures of oppression that shape the lives of so 
many. It was through immersion trips, service-learning courses, and student advocacy 
groups that my horizon slowly began to expand. My motives for this involvement were 
never purely altruistic and others-centered. Rather, vocational discernment and identity 
formation were central concerns for all of us. Yet through continual contact and 
deepening relations with those on the margins, my vision was slowly decentered. I began 
to define my own life’s journey in terms of honoring the relationships I had formed. 
Critically, I did not first develop my theological framework and subsequently act 
on it. The experience always came first. In this way, my theological education came as 
somewhat of a relief, providing the language I needed to make meaning from these 
varying encounters. To be certain, Catholic social teaching, that ‘best kept secret’ of the 
Church, profoundly shaped my understanding of these activities. Yet I also found 
resonance with virtue ethics, particularly its emphasis on moral growth and that 
paradoxical insight that developing our own character and cultivating an attentiveness to 
the Other are intimately linked. Studying both theology and psychology, I began to 
question not only what justice entails, but how it is that individuals and communities 
become just. It seemed that too often, we have a conception of what is right, but are 
unable to translate these judgments into meaningful and committed action. In these 
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inquiries, I was very fortunate to have Roger Bergman as a mentor and guide. His 
research and teaching on faith and moral development challenged (and continues to 
challenge) me to be attentive to the social context in which our moral ideals are 
concretely realized. 
It was Bergman who first introduced me to the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, just 
as I was beginning my work with JVC. MacIntyre’s proposal of moral traditions 
embodied in particular communities and social practices seemed (and still seems) the 
clearest articulation of the formation that occurs in such programs. I began to recognize 
participation in JVC as an apprenticeship into in particular way of life, and I saw how the 
four values functioned within our communities as something akin to virtues. Similar to 
cardinal virtues, these pillars represented the most essential dimensions of the life we 
were striving to foster, and became the basis for any normative statement or policies we 
developed. Our volunteers committed themselves to a particular sort of life, the contours 
of which were defined by certain habits – the perfection of which constituted a particular 
kind flourishing: that of a ruined life. 
As director, I often found myself emphasizing the centrality of the word 
‘intentional’ in the phrase ‘intentional community.’ It seemed almost any volunteer 
struggle or conflict could be resolved so long as there was an intentional commitment. 
When this was missing, however, even the smallest troubles were insurmountable. Yet, in 
JVC there was very little that we were able to take for granted. Faith of any sort has never 
been a requirement or expectation. We drew volunteers from across the political 
spectrum. What we did know was that every Jesuit Volunteer committed herself to living 
the four values. Whenever there was conflict, or an intervention by the staff was 
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necessary, the values provided a common language through which to engage 
communities. We could not challenge volunteers on their fidelity to the gospel; nor could 
we get far by reminding them of the categorical imperative. What we could do was 
discuss their commitment to community, spirituality, simplicity, and social justice. We 
could engage them on the authentic expression of these values and on what they require 
in specific situations. 
This work helped me to appreciate the rich potential of applying a virtues 
framework to the formative life of a community. It also helped to mitigate some of the 
more extreme claims made by both MacIntyre and his critics. A common critique of 
MacIntyre is that he is advocating a rejection and withdrawal from civil society. I can say 
this: our volunteers did indeed have a distinct moral vocabulary and conception of the 
good life. They continue to reject many of the norms and values central to our 
contemporary culture. That said, JVC has empirical studies that prove former volunteers 
consistently demonstrate higher levels of voting, volunteering, and civic participation 
than their non-volunteering peers. Moreover, while the list of those values considered 
‘cardinal’ varies across similar volunteer programs, former volunteers almost always find 
it easier to talk to those similarly formed by other distinctive communities than the 
unaffiliated who are comfortable in society’s mainstream. Deep formation within a 
particular tradition implies neither a withdrawal from broader civic engagement nor an 
absolute incommensurability with other traditions. 
It was not only in working with volunteers that I found the virtues framework 
useful. I was hired by the JVC: Midwest board in part to participate in national 
conversations surrounding the realignment of JVC regions from independent 501(c)(3) 
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organizations into a national structure with regional offices. The celebration of our 50th 
anniversary was a time to recall our original narratives, core values, and future 
aspirations. Similarly, as the director of a Jesuit apostolate, I was invited to take part in 
regional conversations surrounding the US Assistancy’s strategic discernment. With roots 
in the Ingatian tradition, it is not surprising that both of these conversations were largely 
framed in terms of mission: who we must become in order to respond to the needs, 
challenges, and opportunities before us while faithfully retaining our history and 
distinctive charism. With mission as both the start and end point of every discussion, I 
again found deep resonance with virtue ethics, which always begins with the end: the 
telos toward which all our activities are directed. 
As I write, I am in my second year of teaching introductory-level theology 
courses through service-learning pedagogies. This work has only affirmed what I believe 
is a natural complementarity between the languages of mission and vocation. In every 
class I have taught, the first theological document we read was the institution’s mission 
statement. This has proven to be a successful way to help the students appreciate why 
their college or university views the ability to think theologically as a central element to 
the distinctive way of life it is trying to cultivate on campus. Likewise, it invites students 
to name and reflection upon the particular vision of the good life they themselves are 
working to attain. Students’ experiences at their placements in community-based 
organizations help them to critically test both the voices of the tradition and their own 
beliefs. More importantly, their daily encounters challenge them to redefine their own 
mission and vocation. Through these practices, they come to recognize that their 
education and opportunities are never theirs alone. 
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It is these experiences and insights that frame this project. This dissertation is 
principally concerned with solidarity as a virtue: how to locate it within the Christian 
tradition and how to embody and nurture it in the life and practices of Christian 
communities. I take for my context and focus Catholic higher education in the United 
States. In the past few years, I have frequently found myself speaking with ethicists about 
moral formation and speaking to religious educators about ethical theory. It is my hope 
that this dissertation offers something constructive to each discipline. How we educate, 
and to what ends, are moral and political questions. Yet even as the moral character of the 
agent increasingly becomes the focus of ethical inquiry, few theorists pause to consider 
concrete strategies for effectively realizing their articulated goals. We love to propose 
virtues, but seldom pay attention to how they are fostered in community. Conversely, the 
social policies and practices of any community (including our colleges and universities) 
are inescapably formative. We participate in the construction of our social reality while at 
the same time being formed by it. Thus I hope to avoid one-directional deductive 
application in favor of an ongoing conversation between theory and practice. 
I hope that this dissertation speaks to two emerging and rapidly developing trends 
in Catholic higher education in the United States: first, mission leadership and the 
cultivation of a particular moral and spiritual culture on campus; second, service-learning 
as an expression of this mission and formative pedagogical practice. Concerning mission 
leadership, I argue that by intentionally attending to and transforming the structures and 
practices they maintain, Catholic institutions have the potential to embody and promote 
solidarity as a core characteristic of campus culture. I particularly hope to challenge the 
notion that providing volunteer opportunities and service-learning electives sufficiently 
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satisfies the demands of solidarity. Rather, justice and commitment to the common good 
must be integrated into all aspects of university life – teaching, research, administration, 
and student formation. Beyond any particular class or student activity, it is this broader 
life together that shapes the moral character of students and prepares them to carry forth 
the virtue of solidarity in broader society. Thus rather than aiming to form individual 
moral giants, my interest is in what policies and practices might make solidarity a more 
habitual inclination in Catholic higher education as a learning community.  
Nevertheless, student formation remains a central aspect of Catholic higher 
education. My interest in service-learning pedagogy stems partly from its inclusion 
within the curriculum, rather than as an extra-curricular activity. The empirical research 
in this dissertation demonstrates that Educating the Whole Person remains a central 
concern for Catholic education. Yet too often, this outcome is pursued in a haphazard 
way, with students encouraged to cultivate the various dimensions of their lives through a 
range of activities, but given no assistance for integrating them into a unified whole. 
Among the strengths of service-learning is the integration of social encounter and 
rigorous academic study. Done well, it also provides opportunities for emotional and 
spiritual growth. Yet while the advantages of service-learning for the student are well 
documented, I argue that the benefits for the community are seldom given equal weight. 
Solidarity in service-learning demands not only that the needs and goals of the student be 
balanced against those of the community, but that they become one and the same. 
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Methodology and Outline 
As an interdisciplinary work, this dissertation combines critical textual analysis 
with empirical research. As a work in practical theology, I intentionally structure this 
dissertation according to Groome’s Shared Praxis methodology, in which life (that is, the 
experiences and practices of the community) raise certain questions of the faith tradition, 
which in turn propels the community on to further action.2 Hewing closely to the see-
judge-act method of social analysis first developed by Cardinal Joseph Cardijn and the 
Young Christian Worker’s Movement, this methodology follows the praxis method of 
theological reflection developing by the Latin American bishops and liberation 
theologians. Groome’s particular method, developed in the context of religious education, 
emphasizes the critical appropriation of the community and highlights the pedagogical 
dimension of all theological reflection. 
Chapter One reflects the first movement in Groome’s methodology: 
Naming/Expressing ‘Present Praxis.’ Here I draw particularly from the social sciences 
and the observations of Robert Putnam and Robert Bellah concerning the decline in 
social capital and rise of individualism in America. Beyond stating the challenge before 
us, both authors identify religion’s important role in building social trust and cooperation, 
and highlight how faith communities are particularly impacted by these shifts. Chapter 
Two parallels Movement 2 in Groome’s methodology: Critical Reflection on Present 
Action. Here, I turn to social philosophers Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor to 
better understand the philosophical grounding of the trends identified in Chapter One. 
                                                 
2 Thomas H. Groome, Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education 
and Pastoral Ministry: The Way of Shared Praxis (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock 
Publishers, 1998), 133-154.  
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MacIntyre offers a biting critique of the Enlightenment Project and its attempt to privatize 
or outright deny the traditional role our vision of the good plays in moral and civic 
deliberation. While Taylor’s writings express similar ‘communitarian’ concerns about our 
liberal democracy, his prognosis differs in important ways. This chapter focuses, 
however, on Taylor’s nuanced account of the moral roots of identity, emphasizing that 
how we view ourselves and narrate our lives is always rooted in our vision of the good. 
Movement 3, Making Accessible the Christian Story and Vision, is the focus of 
Chapters Three and Four. Chapter Three examines the formulation of solidarity as a 
virtue in the Catholic social tradition. I begin with a close reading of John Paul II’s 1987 
encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, which famously proposes solidarity as the necessary 
social and moral response to our fragmented and interdependent world. From this 
document, I expand my investigation from the earliest appearances of the concept in 
social encyclicals to Pope Francis’s Evangelii Gaudium. In Chapter Four, I attempt to 
locate this virtue within the moral framework delineated in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa 
Theologica. I first highlight the implications of focusing on virtue in moral education, 
and second attempt to locate solidarity within Aquinas’ system of cardinal and 
theological virtues. Whereas most theologians have attempted to align solidarity with 
either justice or charity, I argue that it is in fact closest to the virtue of friendship first 
articulated by Aristotle and later expanded by Aquinas. Viewing solidarity as a perfected 
form of civic friendship, I argue, has many implications for how we understand and 
practice the virtue. 
Movement Four, a Dialectical Hermeneutic toward Appropriation, is the most 
difficult to translate from Groome’s pedagogy to scholarly methodology. Nevertheless, 
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this is the intention behind Chapters Five and Six. Chapter Five returns to MacIntyre’s 
constructive proposal. I first trace (somewhat laboriously) the contours of his definition 
of a social practice: complexity and coherency, internal and external goods, practices and 
institutions. MacIntyre builds his proposal from practices as guilds and crafts to a practice 
as a moral community. This is further developed through his treatment of narratives and 
moral traditions. I next consider how practical theologians and moral educators have 
appropriated his proposals in their own work. For these scholars, practices are more than 
internally-normed human constructs; God is actively present and revealed through them. 
Thus we can examine practices as a source of theological reflection and propose practices 
as a means of shaping the character of the community.  
The first five chapters serve in part as an extended literature review that generates 
a particular set of questions about how Catholic colleges and universities are striving to 
realize and embody their mission today. To this end, chapter six surveys the designated 
senior mission leaders of Catholic colleges and universities in the United States (all those 
who appoint an individual officer or chair as opposed to a team or task force). Though 
only one of several institutional stakeholders, the senior mission leaders of Catholic 
higher education institutions have a unique position and perspective from which to 
understand the institutional culture of the learning community. We may fairly presume 
that their appointment to this position is largely based on their grasp of and commitment 
to the advancement of the school’s mission. Similarly, this constituency is in a privileged 
position to reflect upon the efficacy of various attempts to establish policies and practices 
that further the mission. Chapter six reports and analyzes responses received from these 
leaders attained through an online survey that asked a series of closed and open ended 
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questions seeking to understand how these figures a) reflect a developing trend toward 
greater emphasis on mission integration in Catholic higher education, b) understand, 
develop, and articulate their institution’s mission, and c) attempt to realize this mission 
through policies and practices. 
 Chapter Seven corresponds with Groome’s fifth and final movement, 
Decision/Response for Lived Christian Faith. This chapter pulls together observations, 
conclusions, and points for further inquiry. I focus my comments around two dimensions 
of Catholic higher education: mission leadership and service-learning. The need for 
solidarity in these activities is undeniable, yet practicing solidarity requires that we 
radically reconsider our aims and the loci of our energies, even if at times may feel like 
we are ruining our students and our institutions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
The Decline of Social Capital and Rise of Individualism 
 
 Ethics from the perspective of virtue is grounded in our answers to three 
interrelated questions: Who are we? Who ought we to become? How do we get there?3 
These, too, are the questions of practical theology. Our proposals concerning what must 
be done are only meaningful when they help us to bridge the gap between our current 
praxis and our ultimate moral and theological horizons. It is thus necessary to begin this 
dissertation with an examination of where we find ourselves today. Quite naturally, this 
diagnosis and the recommendations that follow are entirely dependent upon where we 
choose to focus our attention. What themes and challenges from our contemporary 
context are most salient? What are the signs of our times? 
 The question I begin with is this: what does the appeal of a ‘ruined life’ tell us 
about our context today? Why is it that so many young adults and millennials are drawn 
to a life that seems to directly contradict the prevailing ethos of consumerism and 
individualism? What underlying hungers and desires prompt the decision to commit a 
week, semester, or year to service? Further, what has this to do with Catholic higher 
                                                 
3 James F. Keenan, S.J., “Proposing Cardinal Virtues,” Theological Studies 56, no. 4 (December 1995): 711. Keenan attributes these questions to Aladair MacIntyre’s After 
Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), but does not provide a 
direct citation. I have changed the tense from first-person singular to plural to reflection 
the public dimension of ethical reflection. 
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education? What opportunities and challenges present themselves to Catholic colleges 
and universities today? It what ways does the unique position of these institutions enable 
or impede their effective response to our cultural landscape? 
 The purpose of Chapters One and Two is to answer questions of this sort; first 
from the perspective of sociology and second through the lens of social and political 
philosophy. In this chapter, I examine two interrelated social trends: the decline of social 
capital and the rise of individualism. Both shifts, I argue have practical consequences for 
our lives as citizen and our ability to collaboratively address many of the challenges we 
face. I further recognize the ways in which these trends are manifested in faith 
communities. This chapter is chiefly concerned with the work of Robert Putnam and 
Robert Bellah. They help us to identify not only the empirical indicators of these trends, 
but also their cultural roots. Because these developments are rooted in much deeper 
traditions, I begin with two historical glimpses into the ongoing conversation surrounding 
the United States as a moral community. 
 
1.1. Two Historical Snapshots 
John Winthrop: 1630 
 In 1630, aboard the Arbella en route to the Massachusetts Bay Colony, future 
governor John Winthrop penned an essay that articulated his vision for the common 
project that he and his fellow Puritan travelers were about to undertake. His “Model of 
Christian Charity” offers a vision of a diverse, interdependent, and mutually assisting 
community that would be a “city on a hill” for the whole world – and England in 
 17 
particular – to look upon.4 This essay or sermon (we’re not sure which) continues to 
evoke the moral aspirations of the United States. It has been referenced by John F. 
Kennedy and Ronald Regan. Sociologists throughout history point to it as a defining 
vision if the American project. It is one of the earliest statements of who we hope to be, 
and it is an early articulation of social solidarity. 
 Winthrop begins his essay not with a reflection on unity, but diversity. It is in 
God’s providence, he argues, that we have been made higher, lower, richer, and poorer. 
Such diversity, Winthrop suggests, displays God’s glory in three ways. First, it mirrors 
the diversity of all creation, in which every creature praises God in a unique way. Second, 
viewing the poor as an opportunity to practice charity, he sees in human difference the 
opportunity to manifest the work of God’s spirit. Third and most critically, this diversity 
is a source of interdependence. In our differences, Winthrop believes, the only hope for 
the young colony is to become bound more tightly together. In so doing, the early 
Puritans make present the “Glory of the creator and common good of all.”5 
 Such an experiment was tenuous at best, and Winthrop invokes the language of a 
shipwreck that could occur. The community’s only hope, he argues, was to live the words 
of the prophet Micah, “to do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly with our God.” Such 
was the covenant that the Puritans were entering with each other and with their God. 
Their only hope would be to live, work, and struggle together: 
                                                 
4 John Winthrop, “A Model of Christian Charity,” 1630, http://wps.ablongman.com/wps/media/objects/28/29338/primarysources2_2_3.html. 
5 Ibid. 
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For this end we must be knit together in this work as one man, we must 
entertain each other in brotherly affection, we must be willing to abridge 
ourselves of our superfluities for the supply of others' necessities, we must 
uphold a familiar commerce together in all meekness, gentleness, patience, 
and liberality, we must delight in each other, make others' conditions our 
own, rejoice together, mourn together, labor and suffer together, always 
having before our eyes our commission and community in the work, our 
community as members of the same body So shall we keep the unity of the 
spirit in the bond of peace.6 
 
Thus Winthrop offers one of the earliest Christian articulations of life together in the 
context of what would become the United States. His short essay presents many of the 
themes that will be central to the understanding of solidarity developed in this 
dissertation: unity in diversity, interdependence, and the common good. Winthrop offers 
a vision that, though unabashedly Christian, remains an ideal for a pluralistic and secular 
nation. Amidst diversity, the survival and potential greatness of our nation rests upon our 
ability to work together in unity for common causes.  
 
Alexis de Tocqueville: 1835-1840 
 Writing 150 years later, Alexis de Tocqueville recognized the promise and peril 
of the American experiment, hailing the Puritan ideal encapsulated in Winthrop’s essay 
as an essential element of the success of any democracy. Commissioned to travel the 
United States for the purpose of studying the American penal and correctional system on 
behalf of the French government, de Tocqueville used the nine-month trip as an 
opportunity to examine the democratic political system that was still tentatively moving 
forward in his native country. The resulting record of his observations, Democracy in 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
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America quickly became a classic in political philosophy that captured the spirit of the 
times and identified many of the core challenges that the nation still faces today. 7  
 The core question that occupied Tocqueville’s study was: why was it that 
America’s implementation of democracy had been so successful while France’s first 
experiment had failed? The future of democracy itself, Tocqueville did not question. 
Regardless of whether or not it was the optimal political structure was not Tocqueville’s 
primary question. Rather, he viewed democracy as an “irresistible revolution” and 
unavoidable progression in history.8 The question was not whether democracy should be 
implemented, but how it could be done successfully. Tocqueville’s insights were gathered 
and originally published in two volumes, the first being more descriptive in content, 
tracing the historical origins and contemporary practices of American democracy. While 
there is much that Tocqueville finds admirable in this unfolding legacy, he also identifies 
distinct challenges as well as outright atrocities perpetuated by the young republic. The 
treatment of native populations and blacks (both slave and free) were particularly 
problematic. The second volume, published five years later, focuses much more on the 
institution of democracy itself and less on America in particular. The focus here is not so 
much on the contributing factors toward establishing a democracy, but rather the effects 
of democracy on the people themselves. This volume reflects the shifting political 
context of Tocqueville’s France in the brief period of time between the two volumes. The 
fear for Tocqueville was no longer the tyranny of the majority, but their apathy.  
                                                 
7 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Wordsworth Classics of World 
Literature), ed. Francis Bowen, trans. Henry Reeve (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1998). 
8 Ibid., 8. 
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Tocqueville traces the establishment of a democratic republic to the earliest 
settlers, who, he observes, “differed from each other in many respects; their aim was not 
the same, and they governed themselves on different principles.”9 Yet common roots in 
England provided significant areas of shared experience and outlook. One common 
language is itself an immediate advantage. Likewise, shared experiences of religious 
intolerance in England engendered within the colonies an appreciation for the protection 
that laws can provide. As Tocqueville notes, “The happy and the powerful do not go into 
exile, and there are no surer guarantees of equality among men than poverty and 
misfortune.”10 Yet, the colonies also enjoyed a higher level of education than their 
European compatriots.11 Similarly, geographic realities such as the lack of powerful 
neighboring nations ensured the relative stability of the growing political community. 
The establishment of American democracy finds its roots in such common 
history, but is secured by two mutually edifying constructs: its founding structures of 
governance and the character of its citizens. The principle documents of the United States 
are undoubtedly marvels of political innovation. The Federal Constitution in its 
protection of rights and balance of powers earns high esteem from Tocqueville. Yet it is 
in the society’s mores and “habits of heart” that he finds the Union’s greatest democratic 
strength.12 These customs include a love for equality and individualism as moral ideals. 
They are exercised, he argues in public associations and civil activities.  
In both volumes, Tocqueville is keenly aware of religion’s role in shaping the 
democratic character of the United States. This is certainly true among those tracing their 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 13. 
10 Ibid., 14. 
11 Ibid., 19. 
12 Ibid., 117. 
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heritage to Puritan denominations and the Church of England. Indeed, Tocqueville credits 
the plurality of denominations itself as a source of democratic commitment.13 Yet, his 
esteem for the democratic ethos of the Catholic minority is perhaps the most surprising 
observation. Doctrinally, “the Catholic faith places all human capacities upon the same 
level; it subjects the wise and ignorant, the man of genius and the vulgar crowd, to the 
details of the same creed…it confounds all the distinctions of society at the foot of the 
same altar, even as they are confounded in the sight of God.”14 Beyond doctrine, this 
inclination toward equality is rooted in two inequalities. The first is within Catholicism 
itself, in which there lies a sharp distinction between the laity and the ordained. All other 
marks of distinction (wealth, standing, occupation) are overshadowed by this separation 
of higher and lower forms of life. Second and externally, as an untrusted minority, 
American Catholics recognized that their fortunes were largely dependent upon the 
flourishing of democratic institutions. 
Tocqueville again takes up the question of religion in the first book of his second 
volume. Here Tocqueville begins by noting the absence of philosophical thought in the 
United States.15 Citizens do not reflect on principles and insights of Enlightenment 
rationality because they live it each day. One such principle Americans have embraced is 
the autonomy and freedom of the individual. Each person thus believes himself or herself 
to be the final arbiter of truth. Tocqueville thus sees religion as furnishing a limiting 
capacity to this radical freedom, providing an absolute foundation and narrower 
boundaries of free exercise. Yet Tocqueville also believes that the freedom and equality 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 119. 
14 Ibid., 118–119. 
15 Ibid., 179. 
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to which democracy aspires is impossible without dogmatic belief.16 This function of 
religion becomes more clear when we appreciate the principle concerns Tocqueville 
develops in the second volume. 
In his earlier writing, Tocqueville’s greatest concern was the tyranny of the 
majority: “I am not so much alarmed at the excessive liberty which reigns in that country 
as at the inadequate securities which one finds there against tyranny.”17 A political 
structure designed to reflect the will of the majority offers no protection to the minority. 
This concern remains and is particularly reflected in his esteem for the vital role of the 
press in a democracy.18 Yet after witnessing the struggles of his native France, 
Tocqueville’s concern in the second volume shifted to the ‘soft despotism’ that a 
democracy can engender. As opposed to ‘hard’ despotism, the risk that Tocqueville 
struggles to articulate is that of a government subtly disempowering and alienating 
citizens from each other and from greater shared endeavors. “Such a power,” Tocqueville 
argues, “does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannise [sic], but it 
compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to 
nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is 
the shepherd.”19 
The root of this soft despotism is not the malice of officials but the limited 
aspirations of the populace. Though Tocqueville believes that citizens of democracy have 
a natural appreciation for freedom, their passion, he argues, is for equality: “They will 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 182. 
17 Ibid., 101. 
18 Ibid., 364. 
19 Ibid., 359. 
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endure poverty, servitude, barbarism, but the will not endure aristocracy.”20 So long as 
one believes oneself to be held in equal regard to his or her neighbor, higher forms of 
active participation are often disregarded. Such is the particular danger of democratic 
individualism. Dislodged from the social hierarchies of aristocracy, democratic citizens 
recognize no implicit duty or responsibility to those above, below, or near them. Thus 
individualism “disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the mass 
of his fellows and to draw apart with his family and his friends, so that after he has 
formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself.”21 As social 
conditions become more equal, an increasing percentage of the population find that, 
though they are not rich, they have enough to pursue their private ends with no need to 
engage their neighbor: 
They owe nothing to any man, they expect nothing from any man; they 
acquire the habit of always considering themselves as standing alone, and 
they are apt to imagine that their whole destiny is in their own 
hands…Thus…democracy…throws him back forever upon himself alone 
and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his 
own heart.22 
 
Though individualism and the soft despotism it engenders are central concerns to 
Tocqueville, he steadfastly insists that these outcomes are far greater than those that any 
alternative political system could provide. Moreover, Tocqueville identifies three sources 
of resistance to the negative effects of individualism. The first is the existence of free 
political institutions themselves.23 In particular, Tocqueville is appreciative of the lowest 
and most local levels of politics and civil engagement such as town hall meetings. It is at 
                                                 
20 Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Wordsworth Classics of World Literature), 201. 
21 Ibid., 205. 
22 Ibid., 206–207. 
23 Ibid., 210. 
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these immediate levels that one’s stake in the political process is most easily recognized. 
Second, Tocqueville applauds the pervasiveness of public associations which afford 
citizens the opportunity to gather together around a myriad of projects and concerns: 
“They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies…but associations of a 
thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or 
diminutive.”24 More than any other nation, the United States seems to particularly foster 
these associations in Tocqueville’s view. He attributes this directly the American sense of 
democratic equality. Whereas in aristocracy there is a clear distinction between the 
powerful and the powerless, in America social influence flows to those that are most able 
to organize and coordinate human energy. 
Beyond political institutions and public associations, Tocqueville thirdly 
attributes much of the mitigation of individualism to the “principle of self-interest rightly 
understood.”25 In aristocratic times there was much talk of the virtue of altruism, though 
it is in doubt whether such talk came to fruition. In a democracy, however, such praise for 
self-sacrifice has ceased. In its place, Tocqueville notes, “They therefore content 
themselves with inquiring whether the personal advantage of each member of the 
community does not consist in working for the good of all; and when they have hit upon 
some point on which private interest and public interest meet and amalgamate, they are 
eager to bring it into notice.”26 The emphasis thus shifts to the utility of social virtue and 
its necessity for achieving one’s own end.  
                                                 
24 Ibid., 215. 
25 Ibid., 229. 
26 Ibid. 
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While this sense of enlightened self-interest undoubtedly serves to bring 
individuals together around a common cause, it is far from the rich vision of life together 
than Winthrop first articulated. Yet even this thin measure of mutuality is vulnerable to 
neglect and decline. The legacy of Tocqueville’s writings is rooted not only in their apt 
observations of America during his travel, but their keen perception of the themes and 
challenges that we continue to face today. The central role of associations and religion, 
and the threat of democratic lethargy continue to be central concerns of sociologist. 
Above all, the priority of the individual and the privatized vision of the good remain 
central to the American identity. What Tocqueville first recognized as threats to the 
common good nearly 200 years ago remain critical issues today. 
 
1.2. Contemporary Declines in Social Capital 
 The social trends and challenges of individualism that Tocqueville first articulated 
in the late 1800s have been verified by contemporary sociological research today. 
Beyond philosophical speculation, there is concrete evidence of both the withdrawal of 
US citizens from the public sphere and the negative effects of this shift. At the forefront 
of this research is Robert Putnam, who offers the image of social capital as an apt 
description of what the United States is losing: 
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Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital 
refers to properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections 
among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely 
related to what some have called “civic virtue.” The difference is that 
“social capital” calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful 
when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations. A 
society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in 
social capital.27 
While Putnam is not the first to coin the term, he is largely responsible for its popular 
usage in contemporary conversation surrounding civic participation. As with other forms 
of capital, social capital plays an essential role in achieving the ends we value.  
In Bowling Alone, his essential and most pervasive treatment of the topic, Putnam 
traces the decline of social capital in two related realms. The first is the large scale 
withdrawal of Americans28 from the formal and informal networks of civic engagement 
that have traditionally brought us closer together as a community and into greater contact 
with those that are unlike us (what Putnam respectively identifies as the ‘bonding’ and 
‘bridging’ functions of social capital).29 Contrary to what the book title implies, we are 
still bowling with others, but it is with select and exclusive relations rather than though 
organized leagues that bring us into contact with a diverse spectrum of our towns and 
cities. The second decline Putnam traces is more focused on social disposition. In 
particular, Putnam recognizes a decline in social trust. Americans no longer believe that 
their contributions to society will be reciprocated. 
                                                 
27 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community, 1st ed. (Touchstone Books by Simon & Schuster, 2001), 19. 
28 I am cognizant of the fact that the term ‘American’ can be applied to more than those 
living in the United States. With other references to US citizen often being too 
cumbersome however, I will employ this term at times. 
29 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 2–23. 
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 Before examining these trends more closely, it is important to recognize a critical 
insight offered within this definition of social capital. Putnam’s comparison of social 
capital to popular conceptions of civic virtue or citizenship offers what will become an 
essential theme in the current study. Putnam suggests most theories of civic virtue focus 
on the moral character of the individual agent: one’s personal inclination toward 
contributing to the common good of society. Yet he rightly notes that such sentiments 
and dispositions, no matter how genuine, can only achieve a limited degree of success 
without broader social and institutional mechanisms of support. It is within networks of 
relations that civic virtue best effects meaningful change within society.30 
 Putnam does not feign objective neutrality on the subject, but nevertheless 
demonstrates that declines in social capital are troubling in more ways than vague notions 
of social harmony. Networks of social relations and social trust have practical and 
empirical benefits for society. As Putnam notes, “social capital makes us smarter, 
healthier, safer, richer and better able to govern a just and stable democracy.”31 By the 
most empirical and economic measurements, America’s decline in civic participation 
bears a real cost to society. The discussion is not simply a matter of subjective preference 
for different models of social living. Beyond these measures, Putnam identifies three 
particular benefits of social capital.32 First, social capital helps communities come 
together to face and resolve shared conflicts and challenges. Cooperation is easier and 
                                                 
30 The emphasis on structures of virtue developed in Chapters Four and following are 
rooted in this insight. Too often, educating for justice implies striving to create moral 
giants that are capable of withstanding all of the destructive patterns and norms that shape 
our reality, including those found in Catholic higher education. My interest is in how we 
can shape our social context and network of relationship in such a way that acting on 
behalf of justice is easier and more effective.  
31 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 290. 
32 Ibid., 288. 
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more likely where there are pre-established networks of relationships. Second, social 
capital provides resources for faster and more stable development. Beyond individual 
brilliance, innovation relies upon supporting infrastructure and is fostered by networks of 
collaboration. 
 A third benefit is an increasing awareness of our interdependence: “social capital 
improves our lot…by widening our awareness of the many ways in which our fates are 
linked.”33 The stronger our networks and relationships are, the more likely we are to 
recognize mutual dependence in pursuing and accomplishing our goals. Conversely, 
declining social capital makes it more difficult to recognize the necessity of social 
networks and civic virtue. Thus, one of the great ironies of declines that Putnam identifies 
is it becomes harder to recognize the value of what we are losing. This perhaps suggests 
why it is so necessary for Putnam to measure the decline in economic terms: it is the only 
measure of social value and progress upon which we can all still agree. 
 
Social Capital and Tolerance 
 Those wary of efforts to build social cohesion and participation most often point 
to what has been gained during this period of decline: namely a greater tolerance for the 
diversity of identities and lifestyles that exist within a pluralistic society. It would seem 
that social capital is at its strongest when mobilized against a common enemy (foreign or 
domestic), and that civic unity comes at the cost of freedom and equality. The 1950s, a 
highpoint in civic involvement was also a period of forced segregation and McCarthyism. 
Moreover, the United States was founded on the self-evident right of each individual to 
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pursue happiness however he or she perceives it. Any attempt to build consensus around 
a particular vision of common life risks violating this principle. 
 In response to this position, it must be acknowledged that the past century has 
witnessed a growing increase in gender and racial tolerance.34 Yet the vast majority of 
this change occurred in the first half of the twentieth century, before social capital began 
to decline. On these measures, boomers and gen-Xers are no more tolerant than the 
previous generations.35 Moreover, the most tolerant Americans today are also those that 
score highest on measures of social capital. Civic involvement and commitment to 
common causes bring individuals into contact with a diversity of people with whom they 
would otherwise not interact. The only exception to this that Putnam could find was those 
heavily involved in fundamentalist churches.36 Withdrawal from civic life and common 
projects does nothing to make us more tolerant. It only shields us from the sort of direct 
encounters that provide opportunities for transforming our worldview. As Putnam aptly 
summarizes, “To console ourselves that the collapse of American community has at least 
brought us a more liberal, egalitarian America is false optimism. To refrain from efforts 
to rebuild community for fear that such efforts will lead inevitably to intolerance and 
injustice is false pessimism.”37 Whether the motivation is economic productivity or social 
tolerance, social capital is a benefit to our society. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 356. 
35 Ibid., 357. 
36 Ibid., 356. 
37 Ibid., 360. 
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Indications of Decline 
 Though Putnam’s research is largely concerned with contemporary declines in 
social capital, it is important to recognize that these social trends are not inevitable or 
historically determined. The history of the United States has witnessed several periods of 
both increase and decline in social capital.38 Indeed, one reason that the contemporary 
decline is so perceptible is the peak in social capital that the United States experienced in 
the mid-twentieth century. Through changing social and economic contexts, communities 
have determined new ways of coming together to achieve social goods. This history 
should give us reason to hope that such periods of renewal are possible again in the 
future. 
 The narrative of social capital’s decline that Putnam offers is largely articulated 
through a review of empirical research identifying declines in key indicators of civic 
participation and social trust. Through this multitude of studies, important themes 
emerge. The vacuums created by civic withdrawal do not remain for long. New 
institutions and mechanisms soon emerge that often bear a resemblance to former 
networks of relationships but frequently lack the intimate involvement of former 
activities. So, for example, Putnam traces the decline of political participation through a 
number of metrics. Americans today vote at lower rates,39 demonstrate less political 
knowledge,40 and are less involved in political campaigns and local government 
activities.41 In lieu of these forms of citizens’ participation, a small professional class of 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 25. 
39 Ibid., 32. 
40 Ibid., 35. 
41 Ibid., 35–45. 
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political activists has become increasingly influential.42 More and more, political 
participation has been reduced to financial donations to political parties and special 
interest groups.  
 A similar dynamic has occurred among the other forms of association that 
Tocqueville recognized as so essential to American democracy. In the past, the most 
common response of Americans to social challenges was the formation of free 
associations which could mobilize human capital toward the achievement of a mutually 
agreed upon goal. From neighborhood associations and the PTA to the Knights of 
Columbus, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed an explosion of thousands of 
membership organizations.43 While the motivation behinds these groups varied, they 
maintained a few distinguishing characteristics that set them apart from the nonprofit 
associations of contemporary society. Principally, these organizations were focused on 
the local and grassroots level. While they may be overseen by a national structure, the 
emphasis is primarily on the direct experience and participation of members. Members 
attended local meetings in which they came face to face with both neighbors and 
(frequently) those with whom they would otherwise not interact.  
 As participation in such membership organizations declined in the second half of 
the twentieth century, a new form of association arose: the nonprofit advocacy 
organization (such as the Sierra Club and Focus on the Family). While these groups 
continue the tradition of organizing resources around a set of mutual concerns, the 
approach differs in significant ways from past associations. From local chapters, these 
organizations place the emphasis on national offices staffed by professional advocates. 
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Indeed, the threshold for membership in these organizations is frequently the simple 
donation of money. Deeper forms of participation are seldom expected and often not 
possible. As with political participation, these organizations set a very low bar for 
participation and lack the opportunities for deeper involvement or interaction with other 
members. Further, both groups frequently limit their field of concern to a very narrow 
range of issues. Associations can be formed around topics as narrow as the preservation 
of a single endangered species or the passage of a single ballot initiative. What these 
organizations lack is a broader and more comprehensive vision of the social good. Their 
interests compete with others for a limited share of public resources with no richer vision 
of life together. 
 These dynamics give a particular form to volunteering and charitable giving in the 
United States today. Rates of giving and volunteers in the United States remain relatively 
high in comparison to the Americans in the past as well as other countries today.44 Yet 
the shape of these forms of engagement has shifted. This can already be seen with the 
shift to donations as the primary form of participation. As with membership in 
associations, charitable giving steadily increased through the depression and post-WWII 
periods, but declined through periods of booms and busts since then.45 Shifting trends in 
volunteering present a much more complicated picture of American’s sense of social 
responsibility and participation. On the one hand, rates of volunteering have steadily 
increased in recent decades.46 Yet over that same period, participation in community 
projects has decreased. While Americans continue to give of their times and talents, they 
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are more frequently imagining this as the work of an individual doing something for 
someone else, not coming together as a collective around a common goal or challenge. 
As Putnam argues, “Social capital refers to networks of social connection – doing with. 
Doing good for other people, however laudable, is not part of the definition of social 
capital.47 As with donating to charitable causes, volunteering is undoubtedly a social 
good, yet it lacks the deeper forms of relationship and interaction that create common 
bonds. 
 
1.3. Social Capital and Religion 
 Rates of philanthropy volunteering, and many other measures of social capital are 
closely linked to Americans’ shifting relationship with organized religion. Indeed, with 
education, religion is the strongest correlate with civic engagement.48 Like other forms of 
association, active participation in parishes and congregations peaked in the 1950s and 
has since declined. Among these organizations, religion stands out as an “incubator” of 
the skills and interests that help democracies operate effectively.49 It is in coordinating 
parish picnics and identifying new pastors that the skills of political participation are 
cultivated. Local churches also served as the avenues through which many citizens’ 
charitable impulses were channeled. Thus declines in giving and volunteering are often 
linked to declines in religious participation. Americans are dropping out of faith 
communities but are not redirecting their time and money to other forms of civic 
engagement. 
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 The question of secularization in modern society is complex, particular in the 
United States, and can only be treated briefly at present. Contrary to the far simpler 
narrative of decline in the belief and practice of Western Europeans, the United States has 
seemingly retained much of its religiosity in the face of modern challenges. In national 
surveys, reports of belief in God and the importance of faith have declined only slightly 
over the past century.50 The declines experienced are not in belief, but participation. Even 
here, some caveats must be made. While there are some difficulties in assessing religious 
membership and participation,51 studies indicate a decline in both private and public 
religious activities.52 Affiliation has likewise decreased, with more and more respondents 
indicating ‘none’ as their faith identity.53  
Yet shifts in the religious landscape of the United States cannot be measured by 
head counts alone. Research indicates that while many are dropping out of organized 
religion entirely, still others are changing denominations and faith communities. Putnam 
is particularly attentive to the resurgence in Evangelical Christianity over the second half 
of the twentieth century. While mainline protestant communities have declined and 
Latino Catholic have replaced departing white Catholics, Evangelical Christianity has 
been on the rise. Relying on Robert Wuthnow, Putnam asserts that though these 
congregations offer a strong sense of community (often a principle motivation for 
joining), they place the focus on individual piety rather than social transformation.54 The 
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community that one joins is more insular and unengaged with the larger societal picture. 
Since the publication of Bowling Alone, Evangelical churches have begun to decline as 
well.55 
 
Religion’s Decline 
Putnam dedicates a full chapter to the question of religion in Bowling Alone, but 
the question receives a book-length treatment in his follow-up, American Grace: How 
Religion Divides and Unites Us.56 Here Putnam and Campbell trace the shifts in 
American religion since the Civil Rights Movement (a time in which religious 
congregations were at the forefront of societal change). As with Bowling Alone, this 
objective was pursued largely through a review of national surveys as well as 
administration of their own Faith Matters Survey.57 This work is complemented by a 
series of vignettes compiled through observations and interviews with particular 
communities. This multiplicity of sources creates a richer view of American religiosity 
than any single measure alone could provide. 
The narrative Putnam and Campbell offer is one of an initial shock followed by 
two aftershocks, each of which was largely a reaction against the preceding period. Thus, 
while there has been some measurable decline in religious participation, particularly from 
generation to generation,58 this change has been very slow. Before exploring these 
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massive shifts, it is worth remembering that the preceding decade was noteworthy for its 
own reasons. The 1950s were themselves and aberration in American history. As noted 
above, the post-war period marked a high point for civic and political participation. 
Likely itself a response to World War II and the angst of the Cold War, this decade was a 
zenith of religious participation and what Robert Bellah identifies as civil religion.59 As 
returning soldiers received an education through the GI Bill and settled into new 
suburban neighborhoods, “religious attendance was less an act of piety than an act of 
civic duty.”60 In the face of ‘Godless Communism’, religious attendance became a central 
way of life. While these activities occurred in traditional congregations, the 
denominational lines (particularly among mainline protestant religions) were well on 
their way to breaking down in favor of a common and vague sense of religiosity. It was 
this period of tranquility that would give rise to the turbulence that would follow. 
It would be impossible to trace every factor contributing to the upheaval of what 
Putnam dubs “the long Sixties,”61 let alone to judge the moral merit of changes taking 
place. Yet the core shift that occurred, in Putnam’s purview, radically transformed the 
location of religion in American society and shaped the civic conversation for the 
decades that would follow. The defining characteristic of this period, according to 
Putnam, was the willingness and drive of the youth to call into question institutions of 
any sort – from government and religion to sexual mores. Far from passive withdrawal, 
suspicion of these organizations and customs gave rise to overt assaults on their 
legitimacy. Yet though this period and these attacks shaped all of society, they were only 
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instigated by a portion of the population. Thus the long Sixties were not so much a period 
of universal shifts in belief as they were a time of polarization. It was not that everyone 
suddenly doubted the legitimacy of the church, state, or particular prohibitions; it was 
that a sufficiently large segment of the population did so as to require that the issue be 
faced as a nation. 
The two aftershocks reflect shifting views of religion in response to this 
polarization. The first, the rise of Evangelicalism, can be viewed largely as a return to a 
more conservative worldview and religious observation. Regarding this familiar 
narrative, however, Putnam offers two cautions. First, in terms of concrete numbers, only 
about five percent of the population actually converted to an Evangelical denomination 
during the period in question (the 1970s and 1980s).62 The apparent ascendancy of 
Evangelicalism only seems as such due to the mass exodus from Liberal Protestantism at 
the time. Though gains were real, this ascendancy was much more one of Evangelicals 
claiming a position of strength amidst others’ declines. Second, the rise of 
Evangelicalism was a historical period that is now behind us. New conversions have 
stalled and gross numbers are now declining.  
While the chain of causation in any of these demographic shifts is difficult to 
discern, empirical data points to some conclusions over other. There is evidence, for 
example, that some of the increase was simply demographic: Evangelicals as a cohort 
raise more children and demonstrate a greater commitment to passing the faith on to 
them.63 When conversions do occur, the reasons may be more a function of liturgical 
innovation than theological persuasiveness. In the religious free market of the United 
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States, Evangelical churches were the quickest to adapt to new technology, media, and 
cultural trends. The product that these churches provided – the experience of worship and 
community – was simply preferred over mainline Protestant (and Catholic) offerings.64 
Yet, the greatest predictor of who would become Evangelical was where one 
stood on social issues.65 Amidst the social and political upheaval of the second half of the 
twentieth century, those who held conservative views or whose view shifted to become 
more conservative were likewise those most likely to become Evangelical. A word of 
caution concerning cause and effect is again necessary. Other variables may be 
responsible for apparent causation. For example, someone living in the South was both 
more likely to oppose racial intermarriage and to become Evangelical. Discerning which 
lead to the other, or if they are related at all would require a much deeper and more 
qualitative examination. Nevertheless, it can be said clearly that those most concerned 
about the moral confusion and changes of the long Sixties were the ones most likely to 
appear in an Evangelical pew by the 1980s. 
The second aftershock, which the United States is still experiencing, is in 
Putnam’s view a direct response to Evangelicalism’s ascendancy. The ‘rise of the nones,’ 
the growing percentage of Americans who profess no religious affiliation, can be viewed 
as a direct response to the success of Evangelicals.66 By seizing the mantle from mainline 
Protestantism as the most dominant religious voice in the political and cultural 
conversation, Evangelical leaders largely became the implicit image of all institutional 
religion. Thus for those opposed to Evangelicalism’s attempt to promote its moral vision 
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in the public realm, there was no distinction between conservative Evangelicalism and 
religion as a whole. Regardless of attempts to modernize or adapt to changing mores by 
mainline churches, many youth seemed to assume that the only way to reject 
Evangelicalism’s social positions was to reject all institutional religion. Just as 
Evangelicals present a particular political profile, there are some telling correlations 
among those most likely to disaffiliate from organized religion. Acceptance of marijuana 
and homosexuality are especially strong predictors of disaffiliation.67 Thus, a historically 
tolerant and permissive generation came of age just as religion was being defined by its 
least tolerant and permissive segment. If this was what being religious meant, youth were 
certain that they were not interested. 
These two aftershocks compose much of the predominant religious landscape 
today. Amidst the polarization and culture clashes of the 1960s, one’s religious stance 
became an expression of one’s political sensibility. These extremes, Evangelicalism and 
no affiliation, accounted for an increasing segment of the population. As Putnam notes, in 
1973, Evangelicals and the ‘nones’ accounted for 30% of the US population.68 By 2008, 
they comprised 41% of the overall population. Moreover, recent surveys of the Millennial 
Generation find more than 30% of youths reporting no religious affiliation.69 In this way, 
mainline and moderate faith is giving way to one of two extremes. The choice for many 
today seems to be between a politically aggressive and conservative form of Christianity 
or no religion at all. 
 
                                                 
67 Putnam and Campbell, American Grace, 130. 
68 Ibid., 106. 
69 White, The Rise of the Nones. 
 40 
The Effects of the Decline on Social Capital 
One can easily recognize this impact of such developments on religion’s role in 
relation to social capital. Previously one of America’s great incubators of social capital 
and civic virtue, an increasing share of the population is either identifying with a form of 
Christianity that focuses more on individual piety than the common good or dropping out 
of any form of organized religion in the name of tolerance. Yet it bears repeating that 
most often, the roots of this shift are not primarily theological in origin. For the most part, 
religious affiliation seems to reflect and follow broader sociological trends rather than the 
inverse. The shift to Evangelicalism and subsequent rise in the religiously disaffiliated 
were reflections of increased polarization and changes in cultural worldview.  
This presents both an opportunity and a challenge to anyone interested in the 
vitality of religion in the public sphere. One the one hand, the decline of religious 
practice does not indicate a decline in belief or spiritual longing. This impulse has 
remained relatively high in the United States (the infamous ‘spiritual but not religious’ 
phenomenon).70 Yet if the impetus behind the shifts and declines of religious practice are 
not at their root theological, it is difficult to discern how and to what extent theology 
alone can drive a renewal. In other words, if ‘poor’ theology is not at the root of our 
contemporary challenge, why should we assume that ‘good’ theology could offer the 
necessary corrective?  
Though these trends reflect broader social movements, it would not be accurate to 
assume that theological outlook has nothing to do with the rise of Evangelicalism or the 
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rise of the nones. According to Putnam’s narrative, those who were uncomfortable with 
the uncertainties and shifting moral stances of the long Sixties were able to find a more 
appealing theological horizon in Evangelicalism. Those adverse to the theological vision 
Evangelicalism presented assumed it to be representative of all religion. What was 
lacking in the public sphere (or at least US citizens’ perception) was a religious voice that 
better articulated their moral intuitions. 
One insight that seems quite clear from this survey of Putnam’s work and the 
shifting demographics of religion in America is the fact that we can no longer view one’s 
denomination or religious affiliation as a static category. Religion as an inherited aspect 
of one’s identity is giving way to a free market in which one may choose the 
congregation that most accurately reflects his or her sensibilities or may opt out of 
organized religion entirely. While theistic belief remains largely a default position in the 
United States, participation in a particular community does not. As we have seen, the 
religious stance toward which many gravitate is often an expression of deeper political or 
social stances. The constitutional separation of church and state has created a free market 
in which those communities and churches that best respond to the needs and sensibilities 
of the people thrive, while those that do not adapt pass away. 
 
At this point, Putnam has helped us to establish two links between religion and 
social capital. Already in Bowling Alone, Putnam demonstrates that the more religiously 
active are also more civically engaged. Again in American Grace, Putnam cites abundant 
evidence that the religiously active make better neighbors: they are more generous with 
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their time and money,71 more active in civic and political life,72 and more likely to give 
and receive trust.73 Second and relatedly, Putnam demonstrates that the contemporary 
declines in social capital have occurred concurrently with declines is religious 
participation. What has not yet been established is the relationship between the two. Is the 
decline in a more general sense of social capital leading to a decline in religious 
participation? Can the drop in social participation and trust be attributed to America’s 
declining religiousness? The strongest evidence points to both declines being symptoms 
of a more fundamental shift in the American mindset and outlook. 
 
Roots of Social Capital’s Decline 
When Putnam takes up the question of why social capital is in decline, he focuses 
principally measurable changes in demographics, technology, and social context. While 
these measures are more reliably testable, pinpointing the direction of causality can be 
difficult. Nevertheless, many common assumptions about the decline of social capital can 
be quickly dismissed. Changes in traditional family structure have little impact on civic 
engagement,74 as does suburban sprawl.75 While less time and money is often the excuse 
offered for these declines, it is worth noting that it is in fact the busiest people that are 
also the most civically engaged.76 Nor can the blame lie with big government squeezing 
out informal and traditional networks of civic participation and relationships. In fact, 
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measures of social capital among Western democracies are highest in Scandinavian, 
where welfare spending is also highest.77  
One surprising source of social change is media technology; namely, the 
television, to which Putnam attributes as much as 25% of the decline in measures of 
social capital. Historically, the appearance of television sets in America’s media 
landscape drastically changed how Americans used their leisure time. Still today, the roll 
that television entertainment plays in a household (in terms of both the types of program 
and the amount) will largely determine everything from political outlook to the frequency 
of volunteering. The impact of this technology raises critical questions about the role and 
influence of the internet. Writing at the turn of the century, Putnam’s answers are 
uncertain and already dated. Yet he does raise a critical question that we have yet to 
answer: “Will the Internet in practice turn out to be a niftier telephone or a niftier 
television? In other words, will the Internet become predominantly a means of active, 
social communication or a means of passive, private entertainment?”78 As time and 
technology progress, this remains an active question. While video conferencing makes 
face-to-face conversations across the globe possible, text messaging supplants the 
minimal intimacy of voice calls. On the one hand, it has never been easier to sign an 
online petition, donate to an environmental cause, or share a news article from a remote 
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region of the world.79 Yet such activities fail to foster the deeper networks of relations 
that traditional forms of civic participation promoted. 
 One of the challenges in identifying the sources of this shift in civic participation 
is determining to what extent the changes are generational. How much of the decline in 
social capital is attributable to changes within a single generational cohort and how much 
is the reflection of a particularly civilly-minded generation giving way to one that is less 
involved? As noted earlier, social capital reaching a peak in the middle of the twentieth 
century as the ‘Greatest Generation’ returned from war and engaged in the social and 
religious associations that defined American life at the time. Identifying that the Baby 
Boomers and subsequent generations failed to meet the high civic bar raised by this 
generation explains much of the decline (a figure Putnam puts at 50%),80 but adds little to 
our understanding of why a change could occur so rapidly from one generation to the 
next. Interactions between generational shifts and other historical changes (such as the 
Boomers’ growing in a household with a television set or the ubiquity of technology in 
the life of Millennials) makes such measurements all the more difficult. Recognizing that 
much of the decline in social capital can be traced to passing of a civically minded 
generation and the ascendance of one that is much more individualistic does little explain 
why such drastic changes could occur in such a brief period of time. Why now? What 
aspects of the Western and American worldview make such a sudden disengagement 
from civic life possible? Answering this questions requires that we look deeper to the 
moral traditions that shape our culture. 
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1.4 Individualism and the Moral Roots of Social Capital’s Decline 
Other sociologists have attempted to offer a more interpretive and qualitative 
analysis of the shifts in participation and practice that Putnam identifies. Most famously, 
Robert Bellah and colleagues in Habits of the Heart offer a rich portrait of American 
civic life through the lens of individualism, which they trace back to Tocqueville’s 
introduction of the term. The project, as they define it, is “social science as public 
philosophy.”81 Rather than striving for the value free objectivity of natural sciences (an 
idea which itself has been called into questions), Bellah’s work aims to construct a 
narrative portrait that combines survey data and personal interviews with history and 
philosophy. The result is a sweeping look at American life and the way in which various 
moral traditions have developed through time and influenced the particular brand of 
American individualism.  
In the introduction to the work, Bellah directly cites Putnam’s notion of social 
capital as a principle interest.82 Yet rather than attending to broad sociological trends as 
Putnam does, Bellah and colleague strive for a more qualitative picture of contemporary 
American life. In particular, they trace the moral traditions that remain central to the 
American identity. Though these resources play a vital role, their function is seldom 
directly recognized. Indeed, a central insight of the text is the fact that we are often 
unable to articulate our values or their origins: “For most of us, it is easier to think about 
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how to get what we want than to know what exactly we should want.”83 Rather, these 
traditions provide the background language and imagery from which we draw in 
articulating our sense of self, society, and world. 
Bellah and colleagues believe that four traditions continue to map the moral 
landscape of the United States. The first, Biblical tradition is traced back to John 
Winthrop and the original Puritan colonies. Critically, Winthrop governed with a 
substantive vision of the common good and justice rooted in Christian theology. In 
contrast, Bellah identifies the Republican tradition of Thomas Jefferson which refused to 
acknowledge any particular vision of the good and strove for a government rooted in 
procedural justice. While this tradition held to a strict vision of equality as the core value, 
it nevertheless recognized the necessity of active participation for ensuring the proper 
function of the young democracy. Thus, while every citizen was free to envision and 
pursue her or his own notion of the good, each was nevertheless obliged to participate in 
the structures and associations that made such a pursuit possible. 
Though these two traditions disagreed fundamentally about their vision of a just 
society, their shared interest in common life formed the foundation of America’s 
participatory democracy. Bellah notes that the Biblical and Republican traditions were 
each individualistic in their own way – both prizing the autonomy of the individual, yet 
they nevertheless recognized the good of community life. In contrast, the third and fourth 
moral traditions lack such an appreciation for common civic life. For Utilitarian 
Individualism, exemplified by Benjamin Franklin, goods are measured in purely private 
terms, with society and its institutions serving an instrumental purpose. Partially in 
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response to this materialist outlook, the Romantics developed an Expressive 
Individualism that sought meaning and values beyond acquisition. Yet this new moral 
vision shared the Utilitarian emphasis on the individual with no sense of common life.  
While all four traditions are still present in contemporary American life, it is these 
two latter forms of individualism that hold the greatest sway over our contemporary 
identities. Through hundreds of interviews with middle class Americans, the influence of 
American individualism becomes clear. The American narrative is one of leaving home, 
finding oneself, and becoming a success. Most often, these markers of a meaningful life 
are articulated in negative terms: breaking away from the communities and institutions 
that have formed us so that we can somehow become more authentically ourselves. Yet 
ironically, with nothing more than a sparse moral vision to draw from, these quests for 
unique self-expression are often reduced to utilitarian acquisition. We come to believe (or 
are often convinced by marketing campaigns) that the possession of particular goods or 
markers of financial security will ensure authentic self-realization.84 
Bellah and colleagues believe that this dual quest for self-expression and 
utilitarian acquisition explains much of our withdrawal from public life. Just as 
Tocqueville predicted, Americans have achieved a level of stability and comfort that 
allows them to neglect broader social projects. We have not abandoned social relations all 
together, but are more frequently withdrawing to “lifestyle enclaves” – segmented social 
groupings based largely on consumption and leisure pursuits.85 While these enclaves 
provide a sense of community beyond familial, religious, or racial boundaries, they are in 
fact deeply expressive of our individualized and privatized notion of self. We attach 
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ourselves to an enclave that we believe best expresses and supports our unique identity 
but that does not require anything of us in return. Perhaps the purest form of a lifestyle 
enclave is a romantic relationship, in which we seek that one person who will recognize 
and affirm the unique self behind all of our public roles and social roots. Unfortunately, 
like other lifestyle enclaves, these relationships are often viewed in instrumental terms, 
and are freely discarded when they no longer serve their purpose.86 
Indeed, the individualism behind these moral traditions informs our approach to 
both private and public roles. Even for those that remain civically involved, Bellah and 
colleagues identify the quest for self-expression and realization at the heart of their 
endeavors.87 Often, it is a desire for a meaningful life that motivates people to become 
politically active, though those activities themselves are frequently directed toward local 
projects that serve one’s own neighborhood or school.88 Indeed, even national politics is 
often a competition between differing lifestyle enclaves, each seeking the freedom and 
opportunity to better realize their particular expression of the good life. What is lacking 
from this approach to politics is a view of the good life together, in which a diversity of 
cultures and lifestyles is honored yet the possibility of life together is affirmed. 
A similar dynamic is at work in Americans’ approach to religion. Far beyond 
static categories, Bellah and colleagues recognize the fluid boundaries of denominations 
and practices. Functioning as yet one more lifestyle enclave, Americans ‘shop around’ for 
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the community that best expresses their sense of self and the transcendent. Rather than 
promoting diversity and exchange across social boundaries (economic, racial, political), 
these congregations offer one more opportunity to withdraw. Yet more and more 
frequently, individualism is not simply motivating Americans to find a spiritual 
community that affirms their sense of self; they are rather dropping out of organized 
religion all together. Bellah most famously offers the example of “Sheilaism,” the name 
which interviewee Sheila Larson assigns to her faith beyond any religion in her “own 
little voice.”89 
In even this brief overview of Bellah’s work, the parallels with Putnam’s studies 
are clear. Yet Bellah and colleagues call our attention beyond the immediate measures of 
civic trust and participation that drive Putnam’s work. These trends are in fact indicative 
of much deeper moral and cultural visions. Individualism remains the aspirational ideal in 
American society, and our withdrawal from the public sphere comes into new light 
through its lens.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has attempted to identify many of the contemporary trends and social 
practices that shape the contemporary context of the United States. This begins with 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s foundational study of American democracy. Through his travels 
and research, Tocqueville recognized that one of America’s greatest strengths, its firm 
appreciation for equality, could become its greatest weakness. Individualism has long 
been established as an essential feature of American life. The sense of mobility and self-
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determination it brings motivates the formation of associations and historical willingness 
to organize toward the accomplishment of shared goals. Yet it was also this sense of 
individualism that allowed anyone who reached a certain level of comfort to withdraw 
from society and seek only the company of friends, family, and loved ones. It was this 
tension, Tocqueville warned, that would ultimately determine the success or failure of the 
American experiment. 
 More recently, Robert Putnam has examined the decline of social capital from 
historic highs in the mid-twentieth century. Levels of civic and political participation as 
well as social trust have been in steady decline for decades. The non-governmental 
associations that Tocqueville had believed were so critical have experienced a rapid 
hemorrhaging of members. In their place, profession organization and advocacy groups 
perform many of the social and political functions that are necessary for a participatory 
democracy. These declines have been mirrored in American faith communities. While 
levels of stated belief remain high, affiliation with particular faith communities has 
declined in almost every religion and denomination. The challenge that this presents is 
not solely the concern of religious leadership. Faith communities have traditionally been 
locations in which civic virtue and social capital is fostered. From abolition to the civil 
rights movement, they have been at the forefront of social change.  
 While Putnam offers a wealth of data supporting the case for the decline of social 
capital, his research focuses mostly on identifiable generational shifts and historical 
influences. The benefits of social capital are likewise measured health and productivity. 
When Putnam turns his attention to the question of religion in the United States, he 
measures the benefits of religious participation largely in terms of the social capital it 
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creates. What is lacking from Putnam’s account is a deeper interpretation of these social 
phenomena. In one sense, this makes Putnam’s research an excellent place to begin the 
conversation. There should now be little doubt as to the benefits or decline of social 
capital. The question before us now is a more theoretical one: what are the ideas and 
ideals behind these cultural trends? How shall we understand this from a moral and 
philosophical vantage point? Bellah and colleagues begin to call our attention to the 
moral traditions and ideals behind this disengagement. The quest for self-realization 
understood in individualistic terms leads many to seek those practices and enclaves that 
will best support their individuality. If Bellah is correct, any response we may develop 
must be rooted in an analysis and understanding of these traditions and the ways in which 
they form us. It is to these questions that the next chapter is directed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Moral Roots of Social Disengagement 
 
 The focus of the preceding chapter was the weakening of social capital, the rise of 
individualism, and the implications of these trends for society at large. Robert Putnam offers a 
convincing narrative of recent declines in civic participation and social trust. These shifts are 
both reflected in and influenced by changes in American religious identification and practice. 
While Putnam does not feign scientific objectivity in his work, he likewise avoids excessive 
social speculation and theorizing. The report of declines are rooted in observable data and the 
importance of social capital is articulated through correlations with generally accepted markers 
of well-being (health, wealth, etc.). This limited scope makes Putnam’s research an excellent 
point of departure for the current study. Bellah and colleagues develop a thicker, interpretive 
framework for understanding these trends, rooted in the rise of utilitarian and expressive 
individualism. Bellah points to the moral traditions and ideals behind these movements. To truly 
understand the roots of our contemporary challenges and begin forming responses, we must 
understand the roots of these traditions and the persuasive power in our contemporary society. 
The task that will occupy this chapter is to understand the history and social theory behind these 
trends. To this end, the insights of social philosophers Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor are 
invaluable. 
 This chapter first examines the shifts that occurred throughout culture as Western society 
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passed from pre-modern to modern. While discussing some of the important historical elements 
that heralded these transitions, particular attention is given to the ways in which the shifts in 
culture were reflected in philosophy. For this task, the historical argument developed by Alasdair 
MacIntyre in After Virtue warrants particular attention.90 MacIntyre’s seminal work sparked 
fierce debates about the history and role of philosophical ethics, while also helping to herald a 
period of reawakening for virtue ethics (MacIntyre’s constructive proposals for navigating this 
context are examined and developed in Chapter Five of this dissertation). After briefly exploring 
the narrative MacIntyre offers, it is suggested that the declines in civic participation and social 
trust that Putnam identifies can be traced to the shifting and diminished role the vision of the 
good fulfills in the public life of a liberal democracy.  
 Charles Taylor will help to greatly advance this argument in the following section. 
Taylor shares with MacIntyre many perspectives and concerns common among what is often 
termed ‘communitarian’ philosophers,91 yet his conclusions and proposals differ in significant 
ways. My interest is not to examine Taylor’s political theory in a systematic way (though I find it 
more convincing on many counts); rather, I wish to highlight a distinct but related dimension of 
his thought: the moral roots of identity and belief. Taylor gives us a better articulation of how it 
feels to embody this particular social space, pointing to potential areas of engagement for moral 
educators. The framework he develops in integral to understanding his magisterial Secular Age. 
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To highlight the critical differences between MacIntyre and Taylor, this chapter concludes by 
examining the most sustained comments each author has written on the others work. 
  
2.1. MacIntyre’s Historical Narrative 
 
Our Context: Intractable Moral Disputes 
 MacIntyre begins his historical argument with “a disquieting suggestion.”92 He 
introduces the current status of moral discourse by imagining a hypothetical society that, reacting 
to series of environmental disasters, destroys and abolishes both the practice and the practitioners 
of scientific inquiry. Not only are the scientists expelled or executed, their entire method of 
investigation is itself obliterated. After such a catastrophe, any attempt at recovering the 
scientific tradition would entail little more than scraping together whatever fragments of 
journals, textbooks, and blue prints remain. Although individuals dedicated to such an 
undertaking may piece together enough splinters to give the impression of internal coherence, 
their project would lack any grasp of the context and methodology that produced the information 
in the first place. Further, and more problematic, if one’s collection of artifacts should appear to 
contradict another’s, there would be no criteria or principle that could discriminate between the 
competing claims. Ultimately, MacIntyre suggests, there would arise the argument that all such 
‘scientific’ systems are in fact subjective claims about reality with no true grounding. 
 Dire as this hypothetical account may be, MacIntyre suggests that just such a calamity 
has occurred in the field of ethical inquiry. Further, we are unable to even recognize the 
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catastrophic loss that we have experienced. Yet, the evidence for this is all too apparent and 
familiar. The central characteristics MacIntyre perceives are easily recognizable.93 In any 
number of contemporary civic debates, the conversation is marked by two equally unappealing 
attributes. First, there is an interminable quality to the conversation, with neither side willing to 
acquiesce to the other; not just on ways of proceeding, but even on the point of departure. It is 
not simply that reasoning from accepted facts leads to different conclusions; the body of 
acceptable premises and applicable principles themselves are contested. What one party views as 
glaringly obvious and unassailably determinate, another considers to have no relevance 
whatsoever in the debate. As participants become increasing entrenched, these debates are 
further characterized by their shrillness. When principled arguments fail, we reassert our position 
with increased volume, if not turning instead to more nefarious or coercive means. 
 Yet, what is particularly surprising about such contests is that each position genuinely 
believes in the universal validity of their claims. Proponents of a particular position will assert 
principles whose validity is independent of the spokesperson and that are obligatory to any 
subject. Further, the principles that are articulated give the impression of being binding on all 
individuals at any time or in any context. Indeed, these positions and principles do hold a degree 
of internal coherence and validity. Undoubtedly, a moral stance can be logically traced to 
guiding principles (be they duty, rights, or utility) with no deductive errors or fallacies. While 
they do retain an internal coherency, they are marked by what MacIntyre terms “conceptual 
incommensurability.”94 That is, though valid within themselves, they cannot be measured or 
weighed against those of another. Because these principles are primary, there is no criteria or 
viewpoint with which to evaluate objective superiority.  
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The Rise of Emotivism 
 Just as we might expect, this climate has given rise to the compelling theory of 
emotivism. As MacIntyre defines it, emotivism is “the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and 
more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of 
attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character.”95 An emotivist regards 
any evaluative statement to be nothing more than an expression of personal preference. The 
justifications underlying such a claim are nothing more than ruses to disguise the irrational 
origins of our stances. Thus, any argument for honesty or against murder are unmasked to signify 
nothing more than “honesty makes me feel good” or “Murder…yuck!” Emotivism views the 
interminable nature of our moral arguments as a natural outcome of our moral positions being in 
fact rooted in nothing more than our subjective tastes. The arguments that we sustain are meant 
only to bend the will of others to our cause. Ultimately, “emotivism entails the obliteration of 
any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations.”96 
 As a theory about the significance of moral claims, MacIntyre dismisses emotivism 
quickly. The challenge, as he sees it is not the meaning of this language, but how it is being used. 
Yet, rather than engaging the theory on the universal terms it asserts, MacIntyre examines it 
within the early twentieth century British context from which it emerged. Viewed thusly, we 
recognize the key features that bolstered emotivism’s truth claims not only in Cambridge circa 
1903, but likewise in other contexts, including our own. MacIntyre locates the inception of 
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emotivism within a period of decline in moral consensus.97 There are three periods identified in 
such deteriorations. At first, moral discussions proceed with a genuine sense of objectivity rooted 
in a shared consensus of underlying impersonal principles. Second, when this sense of shared 
standards is lost, a period of unsuccessful attempts at rooting moral conversations in new 
objective principles ensues. Yet, not only do these objective criteria fail, the very rational 
attempts to justify embracing such criteria likewise collapse. Thus thirdly, amidst the rubble a 
new theory emerges, one which claims that there were never such objective standards to begin 
with. 
 
The Decline of Ecclesial Authority and the Historical Roots of Emotivism 
 MacIntyre believes that Western civilization underwent just such a shift during its 
transition from pre-modern to modern society and subsequently from modern society into our 
emerging post-modern context. Amidst the post-Reformation religious wars and emergence of 
the nation states, Christianity was dethroned from its cultural monopoly on meaning and values. 
As any official and universal ethic became impossible to sustain, Enlightenment philosophers set 
out to ground morality in a universally recognized and accepted foundation. Religious affiliation 
and authority could no longer be taken for granted; how, then, can we justify a common code of 
behavior? 
 It is at this time that Christianity was ‘placed’ as a religion. No longer a living tradition 
that authoritatively provides the context, meaning, and narrative of one’s life, Christianity was 
reduced to a civic association. As the nation state became primary locus of identity, religion 
found its validation in the support that it could lend to the civil order. Faith became a matter of 
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internal belief and private convictions. It offered the ethical motivation lacking in public 
discourse, but was no longer the mediator of temporal flourishing. Rather, it was the state and 
economy that promised emancipation; not through an eschatological messiah, but the promise of 
rational and technological progress. For the first time, the question of the relationship between 
religion and ethics was validly raised. In the pre-modern era, all actions and behaviors were 
viewed within a religious context. Now however, moral validation was sought outside of these 
claims. To justify moral commitments and behaviors on purely religious grounds was viewed 
with distrust, if not outright hostility.  
With the single authoritative voice of religion no longer a possibility, philosophers 
attempted to ground moral discourse in principles that were universally available to all rational 
persons. In so doing, they rejected a long tradition from Aristotle to Aquinas that took as the 
starting point of all ethics a consideration of the proper end or telos of the human person and 
community. Rather, philosophers developed concepts such as duty or utility as guiding principles 
of reflection. Yet any attempt to ‘thicken,’ for example, an injunction that we treat others as ends 
rather than means, requires particular conceptions of human nature and the good for individuals 
and society. Any answer to the questions why we should do our duty or what that duty entails 
requires drawing on deeper moral visions and traditions. Centuries later, not one of these 
attempts has proven to be a demonstrably and reliably secure foundation for ethical inquiry.  
 Though the academic tradition of philosophy continues, the most salient arguments the 
disciples of each major writer offers, MacIntyre believes, are those that explicate the failure of an 
opponent’s system. We have inherited a tradition of negative assessments, with few positive 
contributions. The progress that we have made is simply a greater understanding of what does 
not work. MacIntyre summarizes the failure of modern philosophy as follows:  
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The project of providing a rational vindication of morality had decisively failed; and from 
henceforward the morality of our predecessor culture – and subsequently of our own – 
lacked any public, shared rationale or justification. In a world of secular rationality 
religion could no longer provide such a shared background and foundation for moral 
discourse and action; and the failure of philosophy to provide what religion could no 
longer furnish was an important cause of philosophy losing its central cultural role and 
becoming a marginal, narrowly academic subject.98 
 
Why the Enlightenment Project Had to Fail 
 MacIntyre sees valuable insights into the nature or moral communities in Captain Cook’s 
journeys to the Polynesian Islands in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.99 It was 
on the third journey that the crew discovered the role that taboos played in the culture. The 
Polynesians, who were considered quite lax in sexual mores were astounded at Western 
willingness to allow men and women to eat together. Such activity in their culture was strictly 
‘taboo.’ Based on context, it was clear that taboo did not simply mean forbidden. Rather, the 
distinguishing characteristic of taboos was that there seemed to be no rational explanation for 
their existence. Taboos were simply not done, and no explanation was required. Behind the 
fascination with taboos was the lurking suspicion that Western morality may be just as arbitrary. 
 MacIntyre’s historical view of the development of moral traditions provides insight as to 
how taboos may have come about. Polynesia culture did not simply develop an arbitrary system 
of rules and prohibitions, and it certainly wasn’t the deductive work of the civilization’s great 
thinkers that established the cultural system. Rather, the mores and taboos developed within a 
historical context in which they meaningfully contributed to the community’s realization of 
particular social goods. With time however, the context changed, stripping the rules of their 
functional value. By the time that Captain Cook arrived, these rules lacked their contextual 
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coherence, and were unjustifiable. The extent of this deterioration is made evident by the ease 
with which the taboo rules were cast aside and Protestant ethics filled the void. 
 With this simple example, we begin to recognize why MacIntyre believes the 
Enlightenment Project did not merely happen to fail, but that it had to fail. Modern philosophers, 
set out to establish a foundation for morality that was beyond the particulars of history, 
contingency, and authority. That they failed is not a commentary on the weakness of their 
intellect. Indeed, these were the brightest minds of their time, attempting to resolve the important 
challenges of their day. The context of religious wars and emerging fields of knowledge 
demanded that ethical dialogue be rooted in something other than traditional authority. Yet, 
constructive dialogue on how to pursue the common good is impossible when you deny the 
possibility of any goods beyond those of the individual. As with the taboos of the Polynesian 
Islands, Enlightenment thinkers were attempting to propagate a set of rule with no vision of the 
good that makes them intelligible. 
 The fatal error of the Enlightenment project, in MacIntyre’s purview, was the rejection of 
the telos that gave ethical deliberation its direction. In traditional Greek culture and the 
subsequent classical tradition, ethics entailed accurately articulating the nature of the untutored 
human and the vision of human flourishing.100 The dialogue that took place attempted to identify 
the proper and effective means to transition from the former state to the latter. With no common 
vision of human fullness, we were simply left with a greatly reduced vision of the untutored 
person (distilled to desire or will) and a handful of moral injunctions with no sense of ultimate 
purpose. We have a narrow sense of who we are and no sense of where we hope to go, but we 
continue to develop an elaborate set of directions. Yet, much of our moral vocabulary breaks 
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down when it is severed from its teleological roots. Deontological arguments must smuggle in 
concepts such as right, good, and justice without defining them or else assuming that others 
adhere to the definition put forth by their author.101 
 The choice to root ethics in the autonomous individual is dangerously close to grounding 
it in the very untutored human nature that the Greeks were determined to overcome. When 
morality is separated from any sense of vision or context, very little of the self remains for moral 
evaluation. Ethical inquiry becomes a matter of analyzing acts and casuistry. Stripped of all roles 
and circumstances, the self is obliged to create morality by a sheer act of the will. As MacIntyre 
summarizes, “If there is nothing to morality but expressions of will, my morality can only be 
what my will creates. There can be no place for such fictions as natural rights, utility, the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number. I myself must now bring into existence new tables of what is 
‘good’.”102 
 It is precisely at this moment that we find Nietzsche’s devastating critique of the 
Enlightenment. It was not Nietzsche who killed God. He understood himself as a herald of the 
failure of modernity to offer a legitimate alternative to religious authority. His project was 
simply to bring morality’s lack of foundations to its logical conclusion. If we accept each 
Enlightenment traditions’ rejection of all other traditions, and Nietzsche’s contention that all 
rational justifications for morality fail, we are left only with the non-rational will manifesting 
itself through the guise of rational principles. Opposed to the emotivist’s contended insight about 
the meaning of language and rational propositions, Nietzsche identified the coercive use of 
language in manifesting the non-rational desires of the will. All ethical dialogue is nothing more 
than the will attempting to exert its power. 
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 For MacIntyre, Nietzsche is the logical conclusion of the Enlightenment project. By 
abandoning any consideration of authority, tradition, roles, or context, we are left only with the 
autonomous will and the assertion of its ambitions. The primacy of autonomy and Modernism’s 
strict agnosticism toward any conception of the good reduces all discourse to a clash of 
incommensurable visions determined only by strength of force. The only alternative we have is 
to question whether it was a mistake to abandon a tradition-based approach that sustains and 
roots the dialogue in a shared conception of the good. MacIntyre presents us with the choice of 
Neitzsche or Aristotle: “there is no third alternative.”103 
 
What was Lost: The Classical Tradition 
 Faced with two stark alternatives, we must now develop a more comprehensive 
articulation of what was rejected; only then can we consider the possibility and appropriateness 
of attempting any sort of recovery. What was discarded was not simply religious authority or the 
role of the telos, but what MacIntyre calls the Classical Tradition.104 While Aristotle had a 
decisive role, we must recognize that he in fact inherited a tradition that had already developed 
for centuries. Likewise, Aristotle did not signify any sort of culmination or apex. The Classical 
Tradition continued to develop long after his death. Indeed, we shall see that for any tradition to 
remain vibrant, mere returns or retrievals are impossible. We cannot simply return to Aristotle, 
but must understand how the tradition developed and how it could be applied to our context. 
 The origins of the Classical Tradition are not to be found in Greek philosophy at all, but 
rather in the sagas and epics of heroic societies. MacIntyre recognizes in the early Greek poems, 
as well as Northern European narratives, early articulations of human excellence and virtues. 
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Within these tales, the audience understood themselves and their world in a coherent way, a 
coherence that could not be extrapolated from the narratives themselves. Through these 
narratives, the self is fundamentally understood in terms of the roles into which one is born, and 
likewise, the good is measured in one’s ability to fulfill those roles. In the heroic age, identity is 
entirely rooted in the roles into which one is fated; beyond them, there is no sense of self. 
MacIntyre notes the stark contrast from Modern society: “The self of the heroic age lacks 
precisely that characteristic which we have already seen that some modern moral philosophers 
take to be an essential characteristic of human selfhood: the capacity to detach oneself from any 
particular standpoint or point of view, to step backwards, as it were, and view and judge that 
standpoint or point of view from the outside.”105 
 Thus morality in the heroic age is embodied by acting in such a way that is appropriate 
for anyone in such a role. A good warrior is the one who does those things that a good warrior 
ought. This obligation only terminates upon death, and a happy death comes to those that 
fulfilled the duties appropriate to their roles. Critically, life is construed as vulnerable and fraught 
with peril. Though there is not a strict conception of virtue, the narratives do articulate a vision 
of those skills and excellences that aid an individual in accomplishing his or her fate. Thus, 
although courage is certainly an excellence of character, wit, cunning, and even deception may 
be important skills in the attainment of one’s task. 
 In these narratives we witness the earliest formations of a teleological ethic. Embodied 
within the narrative structures are images of both the self and the world. The hearer is taught to 
identify the dangers and adventures in life. When one sees life’s vulnerabilities, she recognizes 
the need to cultivate certain characteristics that are required for seeing one’s duty through to the 
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end. Yet, what these narratives could not settle was the conflict between two heroes pursuing 
their fates. Such quandaries forced classical culture to develop a more elaborate conception of 
the good. In Athenian society, we see a shift from entirely narrative portrayals of the excellences 
of character to a more argumentative exposition on the good for society itself. As MacIntyre 
remarks, “The community too is a dramatic character which enacts the narrative of its 
history.”106 The shift of emphasis is toward a communal envisioning of human flourishing. This 
does not require the removal of narrative from discourse (MacIntyre notes that Plato’s Republic 
could in fact be read as a dramatic poem),107 but moves beyond the limits of role-based morality 
and begins to consider a flourishing society. It is at this point that we can turn to Aristotle and a 
more concentrated examination of the virtues. 
 Aristotle begins his ethics by considering the goal of human life: the end toward which 
every action and life as a whole is directed.108 Whereas the heroic society locates excellence in 
the fulfillment of particular roles (warrior, mother, etc.), Aristotle roots excellence in the broad 
concept of living well. Only when we have a sense of this good that we are to pursue can we 
consider the qualities that facilitate its attainment. Beyond mere happiness or comfort, Aristotle 
identifies the good as eudaimonia.109 The difficulty in finding an appropriate translation for this 
word is largely because it is not merely a passive state of being, but an active living and 
experiencing of wellness. The virtues, in turn, cannot be understood as mere means to achieve a 
final status, rather their engagement itself is an experience of eudaimonia.  
MacIntyre defines Aristotle’s conception of the virtues as “those qualities the possession 
of which will enable an individual to achieve eudaimonia and the lack of which will frustrate his 
                                                 
106 Ibid., 145. Emphasis original. 
107 Ibid.,144. 
108 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a. 
109 Ibid., 1095a. 
 
 
65 
movement toward that telos.”110 The virtues are not merely inclinations toward consistent action, 
but are in fact rooted in the vision and disposition of the self. The virtuous person is the one who 
cultivates not only proper habits, but likewise a proper moral vision and emotional disposition. 
Indeed, contrary to the virtues working to suppress and counteract irrational passions, the virtues 
channel the passions into worthy habits and activities.111 Thus, moral education is not an 
intellectual endeavor, but rather the formation of the entire person to see and feel correctly. 
What is markedly absent in Aristotle’s ethics is a thorough discussion of principles and rules. 
When he does address prohibited behavior, he is generally thinking of laws enforced by the city-
state. The cultivation of character and virtues is primary in Aristotle’s account, but this does not 
mean that he leaves no room for consideration of acts and imperatives. Prohibitions are viewed, 
however, in light of the community and the telos that it seeks. Thus, it is the role of authority to 
articulate and proscribe those actions that do harm to the community and thwart its pursuit of the 
shared good it seeks.  
 
Challenges to Adopting Aristotle 
 Although the Classical Tradition offers a language and methodology that retains the 
centrality of the telos we must remember that it was rejected for a reason, and the tradition as it 
was developed by Aristotle was built upon assumptions that, if they cannot be overcome, doom 
any attempt at recovery. MacIntyre identifies three challenges that the Aristotelian tradition 
faces.112 The first of these is the metaphysical biology upon which his theory of human 
flourishing is based. If we must reject this vision of the human person (and the basic insights of 
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science demand that we must), how can we retain a common conception of the human person? 
The second challenge is Aristotle’s assumed relationship between ethics and the polis. Aristotle’s 
theology emerged within the historical context of city-states. Could his methodology still apply 
in a pluralistic context that to him would be unimaginable, or is it possible to preserve his 
insights beyond their original context? 
 The third challenge that any recovery effort must face is the presumed unity of the virtues 
within Aristotle’s thought and the denial of conflict. I briefly examined above the fact that 
virtues may and frequently do conflict. Another way of stating this is there can be a tragic 
element to life, in which our moral commitments cannot all be satisfied. Aristotle believed that 
any such conflict was rooted in a flaw of one’s character, and did not address those 
circumstances in which the actor must choose between partial good or least evils. Nor could he 
resolve a clash between two just individuals acting justly, but against each other. MacIntyre 
believes that it was not until the Middle Ages that these quandaries were first adequately 
addressed.  
While the Classical Tradition that Aristotle endorsed continued in parts of the world, it 
was the work of Thomas Aquinas that solidified its position in Western Medieval civilization. 
Aquinas largely adapted Aristotle’s vision of moral growth and development, but added 
distinctively Christian elements. The incorporation of the theological virtues into Aristotle’s 
framework introduced significant changes to the moral horizon of the Classical Tradition. 
Christianity brought to the Aristotelian framework a greater appreciation for the brokenness of 
the world and the profound need for reconciliation. Charity was not a virtue that fit into 
Aristotle’s worldview, and, as MacIntyre observes, the forgiveness and redemption of the thief 
 
 
67 
on the cross would be unintelligible.113 Likewise, the chaos of the times lead to a stronger 
emphasis on surviving the evils of the world rather than contemplating human flourishing. 
 Thus, we were able to address the third challenge to Aristotle’s system, but two 
challenges still remain. If we are unable to adapt the biological assumptions upon which 
Aristotle’s methodology is based, it will hold no validity with our enlightened image of the 
human person. Likewise, if we cannot preserve the content beyond Aristotle’s immediate 
context, it has nothing to offer our modern pluralistic society. MacIntyre’s constructive project is 
ultimately an attempt to reconstruct the classical tradition is such a way as to overcome these 
obstacles. In his mind, we cannot go back to a pre-modern vision of the human person or social 
hierarchy. Any attempt to preserve the essential role of the telos in ethical reflection must be 
done in such a way as to honor the gains of modernity in our recognition and embrace of 
pluralism and the human person. How he attempts this is the focus of Chapter Five of this 
dissertation. The question now, is how a loss of this teleological framework has shaped our 
contemporary culture.114 
 
Justice After Virtue: The Moral Character of Modern Liberalism 
The closing chapters of MacIntyre’s follow-up to After Virtue, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality, treat the now dominant moral landscape of modern liberalism, which has attempted 
to preserve some ground for justice independent of any particular notion of the good. As we saw 
with the Enlightenment Project in After Virtue, this is generally done by appealing to some basic 
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feature of human nature that is entirely independent of social or cultural particularities. 
Presumably, any intelligent and reflective person would recognize the universal phenomenon of 
autonomy, human desire, or the principles of pleasure and pain. Thus by grounding a moral 
theory in a foundation such as these, it was believed that civic debate could advance with a 
common and ahistorical grounding. What we are in fact left with, in MacIntyre’s view, are 
abstractions that “are far too thin and meager to supply what is needed.”115 
Such attempts are not solely the project of philosophers, but all of society. The founding 
aspiration of liberal society is that by assenting to shared rational principles, each individual 
could function cooperatively within the public sphere while privately pursuing his or her own 
notion of the good. Yet in practice, this tradition functions just as any other, with limited 
toleration for other conceptions of the flourishing polis. Any attempt to question the hegemony 
of the liberal worldview must articulate itself in liberal terms and validate itself against liberal 
standards, an impossible and self-defeating task. What we have instead is the illusion of debate 
and choice among various strands of the liberal tradition. MacIntyre observes, “the contemporary 
debates within modern political systems are almost exclusively between conservative liberals, 
liberal liberals, and radical liberals. There is little place in such political systems for the criticism 
of the system itself, that is, for putting liberalism in question.”116 
Within liberal society, the rules of justice are primarily procedural, avoiding the thicker 
or more substantive view of a genuine moral tradition. It is the task of the state to ensure that all 
are able to participate in civil life, which is largely reduced to the freedom to express and pursue 
personal preferences. The principles of justice ensure that the pursuit of one’s private ends do not 
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impinge on the pursuit of others’. Within such liberal debate, all claims are treated as personal 
preferences and nothing more (here we see the role of emotivism as a theory about the use of 
language). While one is free to attempt to sway the opinions and preferences of others, the 
ultimate measure is the tallying of votes – a process which is itself considered to be the product 
of a rational process: the agreement of free individuals to enter into a social contract. When this 
process is itself in question, the final authority is the rules and procedural justice of the legal 
system: “The lawyers, not the philosophers, are the clergy of liberalism.”117 Yet as with the 
traditions of old, liberalism too has a hierarchy. Those with access to this procedural justice and 
those with the power to determine the limited range of possibilities and choices are 
disproportionately able to impose their notion of the good onto a broader population. 
Public policy and practice ultimately becomes formative for the members of a 
community. We learn the values of public discourse through our schooling and participation 
within society, and we come to believe privately what we practice publicly. Dictating what are 
and what are not appropriate sources of justification and motivation, liberal society forms a 
community marked by radical individualism. MacIntyre identifies two key features of liberal 
evaluation.118 First, there is a denial of any overarching good that orders the endeavors in life and 
provides a unity to the self and society. Consequently, each person has available a range of 
incommensurate goods in compartmentalized spheres. With no guiding unity, personal 
preference alone becomes sufficient reason to pursue one set of goods over another. In a liberal, 
individualist society, desire alone is sufficient justification for the pursuit of non-illicit ends; a 
perspective that would have been unimaginable to Aristotle. Yet, in our contemporary society, to 
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offer justification beyond preference (be it religious motivation or appeal to authority) is viewed 
with suspicion. 
For all of his dire critiques of liberalism as a universally accessible foundation for moral 
and political enquiry (as opposed to the teleologically rooted Aristotelian tradition), it should be 
noted that for MacIntyre, “Liberalism is by far the strongest claimant to provide such a ground 
which has so far appeared in human history or which is likely to appear in the foreseeable 
future.”119 If liberalism is indeed one more competing moral tradition, with its own contested 
account of the good, practical reason, and justice, and if liberalism is inadequate both in terms of 
the character of person it forms and the possibility of collaborating publicly for the common 
good, it is highly likely that any such universalist project will similarly fail. Yet, what alternative 
do we have?  
We must recall again that the original impetus for pursuing a tradition-independent 
ground for morality was the religious wars of Northern Europe. Elsewhere, MacIntyre himself 
states this point quite effectively:  
It was for [the theorists of the European Enlightenment], and it remains for us 
crucially important to recognize that the centralizing state powers that had 
reduced local communities to administered dependence, the landed powers that 
had systematically encroached upon or abolished customary peasant rights, the 
imperialist hegemonies that had wiped out the original inhabitants of Prussia, 
enslaved large parts of the Americas, and conquered Ireland and India, all of these 
had rested on what was in fact arbitrary power disguised by a set of false 
legitimating theories and histories… Insofar as it was the Enlightenment’s project 
to expose the groundlessness of these pretentions of the ruling and owning classes 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, its theorists succeeded both 
argumentatively and imaginatively, and we are all of us the better for it.120 
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In a time of exponentially greater pluralism, withdrawing to social enclaves is not an option. 
Appeals to authority and divine providence justified horrific abuses throughout history, and the 
positive contributions of the Enlightenment project cannot be denied. Yet, in a context of 
interminable moral debate, notions such as duty and utility are equally vulnerable corruption by 
those with great wealth, power, or influence. How is it possible to retain a grounded moral theory 
while creating the space for critical engagement?  
 Regrettably, MacIntyre closes his argument in After Virtue with little promise of hope for 
the American democratic system as a whole. At this point, there are simply too many vested 
interests benefiting from the system in place and too few moral resources to mount a coordinated 
challenge. Or, in MacIntyre’s words, “The barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they 
have already been governing us for quite some time. And it is our lack of consciousness of this 
that constitutes part of our predicament.”121 Yet the fact that Western civilization successfully 
emerged from one Dark Age gives MacIntyre hope that it can again. Our best hope, he argues, 
lies with the formation of smaller communities in which a thicker vision of the good can be 
actively maintained and advanced. This should not be a withdrawal however. It is from within a 
moral tradition that the most concrete proposals and clearest critiques of other positions can be 
made. It is the construction of intentional communities that continue to articulate a vision of the 
common good and form members in the practices and narratives that convey it. “We are waiting 
not for a Godot,” MacIntyre concludes,” but for another – doubtless very different – St. 
Benedict.”122 
 Much more could be said about MacIntyre’s project. In important ways, MacIntyre 
extends, nuances, and applies his insights to natural law theory and political philosophy. Yet for 
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the current project, the preceding section establishes five critical themes. First, the push for an 
alternative to religious authority resulted in the abolishment (or at least privatization) of all 
conceptions of human flourishing. Second, this ‘Enlightenment Project’ had to fail, as moral 
principles and injunctions are only coherent relative to the end toward which they are directed. 
Third, the attempt to ground morality in a universal aspect of human nature such as desire or the 
will has created a context in which all moral statement appear to be nothing more than 
expressions of one’s desire or will. Fourth, at the social level, the privatization and negation or 
particular conceptions of the good has created a context in which politics can be nothing more 
than the pitting of one set of claims against another, with no larger vision of a common good. 
Fifth and finally, in such a context, perhaps the best response is the cultivation of moral 
communities that can sustain the narratives and practices necessary for a richer vision of human 
flourishing. 
MacIntyre’s analysis and proposal point toward the philosophical roots and social ideas 
behind the decline in social capital identified earlier. The public refusal to recognize the validity 
of particular conceptions of the common good has shaped a society that denies any conception of 
the civic good and any justification beyond personal desire. Moreover, we should not be 
surprised that those formed by participation in such a society should lose sight of the good life 
together and withdraw to pursue whatever private goals and goods they imagine (the only goods 
society acknowledges as real). Yet while MacIntyre identifies the central question, the role of the 
common good in the social imagination, his account is not complete. He does not fully develop 
how this sense of the good forms one’s identity. Likewise, MacIntyre offers very little help in 
discerning a way forward. Finally, his account does not suggest why this should be a particular 
concern of faith communities. It is Charles Taylor that extends MacIntyre’s arguments and 
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suggests a more fruitful path forward.  
 
2.2. Charles Taylor on the Moral Roots of Identity and Belief 
Beyond MacIntyre’s more narrow focus on the contemporary status of ethical inquiry, 
Taylor grapples with broader questions of the Western sense of self and conditions of belief. This 
is chiefly accomplished in Taylor’s two foundational works, Sources of the Self and A Secular 
Age. Offering his argument in narrative form, any attempt to treat either one of these works in its 
entirely is beyond the scope of this present project. Treating them together (with their sum of 
1400 pages) is folly. As such, I must be unjustly cursory in my study of his overarching project. 
This section begins by briefly exploring the method and motivation behind Taylors project. I 
then sketch the moral framework that Taylor develops in Sources of the Self to articulate the 
relationship between one’s identity and one’s vision of the good. Next, I trace how Taylor uses 
this dynamic to explain the emergence of the modern sense of self as an atomized, buffered 
individual. This section concludes with drawing out the implications of Taylor’s insights for how 
society in general and Catholic higher education in particular might respond to the interrelated 
challenges of declining social capital and rising secularization. 
 
Taylor’s Motivation and Method 
 Before exploring the framework that Taylor offers, it is helpful to pause to consider the 
motivation behind Taylor’s overarching project. Ruth Abbey identifies a fourfold purpose 
motivating Taylor’s writing Sources of the Self; much of which carries over to A Secular Age.123 
In the most general terms, Taylor is first concerned with establishing a greater comprehension of 
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how the self is understood in modern times. While the notion is tossed around with ease in 
contemporary society, there is seldom any detailed consideration of what is meant. This is not 
only intended to clarify the thought of scholars, however. Taylor further hopes to deepen our 
own self-knowledge and some of the dynamics that contribute to our being in the world. These 
two concerns facilitate two further purposes in Taylor’s writing. Taylor hopes that this 
understanding will have an emancipatory function in freeing individuals from inadequate notions 
of the self; and further, will lead to a more critical view of Western culture – not as the height of 
civilization, but as a particular expression among many.  
 The heart of Taylor’s project, and of what sets him apart from many contemporary 
philosophers, is his central concern with questions of being over questions of doing. Who we are 
and who we are striving to become are of central importance, and must be answered before one 
can address questions of action or duty. Against theories tending toward absolute universalism 
and systematization, Taylor holds that the moral project begins with the far more fundamental 
(and admittedly problematic) notion of the good: what is of value and what it is that makes life 
worth living. This undoubtedly places Taylor within the tradition of virtue ethics, and his 
indebtedness to Alasdair MacIntyre is clear (and openly acknowledged). Yet, what he does with 
this insight is quite unique. As per his overriding intentions, Taylor does not leap to prescriptive 
declaration, but rather offers an extended meditation on the implications for this core aspect of 
human nature, both in understanding the legacy of modernity and the spectrum of choices 
available to us today. 
 
 The fullest treatment of Taylor’s methodology appears about half way through Sources of 
the Self, long after Taylor has begun constructing his narrative. Taylor describes his project in 
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part by contrasting it with historical explanation – a project far too large and complex for any 
scholar to undertake.124 His stated goal is discerning the history of the ideas and ideals that 
contribute to our contemporary outlook, and he openly acknowledges neglecting broader social, 
political, and technological factors that have shaped Western civilization. Where these do appear, 
it is only through their influence on philosophy, art, and literature. 
 Taylor identifies two interlocking sets of questions that animate his work. The first, more 
ambitious set of question are those of diachronic causation: the “precipitating conditions” that 
allowed the distinctive aspects of Western culture to emerge.125 Profound shifts in outlook and 
belief did not occur in vacuums, but rather required and built upon earlier developments. As will 
be demonstrated below, nowhere is this more apparent than the Christian roots of Western 
secularity. This diachronic causation approaches the historical explanation Taylor is intentionally 
trying to avoid, and he readily admits that it is an overly ambitious project. Thus, Taylor 
dedicates the majority of his efforts to a less ambitious project. 
 The second set of questions that Taylor seeks to address are interpretive, aiming to 
understand the motivation behind the shifts in outlook. For reasons that will be explained in the 
following section, Taylor emphasizes that the rise of new ideas and ideals were anything but 
accidental. Rather, these new horizons came to prominence because they had a particular appeal; 
they tapped into our values and visions of the good. The shifts that Taylor traces in our 
understanding of the self and view of the transcendent were rooted in moral ideals that shape our 
identity.126 Before examining the phenomenological justification for his focus on moral 
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aspirations, we must pause to consider two further categories that bridge the gap between ideas 
and social institutions: practices and social imaginaries. 
 Taylor believes that we are formed by and participate in larger social imaginaries. In 
contrast to the social theories intentionally developed by experts, Taylor is interested in “the 
ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on 
between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative 
notions and images that underlie these expectations.”127 Stated plainly, Taylor is interested here 
in our shared image of how things are and how they ought to be. Unlike theories developed by 
elite minority, social imaginaries consist of the popular narrative and images that construct the 
background of meaning. They are what make common practices possible, legitimate, and 
meaningful. Taylor emphasizes that these imaginaries contain both descriptive and prescriptive 
elements. They not only tell us how things are, but how they ought to be. They include a social 
and moral order in which we must locate ourselves. Thus, ideas such as the invisible hand of the 
market or self-determination are more than theories, they are moral visions that are grounding in 
our practices and institutions and that shape our moral imaginations. 
 
Taylor’s Moral Framework: Strong Evaluations, Hypergoods, and Constitutive Goods 
 The previous section gives a brief overview of Taylor’s perspective and areas of interest, 
but it does not fully explain why he chooses the perspective that he does. Specifically, it does not 
develop the driving force that Taylor believes is behind our evolving sense of self and world. 
Our modern sense of self and of the transcendent are embodied in the practices and imaginaries 
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that culture sustains, but we do not yet have a sense of why they rose to prominence. More 
importantly, we have not yet identified an effective way to engage this modern landscape. This 
section offers a sketch of the moral framework that Taylor believes is behind our sense of 
identity. Who we are and how we define ourselves are rooted in deeper questions about what we 
value and what makes life meaningful. It is only by engaging one’s sense of the good that we can 
begin to address the many challenges identified in chapter one. 
 The foundation of Taylor’s moral framework is his notion of strong evaluations, which 
“involve discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are not 
rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these 
and offer standards by which they can be judged.”128 Within his definition of these strong 
evaluations are several important components that contribute to his notion of the self, and 
ultimately, of secularization. First, it is necessary to recognize that not all choices are genuine 
strong evaluations. Our preferences for romantic comedies or pizza toppings are exactly that: 
preferences. While we may feel passionately about these opinions, we nevertheless recognize 
them as non-morally binding. We (hopefully) do not hold others accountable for failing to share 
our preferences in such matters regardless of how much we may disagree.  
 Strong evaluations, on the other hand, are those moral intuitions that are perceived to 
have grounding in external or objective criteria. There is a good beyond us that attracts us. In 
many of our more foundational choices, we do indeed believe that some values or ways of being 
are superior to others. We view particular ways of living or acting in the world as more 
praiseworthy than others. Similarly, our disagreement with the choices of others extends beyond 
opinion and preference. This condemnation is not solely the case in situations of oppression or 
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injustice. One may live a quiet and solitary life in which she has done no real harm to others or 
transgressed any serious moral injunction; yet, to declare her life meaningless is to hold her 
accountable to a standard beyond personal preference. Thus, these evaluations have both a 
descriptive and prescriptive role. We evaluate objects and actions as we perceive them, but also 
discern what life goods are worthy of pursuit.  
According to Taylor, we make such evaluations on a regular basis, both about others and 
ourselves. Often, however, the roots or foundations of these judgments remain largely 
unarticulated. We experience them as moral instincts or ‘gut reactions’. Our moral sensibilities 
are outraged when we witness blatant act of oppression or neglect, and likewise we experience a 
sense of wonder and humble awe when witnessing a life of heroic virtue. For naturalists and 
sociobiologist (common adversaries in Taylor’s writings), the seemingly instinctual response is 
evidence of irrational subjectivism with no ontological basis. Our articulated justifications for 
these judgments are considered, “so much froth, nonsense from a bygone age.”129 Ironically, as 
we shall see, this refusal to acknowledge the ontological becomes an ontology of its own for the 
naturalist, but this is getting ahead of the story.  
Taylor points to our consistent ability to make distinctions of value as evidence against 
naturalistic conceptions of morality. We do recognize a difference between sources of physical 
nausea (such as a foul smell) and moral repulsion (such as witnessing the abuse of a child). Our 
evaluations may vary, but we do experience the objects of these evaluations to have an objective 
worth. Yet, it is often only when these values are challenged or threatened that we seek to 
investigate and clarify the nature of our strong evaluations. We begin to name the goods that 
guide our determination that one career choice is more meaningful than anther, or one form of 
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self-expression is more authentic. For Taylor, these goods are plural and often competing. Goods 
such as intimate friendships and cultural discovery are irreducible and at time irreconcilable. 
This multiplicity of goods is in part an inherited legacy of modernity, which will also play a role 
in our cultural shift toward secularism. 
When forced to explain or justify our moral appraisals, or when we encounter a conflict 
of goods in our lived experience, we draw on deeper moral values and higher orders of worth. 
Behind our appraisals of particular actions and modes of being, there are more foundational 
goods that order strong evaluations and establish a hierarchy of commitments. These 
‘hypergoods’ provide the vantage point from which lesser goods are “weighed, judged, decided 
about.”130 When we must formulate an articulation of what it means to be moral, our starting 
point is these hypergoods. Similarly, societal debates and culture wars frequently occur along the 
fault lines of competing hypergoods, and hence competing moralities (for example, patriotism 
versus human dignity). Even when there is an agreement about some set of goods, their proper 
ordering can be source of division.  
Taylor believes that societies can reject and transcend inadequate hypergoods, as 
evidenced by Plato’s assault on the Greek warrior ethic, though a remnant will nevertheless 
remain. In a pluralistic society such as ours, we must not only account for the fragments of past 
ethics, but must also negotiate the multiple living traditions that remain active and vibrant. Such 
deliberations are not accomplished through abstraction, but by directly appealing to the moral 
intuitions of agents. Echoing MacIntyre, moral deliberation about the proper ordering of goods 
occurs in conversations among rival notions of the good.131 A rival must demonstrate why 
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attachment to one particular set of goods over another facilitates a more meaningful human life: 
“You will only convince me by changing my reading of my moral experience, and in particular 
my reading of my life story, of the transitions I have lived through – or perhaps refused to live 
through.”132 Systematic abstraction and universal declarations may be appealing, but they are a 
distortion of the actual ways that individuals engage in practical reasoning. 
Articulation of the goods that motivate our lives is a central concern for Taylor. Without 
such articulation, life remains unexamined; moral conversations and deliberations are 
impossible. When one must give further account of even these hypergoods, we must articulate 
their ultimate source: our constitutive good.133 This is more than yet another layer in our 
hierarchy of goods; rather, it is the sources of all life goods, and the font of goodness itself. 
Plato’s ideal of the Good is a helpful point of departure for investigating Taylor’s 
understanding.134 Wisdom, for Plato, is rooted in a vision of and love for the rational ordering of 
the cosmos. In other words, the Good for Plato has both a moral and an ontological dimension; it 
is a perception of how things are and an affective desiring for that reality. The Good is 
‘constitutive’, to use Taylor’s vocabulary, because it is the source for all subsequent goods and 
values, and for reality itself. Further, it is love for this Good that empowers us to act morally in 
the world. The Good is both the source and the goal of the moral life. 
Taylor does not pigeonhole all other traditions into Plato’s framework, but he does 
perceive a similar dynamic at work in mature moral theories. In each, there is a strong 
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relationship between how the world is and what ought to be pursued. Thus, for example, even 
materialistic Marxists envision history as an inevitable progression toward liberation. So too, 
naturalist ecologists today have a perception of the world and our place in it. Contemplation of 
and appreciation for this order are central to the moral life. For Christians, particularly as 
inheritors of Augustine’s Platonism, God is the constitutive good. God is the source of the 
rational ordering of the cosmos – the way things are. Similarly, through prayer and closer 
affiliation with the divine, we are empowered to act morally within this cosmos, thus bringing us 
closer to God. The constitutive good, therefore, is a closed circle, defining our reality and 
comprehension of the good life. Through modernity, it is not so much that this general moral 
structure has changed, but rather, its content.  
 
Identity and the Good 
Before exploring this evolution, however, it is necessary to explore Taylor’s link between 
the good and identity in greater detail. Identity and the good are entirely intertwined in Taylor’s 
work, so much so that he seldom treats one without addressing the other. Thus the progression 
presented here is artificial, though nevertheless helpful in understanding Taylor’s framework. 
Identity also begins with the strong evaluations that we make. This needs no elaborate defense, 
but should rather be readily apparent. When asked to describe ourselves or give an account of 
our lives, we necessarily make judgments about what merit mentioning and what does not. We 
decide which relationships and activities are more central to our self-understanding and which 
are peripheral. It is who we are as a doctor, mother, musician, or citizen that shapes the core of 
our character. These roles are not merely descriptive, but value-laden. 
This link between the good and identity continues through Taylor’s hypergoods. Even 
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beyond our judgments and the roles that we play, our uniqueness is rooted in the overarching 
goods that order our life: belief in concepts such as justice, security, or self-expression. 
Ultimately, our identities are grounded in our constitutive good. The source of our strength and 
goal of our efforts is the defining characteristic of our identity. These are not static realities, 
however. As we have already seen, our ordering and judgments about the good can change over 
time. What was once the overriding goal of our lives can be exposed as a false idol or simply 
fade away as higher values emerge. Our roles change and different aspects of our identity come 
to the fore. 
Most importantly for Taylor, as self-interpreting animals our identity is evaluated in 
terms of how we measure against the goods that we value. Whether we believe ourselves to be 
moral or not, these hypergoods and the constitutive good provide the dimensions for our self-
evaluation. We define ourselves not merely by what we value, but by the degree to which we are 
approaching or regressing from these ideals. The narrative of our lives is the journey toward or 
away from our ultimate values. Our self-worth is rooted in our evaluation of how we are doing: 
Whereas I naturally want to be well placed in relation to all and any of the goods I 
recognize and to be moving towards rather than away from them, my direction in 
relation to this good has a crucial importance. Just because my orientation to it is 
essential to my identity, so the recognition that my life is turned away from it, or 
can never approach it, would be devastating and insufferable… Symmetrically, 
the assurance that I am turned towards this good gives me a sense of wholeness, 
of fulness [sic] of being as a person or self, that nothing else can.135 
 
 This centrality of self-interpretation puts Taylor at odds with deterministic theories that 
explain behavior with no reference to identity.136 It is not simply the cultural or economic 
context in which we find ourselves that shapes our self-understanding. Rather, it is how we 
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articulate the narrative of our striving.137 Yet, this self-interpretation should not be confused with 
absolute autonomy. We seek to make meaning out of the stories of our lives, but the tools with 
which we work are largely provided by our historical and cultural context. When Taylor speaks 
of the moral frameworks or horizons (he uses the two interchangeably) that shape our identity, he 
recognizes that we are never more than co-authors of these structures: “People may see their 
identity as defined partly by some moral or spiritual commitment, say as a Catholic, or an 
anarchist… What they are saying by this is not just that they are strongly attached to this spiritual 
view or background; rather it is that this provides the frame within which they can determine 
where they stand on questions of what is good, or worthwhile, or admirable, or of value.”138  
Taylor describes these frameworks as ‘inescapable’, with two implications. First, he 
holds that it is impossible to ever step outside of a framework completely. While one set of 
goods may give way to another, stepping out entirely is impossible. To do so would be to 
abandon precisely what makes us human (i.e. self-interpreting animals).139 To be without a 
framework is to suffer a crisis of identity, to lose track of one’s location in the world. Yet, these 
frames are likewise inescapable in the sense that they are constantly being handed on and formed 
by our larger social network and culture. Who we are begins with what narratives and practices 
have shaped our values. As Abbey observes, “When all the features of an individual’s self-
interpretation are aggregated this might amount to something unique, but this interpretation 
always points beyond the individual to the wider society and culture to which she belongs. This 
is because the array of linguistic, intellectual, emotional, and aesthetic resources available for 
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interpreting oneself are furnished by one’s culture.”140 We can only make do with the tools and 
resources we have been given, though they may be limited and fallible. Our culture may both 
guide and deceive us. Though we can critically engage these sources, we only do so from a rival 
perspective. 
 
Emergence of the Modern Self 
 Taylor employs the theoretical groundwork outlined above in tracing the content and 
history of the modern identity. This self-understanding will later play a central role in the West’s 
shift toward secularism. Again, it is far beyond the scope of this work to outline all of the factors 
and shifts in Taylor’s narrative. A brief summary of the primary dimensions of the modern 
identity must suffice. Behind these movements, however, is a central dynamic: the attempt to 
dislodge the self from the moral framework that gives it meaning. The reasons for doing so may 
vary, but are often traced to the Reformation and resulting religious wars. If the moral horizons 
which we inherit from religious authority are no longer shared, and further, can be the source of 
conflict, we must re-conceptualize the person in such a way that these frameworks lose their 
effective power. Thus, autonomy and self-definition become paramount virtues, with tolerance 
being the greatest public good. “Radical reflexivity” contemplates the self beyond any 
relationship and attachments.141 
Yet, as Taylor has already made clear, such a move is impossible to make. We can never 
do away with our moral frameworks; only alter their content. So, for example, even the most 
ardent deniers of moral ontology continue to draw on values and moral sources in constructing 
their arguments. The central question for Taylor becomes whether these sources are sufficient to 
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address the major challenges of our day. While he no doubt acknowledges many of the fruitful 
developments that the Enlightenment inaugurated, he is always cautious concerning the degree to 
which we should embrace these shifts. More intriguingly, Taylor believes that many of these 
movements were Christian in origin.  
The first fundamental shift that Taylor traces is the emergence of an appreciation for the 
inner depths of the self. The expanse of mystery is no longer found in the cosmos beyond, but 
within the individual. The self becomes a wonderful mystery to be explored, contemplated, and 
celebrated. This is not simply a descriptive claim, but a normative one. We have an obligation to 
discover and express our true natures. To fail to cultivate an entirely unique personality is an 
indictment against the value of one’s life. While Taylor sees traces of this interiority of 
Augustine in this dynamic, it is through the modern period that it takes full force. For Augustine, 
the turn inward was a preliminary turn toward God. We look within because that is where God 
might be found. In modernity, the inner self became its own moral source and constitutive good. 
It is our inner nature that empowers us to act meaningfully in the world. 
The second major emerging trend has its roots quite directly in the Reformation period. 
Against the prevailing division of higher and lower modes of being in the world, reformers 
demanded the recognition of the dignity of ordinary life. At the time, the prevailing worldview 
esteemed the lives and sacrifices of the religious over and above common piety. In fact, it was 
the duty of the vowed and ordained to fulfill the religious obligations for the masses who, in turn, 
supported their enterprises. Against this stratified society, reformers placed the emphasis not 
what one does, but how one does it. Taylor gleans his title for the first chapter of this section 
from an apt Puritan saying: “God loveth adverbs.”142 It is in how we perform even the most 
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simple and profane of tasks that our life is evaluated. It is not what we do, but how we do it. 
The consequences of this shift are profound as society implemented this new framework. 
First, there was an ontological dimension: many of the traditional hierarchies and orderings in 
society fell away. No status is closer to or further from God or the good. Further, echoing Weber, 
this emphasis on the ordinary had profound effects on social and economic reality. Production 
and reproduction found new moral significance, which laid a foundation for later capitalism. So 
also, marriage and family life became a central value and concern. Ultimately, concern for the 
secular sphere gave way to a marginalization of the transcendent. Tracing this movement 
becomes one of Taylor’s central tasks in A Secular Age. 
As the instrumental rationality of modernity and advanced capitalism took hold, the 
Romantic backlash constituted Taylor’s third major shift in modern self-understanding. Then, as 
now, a return to previous frames was impossible. Yet, something beyond human reason was 
needed. The new moral source was found in encounters with and explorations of nature. This 
includes the wilderness beyond as well as human nature within. Again, there is no simple line to 
be drawn in the emergence of this dynamic. On the one hand, nature can inspire and empower 
the agent to act meaningfully. Yet, the indifference of nature also demands our wonder and awe, 
if not our fear and resignation. Naturalism itself becomes a spiritual movement, even when we 
hold that there is no ultimate meaning to be found: 
The reflection which moves us is that thought, feeling, moral aspirations, all the 
intellectual and spiritual heights of human achievement, emerge out of the depths 
of a vast physical universe which is itself, over most of its measureless extent, 
lifeless, utterly insensitive to our purposes, pursuing it path by inexorable 
necessity.143 
 
 
 With this turn toward nature is a corresponding turn toward expressivism. Nature is found 
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both beyond and within. If we are not attuned to our inner nature, we will be unable to perceive 
the natural forces at work in the universe. Yet further, “If our access to nature is through an inner 
voice or impulse, then we can only fully know this nature through articulating what we find 
within us.”144 Full individualization is only possible when we perceive our inner nature and 
express it uniquely. Taylor sees this as a significant development from the inwardness of earlier 
times. The imperative toward self-discovery and expression places authenticity as the core value 
of our modern society. Taylor takes up this thread of his argument more directly in his much 
more accessible Ethics of Authenticity.145 Here Taylors recognizes the prevalence of 
individualism and relativism in contemporary society, offering many of the same contributing 
factors as he does in Sources of the Self. This work will be treated in more detail below as we 
consider possible responses to our modern and secular age. 
 
The Rise of Our Secular Age 
 As should be clear, for Taylor many of the sources that constitute our modern identity are 
the same sources of secularism in our society. This should not be a surprise, as such questions 
were a prevailing concern of Taylor’s long before either Sources or Secular Age was written. 
Many of these parallels would be easy to draw out. In both, Taylor witnesses the disengagement 
of the individual from a larger cosmos and the emergence of the value of ordinary life and inner 
depths. Yet, attending only to such glaring overlaps does a disservice to the depths of each work. 
Taylor clearly sees the roots of both phenomena in Christianity itself, and the consequences of 
such connections are clear. What is far more interesting is the way that Taylor’s moral 
framework continues to shape how he understands these dynamics. Beyond summarizing the 
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general arc of A Secular Age, this section examines his insights and proposals through the lens of 
his notions of the identity and its relation to the good. 
 
 The most familiar contribution Taylor has made to contemporary discussions of 
secularism is his delineation of three distinct ways of understanding the term. Taylor begins his 
study by observing that for many, secularism can refer to either the withdrawal of religion from 
the public and political sphere (secularism 1), or the decrease in religious practice and 
participation (secularism 2).146 Neither of these are central concerns for Taylor. Rather, the 
notion of a secular age for Taylor entails the conditions of belief. Why is it, he asks, that whereas 
five-hundred years ago it was nearly impossible to conceive of a universe in which God does not 
exist, it is now not only possible for many, but inescapable? How is it that theistic belief has 
become, even for believers, only one possibility among many? This is secularism 3, the central 
concern of Taylor’s text. 
 In articulating his narrative, Taylor hopes to address secularism on two fronts. 
Negatively, he hopes to overcome the ‘subtraction theory’ which views secularism as an 
inevitable human evolution. As Ballard summarizes, “We Westerners have been stripping away 
the occluding superstitions of religion until, liberated, we come to see this world as the only 
reality in light of our own unbiased natural reason. In a word, the scientific and humanistic 
outlooks eclipse the religious.”147 Taylor demonstrates forcefully that this narrative does not hold 
up to scrutiny. In fact, it is based on many of the sort of groundless assumptions naturalist accuse 
of theists of accepting. Yet, if secularism is not the inevitability that naturalists claim, why has it 
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risen to such prominence in Western society? This leads to Taylor’s positive aim: to provide a 
narrative that traces the roots of these movements to their early (and often Christian) roots. In 
doing this, it becomes apparent that there are no simple origins or remedies. Most often, these 
were well-intentioned attempts to reform society or Christian doctrines in response to new 
insights and challenges. 
 These shifts occur precisely in that moral and spiritual space that Taylor identifies in 
Sources of the Self. At the heart of Taylor’s enterprise is his notion of “fullness”: 
We all see our lives, and/or the space wherein we live our lives, as having a 
certain moral/spiritual shape. Somewhere, in some activity, or condition, lies a 
fullness, a richness; that is, in that place (activity or condition), life is fuller, 
richer, deeper, more worth while, more admirable, more what it should be. This is 
perhaps a place of power: we often experience this as deeply moving, as 
inspiring.148 
 
Taylor affirms that we can, at times, momentarily experience this fullness, but often we only 
glimpse it from afar, or imagine what it would be like. Nevertheless, this fullness helps us to 
situate ourselves morally and spiritually. We orient our identities both in terms of its experience 
and its absence. We strive to find that balanced condition in which we experience meaning and 
contribute to the good in our daily living. Central to this experience of fullness is the realization 
that it is not of our own making. It is from beyond us, drawing us in and sending us forward. 
 This vision of fullness somewhat encapsulates how Taylor framed his notion of the 
constitutive good in Sources of the Self. There is a similar dynamic of something beyond us 
drawing us in and sending us forward. It is not only a moment of heightened awareness, but an 
ideal around which we structure our lives. When we are removed or drifting further away from 
this good, we know that something is amiss in our live. For Christians, whose constitutive good 
is God, genuine fullness, the ultimate telos of human life, is always beyond our temporal lives. 
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This sense of a transcendent fullness forms a bare, pragmatic definition of religion for Taylor; at 
least within the Western Christian with which he is concerned.149 Because Taylor is not 
concerned with religion in the public sphere or as a set of practices (reflected in secularism 1 and 
2), this “cowardly” definition of religion allows Taylor to hone in on the crux of disbelief in our 
contemporary society. 
 Defining religion as a vision of fullness found in the transcendent establishes a series of 
binaries by which Taylor outlines the contours of contemporary secularism. Against the 
transcendent, the secularist embraces a notion of fullness that is found entirely in the imminent. 
Similarly, Taylor draws a distinction between finding one’s moral source from within or 
without.150 As he identified in Sources of the Self, Taylor holds that the modern identity finds 
wonder and mystery within his or her own depths of self. Our moral strength and direction 
comes from the nature hidden within rather than any source from without. As it became 
increasingly possible to envision flourishing with no referent to the transcendent beyond, belief 
in such entity became superfluous and optional. Hence Taylor’s thesis: 
I would like to claim that the coming of modern secularity in my sense has been 
coterminous with the rise of a society in which for the first time in history a 
purely self-sufficient humanism came to be a widely available option. I mean by 
this a humanism accepting no final goals beyond human flourishing, nor any 
allegiance to anything else beyond this flourishing. Of no previous society was 
this true.151 
 
 The story of secularism is the story of the emergence of an entirely immanent vision of human 
flourishing. The great irony that Taylor identifies is the degree to which this shift was driven 
initially by Christian motivations. It was the Christian desire to better approximate the Reign of 
God on earth that opened the possibility of imagining an entirely earthly form of fullness. 
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 Taylor traces this unfolding narrative through a series of shifting frames which are by 
now familiar. At its root is the disenchantment of the world. The split between the natural and 
the supernatural was a distinction that Christians made intentionally.152 The gradual rendering of 
the supernatural as irrelevant was an unintended consequence that came much later. This shift 
occurred in several dimensions of human life. First, our temporal reality shifted from a cosmos to 
a universe. In pre-modern times, meaning and order were found in creation, with a hierarchy 
extending from the earthly to God. Humans found their identity in reference to their location 
both within a social hierarchy and this larger cosmic order. This was also a cosmos populated 
with angels, demons, and spirits of all kinds capable of offer aid and inflicting harm. 
Similarly, time and space had an ordering of higher and lower, sacred and profane. Some 
locations were sources of spiritual force and power. Years were filled holy days and seasons. So, 
for example, Easter Sunday of any given year would be closer to the original event than any 
October that occurred a decade earlier. Within this flow, there were times for repentance, but 
also times for carnival, in which the rules and order of society were upended.153 In all of life, 
there was a structure and balancing anti-structure. Human meaning and fullness were found 
through the repetitions and cycles between the sacred and profane. One could never escape the 
enchanted cosmos, or the meaning it provided. 
 Images of the self likewise underwent a profound change. The pre-modern self was a 
‘porous’ self: “vulnerable, to spirits, demons, cosmic forces.”154 The porous self lived in a degree 
of peril and fear. Any number of sinister subjects could attack and endanger the pre-modern. To 
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reject God in this worldview is not to deny the existence of the supernatural, but to risk facing 
these elements alone. This is a stark contrast to a modern ‘buffered’ self that has no fear of 
external forces threatening one’s life and wellbeing. To be a buffered self means not only to be 
free of the specter of demons and magic, it is to be the source of meaning and purpose in life. It 
is to face a world with no established order and create meaning for oneself in the face of 
absurdity. It is this buffered self that makes exclusive humanism possible. 
 What are the causes of such profound shifts in frameworks? The narrative is far too 
complex to engage with any detail. In Taylor’s own words: “The straight path account of modern 
secularity can’t be sustained. Instead, what I’m offering here is a zig-zag account, one full of 
unintended consequences.”155 Nevertheless, a few important trends must be highlighted. The first 
was the separation of the immanent and the transcendent, along with a flattening of our natural 
realm. Time and space became linear and malleable. More importantly, an optimism arose 
(primarily among the elites according to Taylor) that society could be reformed and regimented. 
Again, attempts at this social transformation were undertaken for primarily Christian reasons. 
Notions of civility and the establishment of a domestic peace were pursued as Christian values. 
Of course, the clear secular and economic benefits to this sort of restructuring became readily 
apparent.  
 This gradually gave way to a new modern moral order which embraced the benefits 
provided by this new disciplinary society and saw these goods as indicators of God’s 
endorsement (the influence of Weber here is clear). To be certain, the complementarity of nature 
and grace have a long history in the Christian tradition; still, this new ordering took on a far more 
political dimension: “The underlying idea of society as existing for the (mutual) benefit of 
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individuals, and the defense of their rights, takes on more and more importance.”156 Increasingly, 
the emphasis was placed on the benefits here and now. In time, a subtle shift occurred in which 
the directionality in this perceived benefit was reversed. Human flourishing undoubtedly 
glorified God, but increasingly, God’s providence was put at the service of human flourishing. 
 As religious fervor declined (as Taylor believes it naturally will from time to time), the 
personal God of Christianity was replaced with a providential deity: rationally defensible (in 
response to the first genuine atheists), but far from the God of Abraham and Isaac. Taylor notes 
four shifts that occurred during this time, all leading to a greater anthropocentrism. First, we lost 
a “sense of further purpose; and hence of the idea that we owe God anything further than the 
realization of his plan.”157 While God still ultimately designs the plan, our task is to live it out, to 
our mutual benefit. Second, there is a lost sense of grace. Human reason, discipline, and 
determination were sufficient for our wellbeing. Third, our sense of mystery disappears. All that 
we need to know of God can be discovered in nature, and we can likewise discern God’s plan for 
us. This leads to the fourth shift, wherein the emphasis is no longer on God’s transforming us 
into something beyond our nature. We can be nothing more, and ought strive to be anything 
more than healthy and productive members of society. 
 From this turning point, emphasis is increasingly placed on flourishing in our present 
lives, with less and less thought given to the afterlife or even transcendental dimensions of the 
temporal. Soon the dominoes fall more quickly. Taylor traces much of this through the gradual 
replacement of agape with benevolence. This is accompanied by a reduction of religion to 
morality. Then, further, morality is viewed as a project of its own, with religion only providing 
the motivation. The resources for benevolence are entirely from within: the natural capacity for 
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instrumental reason and sympathy which can be extended universally. Heroic altruism, which 
acts with no promise of reward is esteemed above any moral system which calls for a motivation 
beyond recognition of one’s duty. Ultimately, religion is viewed negatively for calling forth and 
expecting more than benevolence and human flourishing. 
 The stage is now set for the age of secularism, in which theistic belief is one among 
several possible options. Once secular humanism established itself as a viable alternative to 
Christianity, an explosion of diversity followed: “The multiple critiques leveled at orthodox 
religion, Deism and the new humanism, and their cross-polemics, end up generating a number of 
new positions, including modes of unbelief which have broken out of the humanism of freedom 
and mutual benefit (e.g. Nietzsche and his followers) – and lots else besides.”158 This ‘nova 
effect’ introduced a pluralism that was unimaginable at any other time in history. All that was 
left was for this multitude of possibilities to penetrate broader spectrums of society. So today, it 
is possible to imagine flourishing in any number of ways, and it is up to each of us on our own to 
discover a mode of being that is an authentic expression of our inner depths. 
 
Engaging Our Modern Secular Age 
 From here, Taylor explores many of the attempts to navigate this pluralistic arena, 
particularly from positions of unbelief. Once again, to consider each of these channels is beyond 
the scope of this paper. A few general insights, however, set the stage for considering the 
implications of and response to Taylor’s project from the perspective of this project. As 
previously mentioned, Taylor resists any secularism narrative that has science gradually edging 
out and eclipsing belief. The naturalist position requires unfounded presuppositions of their own, 
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and any functional life must include some leaps of faith. Further, it is possible to abandon certain 
images of God that have proven unreliable without jettisoning faith all together. Taylor believes 
that significant experiences and phenomena have the capacity to be ‘spun’ in either a direction 
toward openness or closure.159 Those who believe will find evidence for their belief, while those 
who resist find ample proof of their own position. Our secular age is not a story of subtraction, 
and renewed belief will not be the product of deductive reasoning and intellectual proofs alone. 
 Still, Taylor presses his case further. While he does not offer a substantive apologetic for 
theistic belief, he does raise several questions concerning the limits of exclusive humanism. Our 
times and contexts have produced several cross-pressures and dilemmas. Taylor openly wonders 
whether a closed moral framework provides sufficient depth of meaning to navigate our 
contemporary situation. When we encounter new life, death, suffering, or any number of other 
momentous events, does secularism have the depth necessary to help us find meaning? Does it 
have the moral resources we need to sustain the life of benevolence we prize? Our need for 
meaning and moral orientation has not abated, but the resources at hand have dwindled. Taylor 
affirms, “The issue about meaning is a central preoccupation of our age, and its threatened lack 
fragilizes all the narratives of modernity by which we live.”160 
Taylor concludes A Secular Age by speculating how one can break free from the 
immanent frame and open his or her horizon to the transcendent. To Taylor, this amounts to a 
conversion in the deepest sense of the term. He highlights several individuals who discovered 
something beyond the immanent frame; or more accurately, were pulled from it. This suggests 
that in the end, the work is beyond human efforts. Nevertheless, there is a clear path forward for 
engaging believers and unbelievers alike. It would be impossible to revert to earlier times, and 
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Taylor refuses to discount the good that Modernity has brought forth. The critical question is not 
how to escape or overcome the secular age, but rather, how to cultivate meaningful lives within 
it, and this is a task which we all share. Our success or failure will largely depend on how we 
understand and frame the issue. Secularism is not merely a question about what exists, but what 
we value; and what we value determines who we are. We must engage in sincere conversations 
about how we imagine authentic flourishing and how it is realized in our lives. 
 
 This is where the potential of Catholic higher education becomes apparent. While a 
response to our contemporary situation will be developed more in the following chapters, it is 
helpful to close with a brief examination of how Taylor proposes that we might engage the 
particular vision and values of contemporary society. He offers suggestions of how this could 
occur on both the personal level (in which the authenticity of expressive individualism is the 
highest good) and the social level (where society is imagined through the lens of atomism). 
The drive for meaning remains, and in many ways has intensified in modern times. The 
great luxury of living in an enchanted age is that meaning was provided for you; it was woven 
into the fabric of the cosmos. Now, not only are there several systems of meaning to choose 
from, each individual is expected to embrace and express an entirely unique self. We draw on the 
social imaginaries that surround us, but are forbidden from admitting any authority beyond our 
internal intuition. Even for theistic believers, these pressures remain. As mentioned earlier, 
Taylor summarizes many of his insights in The Ethics of Authenticity, declaring that authenticity 
has become for Westerners the ultimate good and virtue (or perhaps hypergood – though he does 
not employ the term). This much, to Taylor, is unavoidable. Yet, against the ‘booster’ and 
‘knocker’ arguing over the proper place of authenticity in society, Taylor suggests that the more 
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fruitful discussion concerns what type of authenticity we seek: 
What we ought to be doing is fighting over the meaning of authenticity, and from 
the standpoint developed here, we ought to be trying to persuade people that self-
fulfilment [sic], so far from excluding unconditional relationships and moral 
demands beyond the self, actually requires these in some form. The struggle ought 
not be over authenticity, for or against, but about it, defining its proper meaning. 
We ought to be trying to lift the culture back up, closer to its motivating ideal.161 
 
The search for authentic fullness is common among many moral frames within our 
culture. Catholic higher education has the opportunity to meet people in this quest and help them 
to develop a vocabulary that reinterprets their lives in more meaningful ways.162 While religious 
educators may question the resources of some moral frameworks, there is merit in challenging all 
to be more articulate about the goods that shape their identity. Indeed, Taylor’s Sources of the 
Self offers a blueprint for engaging others on not just faith, but broader questions of how one 
imagines human flourishing. Rather than a broadside inquiry into one’s constitutive good, the 
conversation can begin around any number of strong evaluations. Again, for Taylor, these strong 
evaluations begin to form our identity by distinguishing those elements that are of greater 
importance. These can in turn lead to deeper conversation about hypergoods and ultimately the 
constitutive good of one’s life. Countering the prevailing contemporary trends could begin not 
with a broadside attack on science and secularism, but by simply inquiring what it is that another 
values. 
 Elsewhere, Taylor develops a similar strategy in confronting atomism as a social and 
political outlook.163 Rooted in social contract theory, atomism is an outlook that view society 
purely as an amalgamation of individuals each seeking their own goods. While even the 
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staunchest of supporters would recognize that several goods (such as clean air or national 
security) can only be achieved by cooperation in the community, they nevertheless view these 
goods as “decomposable” to the individual.164 Recognizing atomism as a political outlook 
grounded in the individual’s right to develop and express particular capacity, Taylor suggests 
that the best approach again is to engage the moral ideals behind this imaginary. Specifically, he 
raises the question of what is needed from society to realize the conditions necessary for human 
autonomy to flourish:  
But the alleged social conditions for the full development of our human 
capacities…open another set of issues altogether: whether the condition for the 
full development of our capacities is not that we achieve a certain identity, which 
requires a certain conception of ourselves; and more fundamentally whether this 
identity is ever something we can attain on our own, or whether the crucial modes 
of self-understanding are not always created and sustained by the common 
expression and recognition they receive in the life of the society.165 
 
Again, Taylor’s strategy is not to deny or confront the prevailing social conception of the good, 
but rather to engage it critically and raise up questions of how these ideals may be properly 
supported and realized. 
 
2.3. MacIntyre and Taylor in Conversation 
 The influence of MacIntyre’s core insight on Taylor’s thought is apparent and readily 
acknowledge. What began for MacIntyre as an inquiry into the status of contemporary moral 
philosophy, Taylor developed into a theory of modern identity and secularization. Both authors 
share a common appreciation for the central role that our vision of the good plays in shaping the 
moral horizon of the individual and the community. Moreover, they are both keenly aware that 
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this vision of the good and the narrative we construct concerning our quest to achieve it are never 
entirely of our own making. We participate in the language and practices of a community that 
shapes our vision of the good life. 
 Similarly, both authors raise concerns about the moral vision of a liberal democracy. For 
MacIntyre, the question is the very possibility of sustaining a moral community with no 
acknowledged vision of the common good. With no shared vision of the appropriate ends of 
civic life, politics becomes the realm of special interests and private goods competing for limited 
power and resources. Lost is any vision of our common social project, let alone an appreciation 
for public participation and dialogue as goods in themselves. Taylor again extends MacIntyre’s 
insight and analysis of the social practices and imaginaries that shape our moral outlook. Both 
recognize the contemporary decline in social capital and rise of individualism as expressive of a 
far deeper and more foundational element the United States’ national character. 
 These similarities in themes and perspectives do not signify that MacIntyre and Taylor 
are in complete agreement on our contemporary situation, nor its remedies. Indeed, the fact that 
they are so often grouped together only seems to cause them to sharpen their (respectful) 
critiques of each other’s work. This chapter concludes with a brief examination of the most 
sustained comments each author has offered for the other’s work, particularly those dimensions 
from each that I have highlighted here. I first look at Taylor’s evaluation of After Virtue and its 
contentions regarding the possibility of pursuing justice in a modern liberal democracy. Next, I 
consider MacIntyre’s appraisal of the moral framework articulated in Sources of the Self. I 
identify both the most salient areas of disagreement and their implications for moral education. It 
is undoubtedly tempting to simply put forward that theirs is a difference of hope: MacIntyre 
believes that the modern era is well along the path to decline (“The barbarians are not waiting 
 
 
100 
beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us for quite some time.”),166 while Taylor 
affirms that it was in many ways a success and in others can still be redeemed (“For all the 
imperfections of our society, it does bind us together in pursuit of some common goods”).167 
Such an interpretation, however, does a disservice to the nuance and ambivalence in each 
author’s thought. 
 Taylor suggests that the key difference between he and MacIntyre is not so much whether 
the modern view of the individual in society fails, but how it fail. MacIntyre, he suggests, “tends 
to take modern society at the face value of its own dominant theories, as heading for runaway 
atomism and break-up.”168 For MacIntyre, the Enlightenment Project may have failed to produce 
a universally accessible justification for morality, modern liberalism has been successful in 
producing a society and populace formed by emotivist principles. It is so dangerous precisely 
because it has accomplished its goals. Taylor, conversely, finds reason to hope in our 
contemporary context because what appear to be the accomplishments of liberal individualism 
are largely illusory. The Aristotelian framework is not as easy to discard as we might hope, and 
our society continues to form its citizens through a shared set of moral ideals and practices. The 
emotivist mindset has undoubtedly weakened our social bonds (thus his call for reform), but it 
could never fully obliterate our common projects and aspirations: “Our way of life never sinks to 
the full horror that would attend it (I believe) if we could be truly consistent Benthamites, for 
instance.”169 MacIntyre, however, is not convinced that the two in fact disagree on this point.  
Believing that a telos-oriented moral imagination is a universal dimension of the human 
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experience, MacIntyre views the problem in terms of a society and culture structured in such a 
way that we are unable to recognize these dimensions and give them their proper place: “They 
are therefore cultures inhabited by many more or less frustrated and usually unrecognized 
Aristotelians.”170 The problem, from MacIntyre’s perspective, is that it is only in local 
communities that these practices and particular visions of the good are able to be fully 
acknowledged and engaged. Where Taylor believes that Western societies have reached 
meaningful consensus on the aspirations of modern moral life (particularly surrounding human 
dignity) and the mechanisms for securing these goals, MacIntyre sees only the tattered remains 
of coherent theories. This refusal to acknowledge the possibility and limited success of shared 
social projects remains one of the greatest weaknesses in MacIntyre’s arguments.  
 A more pernicious problem, the two authors agree, is the question of whether goods or 
virtues can entirely transcend a particular practice. In seeking to reformulate the core thrust of 
After Virtue in his own terms, Taylor develops a distinction between prudence and procedure.171 
Prudence or phronesis deliberates within a specific context or practice, seeking to discern the 
good and determine how to realize it. Procedure, conversely, seeks to construct an ethic free of 
context and universally true. Taylor argues for both the possibility and benefit of procedural 
reasoning about goods rooted in but also transcendent of a given practice. Goods such as 
autonomy and disengaged reason transcend a given practice and, with their close ties to human 
dignity, are essential to preserve.  
MacIntyre acknowledges the critical need for disengaged reasoning, but insists that it can 
never be fully extrapolated from all practices. While such critical reflection is undoubtedly a 
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necessary skill in any practice (and in this way transcendent), it can only occur with those who 
share our commitment to the good and in relation to those practices though which we strive to 
realize it. Without this situatedness, we have no measure of whether our reasoning is successful. 
Here MacIntyre’s argument is the more persuasive, and in fact buttresses Taylor’s contention 
that our civic society continues to function in at least meager ways similar to the poleis of old. 
Debates about realizing justice in a liberal democracy (even those that seem only concerned with 
procedure) remain embedded in practices striving for the good. In this way, they only seem fully 
transcendent and independent. 
A third challenge, concerning the plurality of goods we are capable of pursuing, is 
identified in each author’s critique of the other. MacIntyre raises the issue in the clearest way. 
Any Aristotelian conception of the moral agent must address the challenge of negotiating 
multiple visions of the good, and offer criteria for their discernment. MacIntyre states plainly, 
however, “Taylor’s theorizing not only fails to provide such criteria, is seems peculiarly ill-
equipped to do so.”172 Taylor, in turn, finds these critiques of MacIntyre’s baffling, noting that: 
“the contemporary philosopher from whom I have learned most in this account is none other than 
Alasdair MacIntyre.”173 Indeed, as we have seen, Taylor does account for our ability to negotiate 
competing strong evaluations and even hypergoods. While he maintains the necessary possibility 
of holding competing visions of the good, his work in Sources of the Self is in part to 
demonstrate how traditions are negotiated and adapted. The question, however, is to what extent 
we can entertain and pursue differing visions of the good without losing an integrated sense of 
self. At some point the range of goods through which we define lives overwhelm us; we can no 
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longer articulate our lives as cohesive whole. 
The great luxury of MacIntyre’s constructive proposal (developed in Chapter Five) is that 
through affiliation with particular communities we draw boundaries around the set of goods to 
which we are committed. We affirm a specific moral tradition and our debates concerning the 
good function within a core community and against a background of mutually acknowledged 
consensus. Lacking such a community, there are few resources from which to draw when 
negotiating the seemingly infinite spectrum of commitments available to us in our contemporary 
context. Yet though distressing, this is likely more descriptive of our present, postmodern 
context. We find ourselves compelled by innumerable life goods and hypergoods with little 
understanding of how to evaluate and weight their claims (itself an act of practical reasoning). 
Thus, while Taylor is perhaps more optimistic about our democratic project, his portrait of the 
self in our modern context is far from reassuring.  
I have argued that Taylor’s cautioned optimism about modern liberalism and nuanced 
account of the human person are more convincing than MacIntyre’s. Yet if Taylor indeed has the 
more insightful portrait of our social and existential condition, why the emphasis on MacIntyre 
in this dissertation? The reasoning is threefold. First, MacIntyre demonstrates in the strongest 
terms just what is at stake in our contemporary context. While he at times overestimates both the 
degree to which we have truly abandoned an Aristotelian framework and the impossibility of 
negotiating rival moral commitments, his narrative points to many of the critical challenges we 
nevertheless face in no uncertain terms. Second, the direction of influence most often runs from 
MacIntyre to Taylor, and seldom the reverse. While there are hints at Taylor’s influence in some 
of MacIntyre’s later writings, it is most often Taylor that is acknowledging a debt. Indeed, 
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MacIntyre can be rightly credited with profoundly shifting the conversation in moral and 
political philosophy, and his argument, though limited, deserves recognition.  
Third and most importantly, MacIntyre in fact offers the more hopeful avenue of 
response from the perspective of Catholic higher education. Were this a dissertation concerned 
only with political philosophy, the thought of Taylor might suffice. What his writings lack, 
however, is a clear sense of how we can respond to the context he identifies. Most frequently, he 
sketches how one might structure a counter argument to modernist claims, but leaves it to others 
to determine appropriate practical or pastoral responses. While our society might indeed have 
retained enough vestiges of the Aristotelian framework and the common good to make social 
cooperation possible, the resources that remain universally available are minimal. The vision of 
human flourishing is far too thin to inspire the moral commitments of a generation. While we 
might affirm the democratic practices of voting and civic engagement as substantive goods, a 
genuine commitment to the common good requires much deeper formation. MacIntyre, with his 
emphasis on moral traditions embodied in social practices, provides a clearer vision of how faith 
communities and post-secondary institutions might form engaged citizens in our contemporary 
context (even as he seems to deny this possibility). Chapter Five examines this aspect of his 
work, as well as its adaptation by practical theologians and religious educators. 
 First though, we must examine how our contemporary situation is interpreted 
theologically, and what responses are called for from a community of faith. The central role that 
the vision of the good plays in our moral lives and identities points us in the direction of virtue 
ethics. Animated by a vision of the good life, virtue ethics examines the ends that we seek and 
the ‘habits of the heart’ that we need to consistently act toward these ends. If the trends that 
Putnam identifies are correct, and the insights of MacIntyre and Taylor are accurate, our times 
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require a particular virtue that is able to recognize our interdependence and commit ourselves to 
the common good. It must be rooted not only in the hearts of individuals, but the narratives, 
practices, and structures of the community. The next chapter proposes solidarity as an essential 
virtue of our time. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Virtue of Solidarity in the Catholic Social Tradition 
  
 The decline of social capital and the rise of unchecked individualism in the United States 
were neither inevitable nor inconsequential. As Chapter One demonstrates, increased isolation 
and withdrawal from American civic life comes at a cost by even the most utilitarian of 
measures. Moreover, these broader social trends are paralleled in the spiritual and religious life 
of the United States. The weakening of the bonds of faith is symptomatic of larger trends but also 
contributes to their perpetuation. As essential elements of our social fabric, the disintegration of 
faith communities results in a loss of one of the most traditionally robust outlets for social 
engagement. Thus the implications for Catholic higher education run two directions. Our 
colleges and universities will experience these broader challenges in specific ways, but are also 
uniquely positioned to respond in ways that engage the whole person. 
 In the previous chapter, Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor identify some of the 
deeper undercurrents that have generated these declines. What has been lost is a vision of and 
commitment to the common good – a vision of the good life that we can only build together. For 
MacIntyre, the negation of the telos in the Enlightenment and the rejection of the common good 
in our liberal democracy create a political and civil discourse in which autonomous agents strive 
to realize to the fullest extent possible their individual vision of the good with no sense of 
responsibility for larger social projects. Charles Taylor extends MacIntyre’s argument and 
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considers its effects on one’s moral and spiritual identity. For him, our moral frameworks and 
visions of the good remain central to who we are and how we interpret our life’s quest, but 
human flourishing is now imagined in disengaged and atomistic ways. Any attempt to respond to 
this reality or educate for the common good must engage these deeper moral sources of identity 
and belief – our vision of the good. In this chapter, we begin to consider how the church and 
Catholic higher education specifically can respond pastorally to this reality through the 
promotion and practice of the virtue of solidarity. 
  This chapter proceeds in two sections. In order to most accurately grasp the 
emergence of solidarity as a virtue in the Catholic social tradition, this chapter must begin in the 
middle. The critical point of departure is John Paul II’s social encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 
(SRS), in which solidarity is first articulated as a Christian virtue.174 Though the term ‘solidarity’ 
itself appears in earlier documents, it is John Paul II that gives the concept its most systematic 
and deliberative treatment. Simply tracing every occurrence of the word, however, does little to 
distinguish the theological concept from more general rhetorical usage.175 Moreover, John Paul 
II in Centesimus Annus suggests that the underlying concept has appeared throughout the 
tradition under a variety of titles.176 Beginning with the definitive treatment in SRS allows for a 
more complete and systematic view of the evolution and underlying significance of the concept. 
                                                 
174 John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, 1990. All official documents accessed in this chapter 
were retrieved from the Vatican website: www.vatican.va. 
175 This does not mean that others have not tried. For a complete documentation of every 
occurrence of the term in official social teachings up to 1991, see: Marie Vianney Bilgrien, 
Solidarity: A Principle, An Attitude, A Duty? Or the Virtue for an Independent World? (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1999), Ch. 1. 
176 “This principle is frequently stated by Pope Leo XII, who uses the term ‘friendship’, a 
concept already found in Greek philosophy. Pope Pius XI refers to it with the equally meaningful 
term ‘social charity’. Pope Paul VI, expanding the concept to cover the many modern aspects of 
the social questions, speaks of a ‘civilization of love’.” John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, 1991, no. 10. 
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 After examining John Paul II’s proposal of solidarity as a virtue, the second section 
briefly traces the evolution of the concept from the earliest social encyclicals to Pope Francis’s 
most recent Evanelii Gaudium. While this overview offers a more comprehensive view of 
solidarity as a virtue, two limits must be acknowledged immediately. First, the social tradition of 
the Catholic Church is much longer and broader than the dozen or so papal encyclicals. Yet due 
to the limited scope of this dissertation, my focus must remain on these documents with minimal 
reference to other documents in the tradition. Indeed, SRS is the only document that can receive 
full and comprehensive treatment. Second, as is shown shortly, solidarity is directly linked to the 
common good, a central theme of the Catholic social tradition. While some understanding of this 
notion in essential, it is far beyond the scope of this section to develop a comprehensive 
formulation of the common good in the Catholic social tradition.177 The focus here, is on how 
solidarity shapes our commitment to the common good. 
 
3.1. Solidarity in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 
Context 
 To understand the full meaning of John Paul II’s proposal of solidarity as a virtue, one 
must first recognize the historical context of Sollicitudo Rei Socialis. The pontiff understood 
himself developing and updating a particular strand in Catholic social thought; but the document 
also reflects his own political and personal experiences. Dated December 31, 1987 and published 
the following February, SRS is John Paul II’s commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of 
Paul VI’s 1967 encyclical Populorum Progressio (PP). While the publication of social 
                                                 
177 For an overview, see: Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, “Compendium of the Social 
Doctrine of the Church,” 2004, nos. 164-170. For further reading: David Hollenbach, The 
Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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encyclicals on significant anniversaries of earlier documents is nothing new, this encyclical and 
its predecessor both fall outside of the series of encyclicals dating back to Leo XIII’s 
promulgation of Rerum Novarum in 1891. Rather than focusing broadly on the global social 
situation as documents in this series generally do, both PP and SRS are concerned with one 
particular aspect: the question human development. Thus John Paul II understood himself to be 
celebrating the originality of Populorum Progressio and reexamining the question of 
development in his contemporary context (SRS, nos. 5-10). 
 Like Paul VI, John Paul II aims to broaden and deepen our understanding of authentic 
development beyond material or economic measurements. Yet as John Paul II surveys the 
contemporary situation, he recognizes that even by these measures, the “situation has noticeably 
worsened” for much of the population (no. 13). Beyond the concerns of Populorum Progressio, 
John Paul II notes a more fundamental aspect of its originality, which he develops as a central 
theme in SRS. John Paul II recognizes PP as the first encyclical to locate the social question in a 
truly global context. In addition to the questions of industrialization and economic systems that 
animate the earlier documents, PP examines the interdependence of all in an emerging globalized 
context: 
Political leaders, and citizens of rich countries considered as individuals, 
especially if they are Christians, have the moral obligation, according to the 
degree of each one’s responsibility, to take into consideration, in personal 
decisions and decisions of government, this relationship of universality, this 
interdependence which exists between their conduct and the poverty and 
underdevelopment of so many millions of people. Pope Paul’s encyclical 
translates more succinctly the moral obligation as the “duty of solidarity” (no. 9, 
emphasis original). 
Thus it is to Populorum Progressio that John Paul II attributes recognition of global 
interdependence as a moral reality and solidarity as the corollary response. Solidarity is indeed a 
major theme of this earlier work. The title of the second part of the encyclical is “The 
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Development of the Human Race in the Spirit of Solidarity,” and the ‘duty of solidarity’ is 
developed throughout this section. Thus it is perhaps most appropriate to interpret John Paul II’s 
treatment of solidarity in SRS not as an initial proposal, but as the elevation of solidarity from a 
duty to a virtue.  
 While the anniversary of Populorum Progressio provides the occasion for the 
composition of Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, John Paul II identifies other global developments that 
shape the context in which it is written. In particular, he identifies the global division of the East 
and West and the “logic of blocs” that shape the geopolitical reality (no. 20). Yet against this 
common Cold War narrative, the pontiff suggests that the more critical global division is 
between the wealthy Northern Hemisphere and the impoverished South. Though the Soviet Bloc 
and NATO allies drive the conflict, it is the poorer third and even fourth-world countries that 
bear the greatest burden, whether through participation in exploitative economic systems or by 
hosting devastating proxy wars. Critically, John Paul II identifies both the East and West as 
bearing responsibility for these global realities. 
 John Paul II directly experienced these global realities in two ways. First, Charles Curran 
and colleagues identify the influence of the Pope’s global travels in shaping his understanding.178 
In particular, they point to the experience of John Paul II in Chile, where during an open-air mass 
the government violently suppressed a civilian protest. It was trips to Latin America that 
convinced the Pope that American capitalism had done little to improve the conditions of the 
global poor. Second and undoubtedly central to John Paul II’s approach to this document was the 
experience of his native Poland. By 1987, the pontiff had already visited Poland as Pope three 
                                                 
178 Charles E. Curran, Kenneth R. Himes, and Thomas A. Shannon, “Sollicitudo rei socialis,” in 
Modern Catholic Social Teaching: Commentaries and Interpretations, ed. Kenneth R. Himes 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 417. 
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times, and was experiencing warming relations with the Polish government. Moreover, the 
Soviet Union had recently signaled openness to reforms and greater autonomy of the Bloc 
countries. At the center of Poland’s rapidly changing reality was Solidarność (Solidarity), a trade 
union movement that John Paul II readily embraced. Anyone reading the Pope’s affirmation of 
solidarity as a Christian virtue could not but think of the revolution underway in his native 
land.179 
 
Overview and Themes 
 This context and these concerns overshadow Sollicitudo Rei Socialis heavily. Including 
the introduction and conclusion, the document is divided into seven chapters. After recognizing 
the original contributions of Populorum Progressio in the second chapter, John Paul II turns to a 
survey of the contemporary world. While there is much that he finds troubling in this outlook 
(the growing global disparities and the logic of blocs outlined above), he also raises up some 
positive aspects of the contemporary situation. In particular, he recognizes a growing awareness 
of our dignity and interdependence. This awareness of our shared basic rights and common 
destiny encourages us to work together to ensure legal protections for human rights and even 
leads to a growing concern for ecological sustainability. 
 This survey flows into the constructive portion of the encyclical. Chapter four develops a 
contrast between false and authentic modes of development. Immediately, he notes: 
“development is not a straight-forward process, as it were automatic and in itself limitless, as 
though given certain conditions, the human race were able to progress rabidly toward an 
                                                 
179 For a summary of this history and a review Poland’s development since 1989, see: Gerald J. 
Beyer, “The Unfinished Revolution: Solidarity, Freedom and Participation in Poland after 1989 
through the Lens of Catholic Social Thought” (Dissertation, Boston College, 2005). 
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undefined perfection of some kind” (no. 27, emphasis original). For John Paul II, the question of 
development is not simply a matter of bringing third- and fourth-world countries up to first-
world standards. He is particularly concerned about materialistic and dehumanizing views of 
development and the risk of “superdevelopment” (no. 28). Drawing on the personalist outlook 
that informs much of his theological horizon, the pontiff stresses meaningful progress that 
touches all dimensions of life and is experienced communally through participation.180 Again, 
the question of sustainable development in the context of finite natural resources is raised. Yet 
above all, John Paul II recognizes authentic development as a question of having vs. being. The 
vision that the Pope ultimately lays out is one of being in right relationship with God, one’s 
neighbors, and all of creation. 
 After offering a theological reading of the contemporary context in chapter five (a section 
that is examined below), John Paul II offers a few particular guidelines before concluding the 
document. In this sixth chapter, the pontiff makes a concerted effort to delineate clearly the 
limited role that the Church can offer in the pursuit of authentic development. He opens the 
chapter by noting:  
The Church does not have technical solutions to offer for the problem of 
underdevelopment as such…For the Church does not propose economic and 
political systems or programs, nor does she show preference for one or the 
other…But the Church is an “expert in humanity,” and this leads her necessarily 
to extender her religious mission to the various fields in which men and women 
expend their efforts in search of the always relative happiness which is possible in 
this world, in line with their dignity as persons (no. 41, emphasis original). 
Later, he similarly emphasizes that the “Church’s social doctrine is not a ‘third way’ between 
liberal capitalism and Marxist collectivism, nor even a possible alternative to other solutions less 
radically opposed to one another: rather, it constitutes a category of its own” (no. 41, emphasis 
                                                 
180 Here John Paul II is developing the moral anthropology that he developed while still a 
cardinal: Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person, trans. Andrzej Potocki (Boston: D. Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1979). In particular, Part Four: Participation. 
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original). The purpose of the Church’s social teaching is to provide a thoughtful reflection on 
contemporary realities “in light of faith and of the church’s tradition” (no. 41).  
 With the dust not yet settled from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s two 
instructions concerning liberation theology, John Paul II is careful to emphasize that the vocation 
of the Church is to be a voice of conscience in moral debates, not to engage in the political 
process itself. While he calls attention to particular structural challenges, such as the 
international trade and financial systems, the focus is much more on articulating moral values 
and goals. Yet while John Paul II’s overall stance toward liberation theology was ambiguous, he 
draws his first guideline directly from one of its central precepts: “the option or love of 
preference for the poor” (no. 42, emphasis original). While the definition he offers is more 
narrowly that of the poor as the preferred object of the Church’s compassion and as a guideline 
for policy making, this encyclical is the first in which the language of the preferential option is 
articulated. To this insight, John Paul II offers two additional guidelines that have a much longer 
legacy in the Catholic social tradition: the limited right to private property and an affirmation of 
human rights and freedom. Central to these proposals is John Paul II’s notion of solidarity. 
 
Solidarity in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 
 The chapter of theological reflection in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis approaches solidarity 
from the context of interdependence. Our contemporary situation, marked particularly by 
technological advance and globalization, renders interdependence an unavoidable dimension of 
human life. However, beyond interdependence as a de facto element of human social existence, 
John Paul II seeks to highlight its moral quality. We cannot avoid participating in structures and 
systems that form and regulate our relationships, and these are never morally neutral. The social 
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obstacles and challenges that we face are not natural or unavoidable, but rather the products of 
structures of sin, which: 
Are rooted in personal sin, and thus always linked to the concrete acts of 
individuals who introduce these structures, consolidate them and make them 
difficult to remove. And thus they grow stronger, spread, and become the source 
of other sins, and so influence people’s behavior (n. 36, emphasis original). 
The structures and institutions of modern life create relationships across geographic, religious, 
and political boundaries that are frequently unequal. Yet we cannot avoid participating in and 
being formed by these realities. Though they are not entirely of any individuals’ choosing they 
are nevertheless tolerated or sustained through human greed, shortsightedness, and sloth. The 
challenge for John Paul II begins with recognizing this reality and responding with a 
“diametrically opposed attitude” (n. 38, emphasis original). 
 The recognition of the moral fact of our interdependence, particularly from a Christian 
perspective, leads to both a conversion and a commitment. The conversion is experienced as an 
urgent recognition that we must change not only our behaviors, but also our attitudes. The 
commitment is to sustaining and advancing this interdependent web through (quoting from 
Populorum Progressio): “The full development ‘of the whole individual and of all people’” (no. 
38). This commitment to the common good is central to John Paul II’s definition of solidarity: 
It is above all a question of interdependence, sensed as a system determining 
relationships in the contemporary world, in its economic, cultural, political, and 
religious elements, and accepted as a moral category. When interdependence 
becomes recognized in this way, the correlative response as a moral and social 
attitude [habitus moralis et socialis], as a “virtue,” is solidarity [consensio]. This 
then is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of 
so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering 
determination to commit oneself to the common good [voluntas firma et cons tans 
bonum curandi commune]; that is to say to the good of all and of each individual 
because we are all really responsible for all (n. 38, emphasis original). 
Within this core passage are three key insights that give shape to the definition of solidarity that 
is developed in this dissertation. The first has already been highlighted: not only is 
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interdependence an inescapable dimension of human life; it is likewise a moral reality, 
embodying and expressing our social attitudes. Second and in this context, solidarity as a virtue 
commits one to work for the common good. Third, the common good itself (closely associated 
with John Paul II’s notion of authentic development) holds in tension the good of all and the 
good of each individual; neither eclipses the other. 
 In the following paragraphs, John Paul II continues to develop his understanding of 
solidarity as a virtue and suggests ways in which it might be exercised. Generally, the practice of 
solidarity recognizes the full humanity of anyone considered ‘other’, “whether a person, people, 
or nation” (n. 39, emphasis original). Yet he raises up particular relationships and the unique 
form that solidarity takes within them. For those that are stronger or more influential, solidarity 
is expressed as a greater responsibility for the weak and a willingness to share what they have. 
Yet in turn, solidarity encourages the weak to avoid passivity or destructive impulses and 
participate in whatever ways possible toward the promotion of the common good. Third, and 
critically for this study, John Paul II calls on “intermediate groups” to look beyond their own 
priorities and interests in striving for the good of all. Finally, the pontiff likewise recognizes and 
celebrates the solidarity experienced by the poor among themselves, standing together in pursuit 
of their needs and rights. Echoing the Church’s preferential option, he assures: “By virtue of her 
own evangelical duty the Church feels called to take her stand beside the poor, to discern the 
justice of their requests, and to help satisfy them, without losing sight of the good of groups in 
the context of the common good” (n. 39).  
 John Paul II believes that such relationships of solidarity for the common good are a 
possible and worthy goal for all nations and peoples. Drawing parallels with the traditional virtue 
of charity, he argues: “In the light of faith, solidarity seeks to go beyond itself, to take on the 
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specifically Christian dimension of total gratuity, forgiveness and reconciliation” (n. 40, 
emphasis original). A Christian recognizes the other as not only fully human, but as the Image of 
God. This common source of dignity draws us beyond finite conceptions of unity and into 
communion. Thus the goal is not simply the common good that justice establishes, but “the 
realization of [the] divine plan” only made possible through the work of the Holy Spirit (n. 40).  
 
Evaluation of Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 
 When it was first published, commentaries and reviews of Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 
focused on John Paul II’s critique of both the East and the West.181 Conservative American 
authors in particular were outraged by the Pope’s apparent disregard for the distinctions between 
American capitalism and atheistic communism. While there can be no doubting John Paul II’s 
personal resistance to communism, they feared that this document facilitated a political 
relativism that failed to recognize the true moral disparity between the two hemispheres. Yet as 
mentioned above, one of John Paul II’s principle concerns in writing SRS was precisely the logic 
that separates the world in Eastern and Western blocs, ignoring the struggles of the global South. 
It was John Paul II’s deliberate decision to view development from this perspective (an 
expression of the Church’s preferential option for the poor) that led him to find culpability in 
both global powers. His goal was not to take a side amid this global tension, but to remind both 
sides that from the perspective of faith, theirs was not the primary historic narrative. 
 More forceful critiques engage the methodology and guidelines of the document. Maria 
Riley, for example, notes that though the document powerfully critiques global definitions of and 
                                                 
181 Curran, Himes, and Shannon, “Sollicitudo Rei Socialis,” 430. 
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efforts toward development, it fails to recognize the essential role of women.182 Women continue 
to bear the greatest brunt of poverty, and any attempt at internationally development that does 
not account for their particular position and needs will inevitably fail. In the decades between PP 
and SRS, governments and NGOs increasingly recognized that the promotion of women in 
particular is one of the greatest means toward ensuring the common good of all. In SRS, John 
Paul II is largely blind to this dimension of human progress. Riley concludes, “Feminist analysis 
would point not so much to what the encyclical says, but to what it does not say, because it lacks 
a gender analysis.”183 Though Riley exposes a blind spot in John Paul II’s thought, she largely 
commends the document’s outlook and finds much with which to agree. 
 Mary Hobgood’s critique, conversely, is far more fundamental, arguing “that this 
‘traditionalist’ pope has taken a noticeable departure from previous or mainstream Catholic 
social teaching by ignoring structural criticisms concerning the causes of poverty, and by 
disregarding radical prescriptions of what might be done about poverty.”184 For Hobgood, SRS is 
a departure from its preceding tradition, promoting an individualist and capitalist view of poverty 
against Paul VI’s more structural and liberative view. Specifically, John Paul II advocates much 
more of a top-down and individualized view of development: “John Paul II assumes that moral 
conversion and consensus at the level of ideas will mobilize the political will necessary for social 
change.”185 Hobgood’s critique extends to the proposal of solidarity at the heart of this study. 
Even against his affirmation of solidarity in earlier documents as essential to workers organizing 
                                                 
182 Maria Riley, “Feminist Analysis: A Missing Perspective,” in The Logic of Solidarity: 
Commentaries on Pope John Paul Ii’s Encyclical on Social Concern, ed. Gregory Baum and 
Robert Ellsberg (Orbis Books, 1990), 186–201. 
183 Ibid., 192. 
184 Mary E. Hobgood, “Conflicting Paradigms in Social Analysis,” in The Logic of Solidarity: 
Commentaries on Pope John Paul Ii’s Encyclical on Social Concern, ed. Gregory Baum and 
Robert Ellsberg (Orbis Books, 1990), 168. 
185 Ibid., 180. 
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in their struggle for social change, John Paul II’s presentation in SRS seems a spiritualized 
solution lacking political teeth. 
 Thus beyond methodology, SRS seems to lack an appreciation of the dynamics of power 
in creating social change. A deeper social analysis of the roots of underdevelopment is missing 
from the document. While there are passing references to the culpability of individuals for 
participation in structures of sin, the emphasis is on how the systems and structures themselves 
have failed the poor and vulnerable. There is no clear identification of economic aggressors or 
acts of oppression. While the rich and powerful are challenged to consider their responsibility 
toward the weak, they are never challenged to examine the sources of their wealth. 
 This shortcoming carries over into the document’s constructive proposals, including the 
articulation of solidarity. The dynamics of change John Paul II calls for are rooted in intellectual 
recognition and spiritual conversion. He calls on the reader to acknowledge the moral dimension 
of our interdependence and respond by committing oneself to the common good. Yet, an 
awareness of the dynamics of power and change seem absent from the pontiff’s proposal. While 
the voluntary conversion of the rich and powerful is an undoubtedly worthy ideal, it is seldom 
the path to social progress. To paraphrase Martin Luther King Jr.’s famous assertion, freedom 
and rights are seldom given freely, but must be demanded by the oppressed. The heavy emphasis 
in SRS is on acts of solidarity through which a society strives harmoniously toward the common 
good. Global leaders continue to wield power, but do so with greater social compassion. Indeed, 
John Paul II seems to distinguish the establishment of justice from the practice of virtue: 
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The goal of peace…will certainly be achieved through the putting into effect of 
social and international justice, but also through the practice of the virtues which 
favor togetherness, and which teach us to live in unity, so as to build in unity, by 
giving and receiving, an new society and better world (no. 39). 
The spirit of solidarity, from this perspective, brings people together in a spirit of freedom but 
does little to directly confront structures of inequality.  
 Finally, we may raise questions about the adequacy of the definition of solidarity as a 
virtue in the document. Questions of this sort would fit into two general categories: first, whether 
what is being described is indeed a virtue; and second, how the virtue might fit into a more 
traditional virtues framework. Regarding the first set of questions, there is some evidence that 
while John Paul II specifically names solidarity as a virtue, his description does not fit traditional 
conceptions of how virtues function. In particular, his central definition of solidarity 
characterizes it as a social attitude diametrically opposed to the negative social attitudes of greed 
and selfishness. While attitudes are morally significant, the language of virtues is more 
commonly associated with inclinations toward action. A commonplace understanding of 
attitudes as psychological disposition lacks this direct link to actions. This is where the official 
Latin text proves helpful. Here the virtue is identified as a moral and social habitus or habit: a 
term that has a specific role in the moral framework developed by Thomas Aquinas. This insight 
is developed further in the subsequent chapter. 
 Assuming that solidarity as described by John Paul II is indeed a virtue, we must further 
inquire as to what sort of virtue it might be. In particular, how does it fit into the traditional 
virtues framework? Scholars and commentators have most commonly aligned solidarity with 
either charity or justice.186 As an act of the will (a firm and persevering commitment), it would 
seem most appropriate to align the virtue with one or the other, as opposed to those virtues 
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governing the intellect or passions. The description the Pope offers provides evidence for either. 
With the common good as a central element of its definition, it would seem immediately clear 
that solidarity is aligned with justice.187 Yet John Paul II himself suggests the “many points of 
contact” between solidarity and charity. Moreover, affirming solidarity’s relevance for all people 
of good will suggests that it is more appropriately considered a moral virtue. Yet he likewise 
develops the specifically Christian elements of solidarity and presupposes “the help of divine 
grace” in its social function (no. 38). 
 For the purposes of this study, it is neither necessary to reconcile the diverse strands in 
John Paul II’s proposal, nor limit ourselves to his development of the concept. Rather, SRS 
offers a point of departure that highlights several of the contours central to the contemporary 
understanding of solidarity in modern Catholic social teaching. Social encyclicals themselves 
seldom strive for systematic theological precision. They are pastoral documents intended for a 
wider audience. It is for this reason that it is helpful to look to the more traditional framework 
developed by Thomas Aquinas. Before turning our attention to this work, however, it would be 
helpful to locate solidarity within the broader Catholic social tradition. In particular, it is 
beneficial to see how these specific paragraphs in SRS have been used in subsequent social 
encyclicals.  
 
3.2. Solidarity in the Catholic Social Tradition 
 As previously mentioned, this task of situating solidarity within the broader tradition is 
more complicated than it might first appear. First, any distinctions between technical usage of the 
                                                 
187 In fact, is developed in the next chapter, what is commonly assumed to be the shorthand 
definition of solidarity in SRS, a firm and persevering commitment to the common good, is 
nearly identical to Thomas Aquinas’s definition of general justice: “The virtue of a good citizen 
is general justice, whereby a man is directed to the common good.” IIa-IIae, q. 58, a. 6. 
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term and more generally rhetorical mentions of solidarity are tenuous at best. That the word 
‘solidarity’ is used in a particular way in a particular encyclical does little to add to a 
comprehensive understanding of the term. This seems to be a critical problem with Bilgrien’s 
survey of solidarity in Church teachings from the earliest mentions through John Paul II’s social 
encyclicals.188 The term does have a clear and growing trajectory from its earliest appearances 
(Pius XII’s Summi Pontificatus) through the documents of Vatican II (in which ‘solidarity’ 
appears five times). That the word appears variously as the ‘spirit of solidarity’, ‘the principle of 
solidarity’, and the ‘duty of solidarity’ does little to advance a more exact understanding of the 
term. 
 Moreover, John Paul II himself admits in Centessimus Annus that solidarity’s underlying 
concept has been developed throughout the tradition under different titles: 
This principle is frequently stated by Pope Leo XIII, who uses the term 
friendship, a concept already found in Greek philosophy. Pope Pius XI refers to it 
with the equally meaningful term social charity. Pope Paul VI, expanding the 
concept to cover the many modern aspects of the social question, speaks of a 
civilization of love. (n. 10, emphasis original). 
Here again, difficulty surrounding the term is apparent. Solidarity is named as a principle, but 
then connected to other themes most commonly found in virtue ethics: charity and friendship. 
This is not an indication of confusion on the part of the author or tradition. Rather, it simply 
demonstrates the fact that systematic exposition was not and is not the goal of social encyclicals. 
Part of what makes the theological reflection in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis so unique is its apparent 
attempt to offer more systematic and intentional language. 
 Nevertheless, a brief pause to consider the usage of solidarity in subsequent papal 
documents reveals some surprising insights about the location of solidarity within the Catholic 
social tradition. First, it must be acknowledged that while the specific paragraphs of SRS 
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offering a theological reflection are cited in later documents, nowhere is the notion of solidarity 
as a virtue further developed. The language of the ‘spirit’ or ‘principle’ of solidarity is used at 
times, but the most common appearances simply describe some activity or action being done “in 
solidarity.” 
 Turning to the encyclicals of Benedict XVI, themes of solidarity are present, though not 
directly stated as a virtue. The language of his encyclicals, however, is entirely in the key of 
virtue. Deus Caritas Est (2005) was perhaps immediately characterized for the sharp distinction 
Benedict draws between justice as the realm of the state and charity as the proper ministry of the 
church. While affirming that the two spheres are interrelated, it is clear that he is wary of the 
church working directly for political change: “A just society must be the achievement of politics, 
not the Church. Yet the promotion of justice through efforts to bring about openness of mind and 
will to the demands of the common good is something which concerns the Church deeply” (n. 
28). The line that Benedict appears to draw raises two difficult questions. The first concerns the 
implicit conception of ‘the Church’ being assumed. Of whom does he speak when articulating 
the limited role of the church in promoting the common good? The second question concerns 
how it is that he expects this good to be achieved. These questions are addressed after 
considering his second encyclical treating social matters. 
 In this Deus Caritas Est, the word solidarity only appears three times, all in the same 
paragraph (no. 30). The emphasis here is globalization and the capacity of technology to 
strengthen awareness and connections across geographic boundaries. This connectivity has led to 
greater forms of cooperation between state, private, nonprofit, and religious agents in seeking to 
respond to global challenges. While this section does little to deepen our understanding of 
solidarity, it does offer an apparent endorsement of service-learning pedagogies:  
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Significantly, our time has also seen the growth and spread of different kinds of 
volunteer work, which assume responsibility for providing a variety of services. I 
wish here to offer a special word of gratitude and appreciation to all those who 
take part in these activities in whatever way. For young people, this widespread 
involvement constitutes a school of life which offers them a formation in 
solidarity and in readiness to offer others not simply material aid but their very 
selves (no. 30). 
 
 In Caritas in Veritate (2009), Benedict seems to back away from the sharp distinction 
between charity and justice drawn in Deus Caritas Est. While the focus is still primarily on 
charity, he affirms “Charity goes beyond justice…but it never lacks justice” (n. 6). Identifying 
this encyclical in line with Populorum Progressio and Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, authentic human 
development is again a central theme of the document. Similarly, solidarity appears prominently 
throughout the text (40 citations in total). Tracing the usage of the term in each of these 
occurrences adds little to what has been developed so far. The topic is not treated in a formal 
way, and only once is solidarity mentioned with a reference to the appropriate paragraphs in 
SRS: “solidarity is first and foremost a sense of responsibility on the part of everyone with 
regard to everyone, and it cannot therefore be merely delegated to the State” (no. 38) Beyond this 
affirmation, one contribution to our understanding of solidarity that Caritas in Veritate makes is 
the tension that it recognizes between solidarity and subsidiarity:  
The principle of subsidiarity must remain closely linked to the principle of 
solidarity and vice versa, since the former without the latter gives way to social 
privatism, while the latter without the former gives way to paternalist social 
assistance that is demeaning to those in need (no. 58, emphasis original). 
This echoes John Paul II’s affirmation of the fruitful tension between solidarity and freedom.189 
The demands of the common good outweigh those of the individual, but never abolish them. 
                                                 
189 “In order to be genuine, development must be achieved within the framework of solidarity 
and freedom, without ever sacrificing either of them under whatever pretext.” SRS, no. 33. 
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Though Benedict does not treat solidarity in an extended manner, he does write on the 
closely related concept of fraternity, in particular linking it to the principle of gratuitousness. By 
this he intends the necessity of a primary experience of giftedness – God’s gift of life and love – 
that makes the work of justice possible: “While in the past it was possible to argue that justice 
had to come first and gratuitousness could follow afterwards, as a complement, today it is clear 
that without gratuitousness, there can be no justice in the first place” (n. 38). This notion of 
gratuitousness seems to replace interdependence as the principle motivation for acting in 
solidarity.190 For Benedict, the willingness to work for the common good and the trust necessary 
for any economic system to function justly are rooted in a moral disposition of fraternity rooted 
in the experience of one’s giftedness. 
There is much that is compelling about this image and indeed, it is unlikely that the 
secure and powerful will work for justice without a primary moral conversion. Yet, it seems that 
the primary agents of change Benedict imagines are the politically and economically powerful. 
In John Paul II’s framework (and recalling the legacy of the Solidarity movement in Poland), the 
virtue of solidarity largely describes the mutual support of the weaker populations and nations in 
struggling for their rights. For the powerful, solidarity is not the motivation for extending charity, 
but a willingness to join the movement. If the realization of justice and human rights is 
contingent upon the gratuity of the powerful, the journey to the common good will indeed be a 
very long one. 
 
                                                 
190 John Paul II, however, similarly emphasizes it in drawing out the Christian dimensions of 
solidarity: “In the light of faith, solidarity seeks to go beyond itself, to take on the specifically 
Christian dimension of total gratuity, forgiveness, and reconciliation.” SRS, no. 40. 
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 Finally, though at the time of this writing Pope Francis has not yet written a true social 
encyclical, his apostolic exhortation Evangelii Gaudium (2013) offers some indications of how 
solidarity may continue to evolve in the Catholic social tradition in the future. First, it must be 
recognized that as an exhortation both the intended audience and subject matter differ from 
earlier social encyclicals. Pope Francis is writing specifically to the church on the question of its 
evangelizing mission. His primary goal is neither to articulate social challenges nor offer 
guidelines for realizing the common good. Nevertheless, the second chapter of the document 
focuses heavily on the social and communal challenges in which the church finds itself, and 
solidarity becomes a central theme in approaching these challenges.  
Appearing a total of nineteen times in the document, themes of solidarity can be found 
throughout the document, though mentions of the term are centered in two areas. The first is 
Francis’ survey of the contemporary landscape, in which deeper social commitments and the 
bonds of solidarity are largely absent. The usage of the word in these paragraphs lacks systematic 
rigor, though in one intriguing passage, Francis notes that the church’s solidarity with the world 
is one of the greatest sources of its global trust:  
Despite the tide of secularism which has swept our societies, in many countries – 
even those where Christians are a minority – the Catholic Church is considered a 
credible institution by public opinion, and trusted for her solidarity and concern 
for those in greatest need. Again and again, the Church has acted as a mediator in 
finding solutions to problems affecting peace, social harmony, the land, the 
defense of life, human and civil rights, and so forth (no. 65). 
This emphasis on the church’s solidarity with the poor and vulnerable emerges as a central theme 
to the document. 
 The second section in which solidarity frequently appears is Francis’ discussion on 
inclusion of the poor within society. Here, Francis begins with a note of ambivalence toward the 
term, but draws a direct connection between solidarity and traditional conceptions of the 
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common good: “The word ‘solidarity’ is a little worn and at times poorly understood, but it 
refers to something more than a few sporadic acts of generosity. It presumes the creation of a 
new mindset which thinks in terms of community and the priority of the life of all over the 
appropriation of goods by a few” (no. 188). Catholic political thought has consistently invoked 
the common good in stating the relative right to private property.191 Yet solidarity had until this 
point implied a more harmonious cooperation toward common ends. Pope Francis states more 
forcefully the role of solidarity in transforming social structures:  
Solidarity is a spontaneous reaction by those who recognize that the social 
function of property and the universal destination of goods are realities which 
come before private property. The private ownership of goods is justified by the 
need to protect and increase them, so that they can better serve the common good; 
for this reason, solidarity must be lived as the decision to restore to the poor what 
belongs to them (no. 189). 
Though solidarity is again proposed as an act of the rich and powerful on behalf of the poor, 
there is little sentimentality or charity in this definition. It is rather a matter of undoing injustice 
and returning to the poor what rightly belongs to them. 
 Finally, though Francis does offer a brief reflection on the virtues in the document (no. 
37-39), he does not address solidarity as a virtue. Yet, similar to John Paul II, he does use the 
language of virtue in discussing the exercise of solidarity: “These convictions and habits 
[convicciones y hábitudos] of solidarity, when they are put into practice, open the way to other 
structural transformations and make them possible. Changing structures without generating new 
convictions and attitudes will only ensure that those same structures will become, sooner or later, 
corrupt, oppressive and ineffectual.”192 Again, the language of habits is central to a Thomistic 
conception of the virtues. Though this section lacks a clear reference to Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, 
                                                 
191 Cf. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, “Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the 
Church,” no. 176–184. 
192 EG, no. 189. It is believed that the encyclical was originally written in Spanish. 
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the connection is clear. Once again, solidarity is articulated as an inclination and commitment 
toward realizing the common good. 
 
Conclusion 
 As previously mentioned, it is not the goal of this chapter to articulate a single, 
comprehensive definition of solidarity as a virtue in the Catholic social tradition. The term itself 
is simply used with too much variation while other expressions are used as synonyms. Rather, 
the goal of this section is to trace contours of the underlying concept, which might then be 
brought into conversation with the virtue framework of Thomas Aquinas. To that end, at least six 
distinct elements can be discerned: (1) Solidarity finds its origin in the recognition of 
interdependence as a moral fact. In Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, the moral nature of interdependence 
is located initially in the social nature of sin. (2) There is also a positive moral dimension to this 
interdependence: a recognition that collaboration for shared life goods is not merely a necessary 
aspect of social existence, but a good in itself.193 (3) Solidarity involves the recognition of the 
other as a human person, equal in dignity, but (4) has a particular concern for the weakest and 
most vulnerable, linking the virtue with the preferential option for the poor. (5) Solidarity 
demands participation, calling on each person to commit to the common good according to his or 
her proper location in society. The rich must recognize their special responsibilities, the poor are 
called to productively participate to the extent that they are able, and those in the middle are 
challenged to look beyond their particular concerns and interests. Finally, (6) John Paul II 
presents solidarity as not only the virtue of an individual, but also of communities and nations.  
                                                 
193 Charles Taylor offers a helpful distinction that demonstrates this point. He contrasts “public 
goods” that can only be achieved together (such as the dam that protects the entire village from 
floods) with irreducibly common goods of culture and shared understanding. Through our 
interdependence civic participation becomes a good in itself. Taylor, “Irreducibly Social Goods.” 
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 The theological development of solidarity in SRS remains the most extensive treatment 
of the concept in Catholic social encyclicals, and the designation of solidarity as a virtue is 
momentous, drawing our attention to questions of moral identity and formation. Yet the 
significance of solidarity remains an ongoing question. There is a degree of ambiguity around the 
term, which Pope Francis himself identifies. Though the term has a particular resonance in our 
contemporary society, we are not clear on the full weight of its implications. While John Paul II 
identifies links with both justice and charity, we do not yet have a clear sense of how solidarity 
fits into a more comprehensive moral framework. Shaping a conclusive definition is likely an 
impossible aspiration, yet the Thomistic tradition holds promising resources for deepening our 
reflection. It is to his theological vision that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
Locating Solidarity with Aquinas’s Moral Framework 
  
The preceding chapter offers an examination of John Paul II’s proposal of solidarity as an 
essential virtue for an interdependent yet alienated world. This virtue, which he describes as a 
“firm and persevering commitment to the common good,”194 helps us to overcome differing 
social locations and our own self-interest in seeking to achieve authentic human development 
through shared participation in the construction of a more just society. Though the language of 
virtue in this document is clearly intentional, the pastoral focus avoids systematic and theological 
rigor. The pontiff suggests connections to a more traditional virtues framework but does not 
locate it specifically within the system of theological and cardinal virtues that has been an 
element of the church’s tradition for centuries. Moreover, looking beyond Sollicitudo Rei 
Socialis it becomes clear on the one had that there is no common understanding of solidarity 
throughout the tradition, and on the other, that the underlying concept has been affirmed under a 
variety of titles. The goal of this section is to begin an examination of solidarity as a virtue from 
within the framework developed by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica. 
 I begin to explore the implications of John Paul II’s proposal by briefly outlining the 
moral framework developed by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica. An exploration of 
solidarity as a virtue naturally begins with a consideration of what is true of all moral virtues. 
                                                 
194 John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, 1990, n. 38. 
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While this section is likely somewhat introductory for those familiar with Aquinas’s thought, it is 
necessary for two reasons. First, as an interdisciplinary work, I recognize that not all potential 
readers will be moral theologians. Second and more importantly, this section lays the 
groundwork for the following chapter, in which I begin to examine how to educate for virtue 
through practices. The second section considers various potential locations for solidarity within 
Aquinas’s virtues framework. While solidarity is most often linked with either charity or justice, 
I argue that the most fruitful interpretation is rooted in the notion of civic friendship, perfected in 
its motivation (the dignity of the other) and object (the common good). Third, I conclude with a 
brief sketch of one attempt to broaden the notion of virtue from individual qualities to those of 
communities and structures. As I argue below, one potential weakness of John Paul II’s proposal 
is the apparent neglect of systemic solutions in favor of moral and spiritual virtue. Daniel J. 
Daly’s proposal of structures of virtue (which he views as an expansion of structural sin) offers 
helpful language for considering the moral merit of institutions and practices without fully 
abolishing the moral agency of the individual. 
 
4.1. The Virtues in Aquinas’s Moral Psychology 
 Before attempting to specifically locate solidarity within Aquinas’s framework, it is 
necessary to briefly consider his understanding of the virtues in general and how they fit into his 
moral anthropology and overall project. The purpose of this section is twofold. First, it illustrates 
the implications of John Paul II’s shift toward considering solidarity as a virtue as opposed to a 
principle or duty. Virtues play a specific role in the moral life, and this shift in our understanding 
of solidarity points to broader implications in approaching Catholic social teaching through the 
lens of virtue ethics. Second, the following chapter considers implications for education. Once 
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we locate solidarity among the virtues we must ask the sorts of questions that are asked of all 
virtues: can it be taught? How? MacIntyre and Taylor already offer some hints at how this work 
is done, but a full exploration of the cultivation and promotion of the virtues must begin with a 
clear sense of what exactly the virtues are. 
 While a treatment of the virtues in the Aquinas’s thought is necessary, the treatment itself 
will be necessarily limited. Aquinas’s Summa Theologica is an undeniable masterpiece. 
Spanning 631 questions and about 5000 articles, the Summa synthesizes the Christian faith in 
conversation with scripture and tradition, as well as Greek, Jewish, and Muslim thought. Even 
within a single article multiple objections are raised and responded to through a process that 
honors authoritative voice but also demonstrates remarkably original thinking. Treating these 
arguments with any degree of nuance in the limited pages of this section is a daunting task. 
Engaging Aquinas’s thought beyond the Summa Theologica, let alone the multitude of historical 
and contemporary commentators and various waves of Thomism, is impossible.195 Therefore, the 
focus of this dissertation is on the Prima and Secunda Pars of the Summa Theologica with only 
minimal reference to other texts and authors when they help to interpret this primary text. 
 This section proceeds by first locating the Summa within history and offering a general 
overview and outline. Next, I locate the treatises on ethics within Thomas’s overarching 
narrative of emanation and return. After providing a brief review of the moral framework and 
psychology found within the Prima Secundae, I focus on the question of habits and virtue: their 
nature, origins, and activities within the moral agent. These initial explorations lay the 
groundwork for the exploration of solidarity as a virtue in the next section of the chapter. 
 
                                                 
195 For a concise summary of the varying Thomisms and Neo-Thomism over the centuries, see: 
Thomas F. O’Meara, Thomas Aquinas Theologian (University of Notre Dame Press, 1997). 
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The Summa Theologica in Context 
 The Summa, both in its composition and content, is undeniably a product of Aquinas’s 
time and context. From great manuscripts to the façade of Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris, his 
was a time in which Summas, great systematizations of the whole of human knowledge, where in 
the air.196 Yet the content of this knowledge was rapidly changing and evolving as new streams 
of thought poured in from around the rapidly expanding world. In particular, Muslim scholars 
had preserved the writings of Aristotle, whose inductive reasoning contrasted with but frequently 
proved more insightful than the Platonism so central to Western Christianity. Aquinas’s goal was 
to incorporate these new insights into the existing body of truth and demonstrate their 
compatibility. Yet while Aristotle plays an undeniably central role in Aquinas’s writing (earning 
the simple title ‘the Philosopher’), the work remains theological. Even in the ethically centered 
Secuda Pars, citations from Augustine outpace those of Aristotle (1,630 to 1,546) and quotations 
from scripture are far more numerous than both combined (1,839 from the Old Testament and 
2,003 from the New).197  
 Though undeniably a towering achievement, the impetus of the Summa Theologica was 
far more humble: the need for a foundational textbook to guide the seminary education of his 
new and emerging Dominican order. While there existed other manuals guiding these 
seminarians through the vices and transgressions they would likely hear during confession, these 
texts lacked a more foundational grounding. Thus Thomas provided a deeper level of theological 
reflection on these practical matters: “Thomas put practical theology – the study of Christian life, 
its virtues and vices – in a full theological context. Christian morality, once for all, was shown to 
                                                 
196 Ibid., 22. 
197 Servais-Theodore Pinckaers, O.P., “The Sources of the Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas,” in The 
Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope, trans. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P. (Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2002), 17. 
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be something more than a question of straight ethical teaching of vices and virtues in 
isolation.”198 Aquinas’s own dissatisfaction is evident in the Summa’s prologue: 
Because the Master of Catholic Truth ought not only to teach the proficient, but 
also to instruct beginners... we purpose in this book to treat of whatever belongs 
to the Christian Religion, in such a way as may tend to the instruction of 
beginners. WE have considered that students in this Science have not seldom been 
hampered by what they have found written by other authors, partly on account of 
the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments; partly also 
because those things that are needful for them to know are not taught according to 
the order of the subject-matter, but according as the plan of the book might 
require, or the occasion of the argument offer; partly, too, because frequent 
repetition brought weariness and confusion to the minds of the readers. 
Endeavoring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try, by God’s help, to 
set forth whatever is included in this Sacred Science as briefly and clearly as the 
matter itself may allow.199 
 
General Outline 
 The key to understanding the ethical treatises in the Summa Theologica and indeed the 
role of the virtues in his moral framework is recognizing the theme of exodus and reditus 
(emanation and return) that provides the overarching structure to the work. A central feature of 
the Summa’s genius is its simplicity: all things flow forth from God and continue onward toward 
God as their ultimate destination. Divided into three parts, the Prima Pars recounts the cosmos 
as all things flow from God. Beginning with God’s nature and essence, the Prima Pars considers 
in turn: creation, the angels, and lastly the human person, closing with a treatise on the divine 
                                                 
198 Servais-Theodore Boyle, O.P., “The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas - 
Revisited,” in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2002), 7. 
199 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Prologue. This and all other English quotations are 
from the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, translated 1911, revised 1920. 
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government of all creation. The Tertia Pars traces the path of return to God first through Christ, 
then the church and the sacraments, closing with the eschaton and final judgment.200 
 Saddled between these movements (both of which largely center on God’s activity) is the 
Secuda Pars, which traces humanity’s initial steps of return. Again divided into two parts, the 
Prima Secundae (first part of the second part) presents an overview of human acts, moral 
psychology, habits, virtues, and the law. The Secunda Secundae in turn outlines the theological 
and cardinal virtues, through which he considers associated virtues, vices, acts, and 
transgressions. While the focus in the Secunda Pars is on human action and morality, the overall 
tenor remains theological. It is grace that makes any return to God possible. As Aquinas states in 
the Prologue to the Secunda Pars, the bridge from the first part on God to the second is the 
human being as the image of God “inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having 
free-will and control of his actions.”201 Aquinas’s ethical reflection, therefore, is a reflection on 
the implications of being made in God’s image: “As God creates the world, a human being 
constructs his life.”202 
 
Aquinas’s Teleological Ethics 
 From a Thomistic perspective, there is nothing novel or surprising about MacIntyre and 
Taylor’s preoccupation with the good as a source of identity and morality. The central insight of 
MacIntyre (which Taylor subsequently expands upon) is that the fatal error of modern 
                                                 
200 Aquinas ceased writing at question 90 of the Teria Pars, midway through his treatment of the 
sacrament of penance. Ninety-nine supplemental questions were later added from previous 
writings to complete the work. 
201 ST, Ia-IIae, Prologue. 
202 Etienne Gilson, cited by Stephen J. Pope, “Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas,” in 
The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2002), 30. 
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philosophy and culture was abandoning the central role that the telos played in moral inquiry. 
The expedient solution to a plurality of visions of the good in society was to deny the legitimacy 
of anyone’s particular conception of the good life in public life. This in turn produced a society 
incapable of deliberating together effectively about the good life we seek together. While any 
return to a context in which a single vision of the good is held in common would be impossible, 
MacIntyre and Taylor both advocate for some sort of recognition and embrace of the role the 
good in forming our identity and moral horizon. This is a call back to the classical teleological 
tradition in which Thomas Aquinas stands as a towering figure. 
 Yet while the influence of Aquinas is undeniable, he was simply adopting and advancing 
a much older tradition. It was Aristotle who first identified the good as the central aim of the 
moral life.203 Ethics thus is not principally a matter of distinguishing right from wrong, but 
investigating the nature of the good life, eudaimonia, which continues to receive the unfortunate 
translation, happiness. For Aristotle, asking of what the good life consists is akin to inquiry into 
the excellence of any practical activity: one must look to the exemplars. If one wishes to 
understand excellence in lute playing, one must look to the exceptional player. So also, one 
begins to perceive the good life by examining the different dimensions that define the life of a 
happy man (and a man was undoubtedly who Aristotle had in mind). The virtues, from this 
perspective, are those qualities of being and action that sketch out different dimensions of this 
good life.  
 So also for Aquinas, the telos is both the point of departure and the guiding horizon of the 
moral life. With Aristotle, Aquinas believes that all actions and agents are directed toward 
                                                 
203 “Every art and every investigation, and similarly every action and pursuit, is considered to 
aim at some good. Hence the good has been rightly defined as ‘that at which all things aim’. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. F. H. Peters (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2004), 1094a. 
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accomplishing their appropriate end. Even animals, he argues, are directed toward an end. The 
distinction being that whereas for animals, the movement is entirely a matter of instincts and 
external forces, humans have the capability of conceiving and rationally evaluating their goals.204 
It is the capacity and freedom to inquire into the value and merit of our goals that makes humans 
moral beings.  
 As with Aristotle, Aquinas affirms that human life must have one ultimate end, which 
provides a unity to human life. The key shift that Aquinas makes concerns what this appropriate 
end entails. It is only by understanding this end that acts gain their intelligibility and precepts 
attain legitimacy. This end and how we achieve it are the central concerns of Aquinas’s moral 
framework. With his treatment of creation emanating from God complete, the Prima Secundae 
begins the journey of return to God. Question 1 thus begins by enquiring into the last end of the 
human person: whether we act for an end (aa. 1-3), whether it is one or many (aa. 4-6), and in 
what this ultimate end consists: happiness (a. 7). Thus all actions, no matter how mundane, are 
undertaken with this goal in mind. Every choice we make, whether well conceived or poorly, is a 
choice for the good and for our happiness. 
 Questions 2-5 ask in what authentic happiness exists. Whereas for Aristotle, happiness 
consisted of living a life of virtue, Aquinas argues that no temporal life, no matter how well 
lived, could provide genuine happiness. In turn examining wealth, glory, and power, Aquinas 
finds the most common conceptions of happiness lacking. Authentic happiness must be self-
sufficient (lacking nothing) and cannot be contingent nor dependent upon external causes. 
Notably, Aquinas does not consider what the human telos should be, or whether these common 
ends are appropriate. He simply asserts that they could not possibly satisfy the infinite yearning 
                                                 
204 Thus Aquinas distinguishes the “actions of a man” from “properly human actions.” ST Ia-IIae, 
q. 1, a. 1. 
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within us. Only something equally infinite could: God. Specifically (and contra Augustine), 
happiness for Aquinas is an activity of the speculative intellect.205 This happiness is ultimately 
found in the vision and contemplation of the divine essence: the beatific vision.206 Thus, for 
Aquinas, humans are naturally built with the desire and capacity for supernatural happiness.207 
 Yet the attainment of this happiness itself is only possible through the work of God.208 
Though we are created for a perfect happiness that can only be realized in the beatific vision and 
can only be attained through the assistance of God, Aquinas maintains the possibility of “a 
certain participation of Happiness” in this life.209 This temporal happiness is always imperfect, 
reflecting finite reality and the inevitable presence of both good and evil in the world. 
Nevertheless, Aquinas never denies this natural happiness and, drawing on Aristotle directly 
connects it to the virtues: “Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by 
man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists.”210 The 
esteem that Aquinas has for Aristotle is thus made clear. Against Augustine’s assertion that 
charity is the root of all virtue and God’s grace necessary for its authentic realization, Aquinas 
maintains that pagan virtues, and in particular the cardinal virtues, demarcate happiness in this 
life. Moreover, with Aristotle, Aquinas maintains that any part is ordained to the whole, just as 
the individual is inclined toward the community.211 Thus human happiness finds its truest 
expression in the happiness we share, the common good. Before looking at the question of virtue 
                                                 
205 ST Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 4. 
206 ST Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 8. 
207 ST Ia-IIae, q. 5, a. 1. 
208 ST Ia-IIae, q. 5, a. 6. 
209 ST Ia-IIae, q. 5, a. 3. 
210 ST Ia-IIae, q. 5, a. 5. 
211 ST Ia-IIae, q. 90, a. 3. 
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and the common good in greater detail, it is necessary to situate the concept within Aquinas’s 
broader framework. 
 
Overview of Aquinas’s Moral Psychology in the Prima Secundae 
 These first five questions of the Prima Secundae present the vision of the good toward 
which humans are ordained and strive. The rest of the Secunda Pars traces the human journey 
toward this telos, with the Prima Secundae presenting Aquinas’s moral framework and the 
Secunda Secundae detailing the specific moral dimensions of the journey. For Aquinas, all 
human acts are directed toward the attainment of the good, though agent is free to ignore or 
violate what he or she knows to be good. All acts of the will are ultimately for what is perceived 
as a good.212 The will, as a rational appetite, is oriented toward the universal good.213 As 
Gallagher notes the root of the will is the love of friendship, desiring good for the beloved, even 
when the beloved is oneself: “Hence, should one ask what a person wills, materially speaking, 
we must answer that a person wills, first, oneself and other persons…and second, all the goods of 
those persons along with the means for achieving those goods.”214 To accomplish this desired 
end, Aquinas traces the moral psychology of an act from intention (q. 12) to choice (q. 13), 
counsel (q. 14), consent (q. 15), and use (q. 16). While the English translation discusses these 
deliberations in terms of ‘means’ (a problematic moral concept), Thomas’s original Latin always 
treats acts of the will “in comparatione ad ea sunt ad finem” – regarding those things in service 
to the end. The contemporary sharp distinction between means and ends (and subsequent 
                                                 
212 ST Ia-IIae, q. 8, a. 1. 
213 The rational appetite here is contrasted with the sense appetite of other animals: the desire for 
food, drink, etc. Only humans are capable of desiring and discerning an ultimate good toward 
which their actions are directed. 
214 David M. Gallagher, “The Will and Its Acts (Ia IIae, Qq. 6-17),” in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. 
Stephen J. Pope (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 85. 
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emphasis on objective acts) would have been foreign to Aquinas’s integrated vision of the person 
striving toward the good.215 For Aquinas, any moral evaluation of an act must take into account 
its aim, circumstances, and consequences. 
 Aquinas further develops this moral psychology by examining the passions (emotions) 
that shape one’s actions.216 Though they are experienced as external influences, the passions 
follow the discussion of the will for a reason. For Aquinas, the will shapes one’s emotions. They 
too are reflections and expressions of the ultimate telos that we seek. Our emotions are not 
uncontrollable shifts in physiological chemistry, but embodied expressions of our desires and 
judgments. For Aquinas, the emotions are natural and therefore good.217 Indeed, love is the first 
of the passions and the root of all others.218 Divided into the concupiscible (regarding the goods 
of sense in themselves) and irascible (regarding difficulties in attaining the good), the challenge 
is not to control or subdue the passions, but to properly order them. As G. Simon Harak affirms: 
the goal is “feeling the right thing, at the right time, for the right reason, to the right extent.”219 
As with actions and intentions, the moral merit of one’s passions is ultimately determined by the 
end toward which they are ordered. 
 
Habits 
 From this discussion of human actions and passion, Thomas proceeds to develop the 
intrinsic and extrinsic principles of human action. Of the intrinsic principles, powers are treated 
                                                 
215 As further evidence, of the 114 questions in the Prima Secundae, only 16 address human acts. 
216 ST Ia-IIae, qq. 22-48. 
217 ST Ia-IIae, q. 24, a. 2. 
218 ST Ia-IIae, q. 25, a. 2. 
219 G. Simon Harak, Virtuous Passions: The Formation of Christian Character (Wipf & Stock 
Publishers, 2001), passim. Harak gathers scientific evidence for the ways in which repeated 
practices can shape our biochemical composition and neurological pathways. 
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in the Prima Pars (qq. 77-90). Now, the focus turns towards habits. As with emotions, Aquinas 
does not consider habits in themselves to be good or evil. Rather, the question is how they are 
formed and to what ends. Etymologically rooted in the Latin habere (to have), Aquinas begins 
with the assertion that a habitus is not possession, but a disposition.220 Specifically, it is a quality 
in the soul that disposes the person well or ill. There is a danger in associating Aquinas’s 
conception of a habit too closely with the commonplace usage of the term today. A habit for 
Aquinas is never mindless activity, but always purposeful. From this perspective, animals, which 
do experience the passions, do not have habits; only rational humans do.221 Moreover, and in 
contrast to Aristotle, Aquinas believes no matter how strong the habit, it is always possible to 
choose to act according to it or against it. 
 According to Aquinas, there is nothing automatic about authentically moral acts. We 
must learn and train ourselves for purposeful activity. Aquinas identifies three sources for habits 
(q. 51), the two extremes being nature and God. Some habits, Aquinas observes, are instilled 
within us through nature. Using the example of health, some habits are inborn.222 Yet these 
natural habits can be influenced or assisted by outside means, just as natural health and healing 
can be assisted by a physician. On the other extreme, Aquinas holds that God alone can infuse 
some habits through grace.223 The reason for this is twofold. First and principally, habits that 
dispose the person to his or her transcendent and supernatural end cannot be produced naturally: 
“since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it 
necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human 
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nature.”224 As addressed above, perfect happiness can only be achieved through divine 
assistance. Other natural habits are infused to demonstrate God’s power and advance God’s 
mission. Here Aquinas again offers the example of health, which God may miraculously restore, 
and the apostles’ “science of the Scriptures” which God perfected beyond natural human 
capacities.225  
 The third and most critical source of habits is habituation through practice. Through our 
purposeful actions, the passive (appetitive) power is shaped by the active intellective power.226 
Yet, Aquinas immediately cautions: “It is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot 
entirely overcome the appetitive power in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined 
variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act, what should be willed in 
regard to various aspects and circumstances.”227 In other words, only through repetition is the 
will fully able to shape the appetitive inclinations of the person. Moreover, this repetition must 
be intentional. It is an active will that transforms a passive appetite. Aquinas emphasizes that 
there are exceptions to this habituation however. Intellectual habits of science, for example, can 
indeed be radically transformed though a clear insight. Likewise, the most bodily forms of habits 
can be quickly changed, as with a strong dose of medicine restoring health (or perhaps a bout of 
food poisoning leaving a lasting aversion to a particular dish). 
 Regardless of their sources (nature, practice, God), habits have the capacity to increase, 
decline, or be corrupted. This shift is not in quantity, but quality: “Such increase of habits…is 
not caused by an addition of form to form; but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, 
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one and the same form.”228 The path of maintenance and growth in good habits is fraught with 
challenges. Not only can habits be corrupted,229 they can be diminished through disuse,230 or 
degrade simply through less than perfect participation.231 Just as perfect whiteness is not only 
corrupted through the introduction of blackness but also less pure shades of white, perfected 
habits only remain so through continued perfect enactment. 
 
The Virtues 
 From this discourse on habits, Aquinas’s transition to virtues and vices is direct. As 
mentioned above, habits in themselves are morally neutral; they are qualities that can be ordered 
toward good or ill. When the powers of the soul are perfected, they become virtues. Drawing 
from Lombard’s Sentences, Aquinas begins with the traditional definition of virtue: “A good 
quality of mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God 
works in us, without us.”232 To this definition, Aquinas makes two revisions. First, he notes that 
the word habit is more suitable than quality, because it identifies the most proximate genus. 
Second, and again reflecting Thomas’s esteem for Aristotle and desire to extend the virtues 
beyond the theological, Aquinas suggests omitting the phrase “which God works in us without 
us” unless referring specifically to infused virtues. What though of the location in the mind? 
Cannot the passions and irrational appetites also be virtuous? Thomas notes that these are 
virtuous only to the extent that they are governed and ordered by reason.233 
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 The virtues for Aquinas are directly linked to his anthropology. In particular, the cardinal 
virtues are in no way an arbitrary list; rather, they reflect the basic components of the human 
person.234 As the mind is divided into the intellect and the will, one needs prudence and justice. 
Similarly, reflecting the concupiscible and irascible appetites, one must be governed by 
temperance and fortitude. These cardinal (etymologically: hinge) virtues are the crux upon which 
the moral life hangs. By encompassing the most fundamental aspects of the person, they account 
for the proper ordering of all dimensions of human life. Thus for example, fortitude for Aquinas 
implies something much richer than our narrower conceptions of courage. While it undoubtedly 
includes bravery in battle, the irascible passion is a resistance to any obstacle that prevents us 
from accomplishing the good. Thus, the martyr is Aquinas’s ideal example of fortitude, but so 
too we could recognize fortitude in the persistence of the social worker struggling with burnout 
or the mother patiently helping her daughter learn fractions. 
 The special role of prudence among the cardinal virtues merits attention. Aquinas 
distinguishes the relative virtues of the intellect from simple and qualified virtues, which must be 
located in the will.235 For Aristotle, science, wisdom, understanding, and art are all intellectual 
virtues. While they indeed point to the perfection of a power within the person, the only have the 
potential to be realized for the good. A well functioning mind is not necessarily a morally good 
mind, and being a good sculptor or scientist is not equated with being a good person. It is 
prudence, a habit of the practical intellect, that is essential to moral virtue and good character. It 
is the practical wisdom of prudence that discerns the good in a particular context and determines 
the appropriate strategy toward achieving it. Regarding the other virtues, it is prudence that 
determines the appropriate expression of justice, temperance, and fortitude. An inclination 
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toward giving another his or her due (a basic definition of justice) is commendable but ultimately 
futile if one cannot properly determine what that due encompasses. Yet while prudence plays an 
essential role in expressing the other virtues, it in turn relies on them. One must be brave, just, 
and moderate to envision the world and the good honestly and clearly. 
 Beyond these cardinal virtues that outline the contours of natural (albeit imperfect) 
happiness, Aquinas retains the tradition list of three theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity. 
Three principles distinguish the theological virtues: their object and direction is God, they are 
infused in us by God alone, and they are only known through divine revelation.236 Because God 
as an object is beyond our natural comprehension, only supernatural habits can incline us to the 
divine. Yet as with the cardinal virtue, the theological virtues reflect human anthropology, 
specifically the intellect and will.237 Thus the virtue of faith informs the intellect with divine 
truth and charity directs the will to its divine end. Hope functions as the bridge through which the 
person of faith believes that he or she can attain the beatific vision. Thus, by order of generation, 
faith precedes hope and hope precedes love.238 Yet, in the order of perfection, charity precedes 
both. Indeed, charity is the “form of all the virtues.”239  
 For Aquinas, there is no necessary connection between the infused theological virtues 
and the natural cardinal virtues. One can be happy in this life with no grace-infused charity 
drawing the person to God. Conversely, a deep faith is no guarantee of temporal virtue or 
happiness. One may be a spiritual genius but incapable of governing the passions of one’s own 
life, let alone governing a community toward justice. Nevertheless while Aquinas maintains a 
clear distinction and refuses to disregard the goodness of natural virtues, there are places of 
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overlap, cooperation, and tension between the cardinal and infused virtues. First, the cardinal 
virtues themselves can be also be infused, directing the will, intellect, and passions toward the 
achievement of supernatural ends. Likewise, charity can in turn inform the cardinal virtues, 
shaping the way that we seek the human good on Earth.240 Yet at the same time, there is often a 
tension between the theological virtues and cardinal virtues. What Christians through faith 
recognize as the good life is often contrary to what nature and reason alone would identify as 
good or reasonable. The Christian moral imagination reaches beyond justice to mercy. Christian 
temperance and fortitude find expression in manners that appear extreme or unhealthy without 
the lens of faith. A tension lies at the heart of Aquinas’s conception of the virtues. While he 
affirms the natural goods of this world as good, he also recognizes that Christians at times 
approach life through a distinctive lens. 
 
Vice, Sin, and Law 
 Following this discussion on virtues, Aquinas completes his treatment of the intrinsic 
principles shaping an act by examining vice and sin (qq. 71-89). From there, he looks at the 
extrinsic principles shaping human actions and character; namely, law and grace. While the 
constraints of this dissertation require that much of this work be passed over, the treatise on law 
merits brief mention, as it contains some of the lengthiest treatments of the common good in the 
Summa Theologica. Nowhere in the Summa does Aquinas offer an extended discussion of the 
common good in itself. Rather, he largely assumes the common good (developed by Augustine, 
who in turn adapted Cicero’s concept of the res publica) as a known concept and a measure of 
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law and virtue. More is said on the common good in the following section, but Aquinas’s treatise 
on law offers excellent insights into how he imagines the principle functioning within society. 
 According to Aquinas, all law, to the extent that it is a law at all, is an ordinance of 
reason directing the person and community to the common good.241 It is the nature of reason to 
be directed to the telos: happiness. He continues, “Consequently, the law must needs regard 
principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as 
imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs 
regard properly the relationship to universal happiness.”242 This shared and universal happiness 
is the common good in its most elemental form. Any law that does not direct the community to 
the common good is not only unjust, but no law at all. Finally, it is important to note here that 
this discussion on law is prior to any distinction between divine, natural, and human laws. All 
three exist to help guide persons and communities to universal happiness and the common good. 
 From the overview, the implications of identifying solidarity as a virtue begin to emerge. 
What is true of all virtues must be true of solidarity as well. Thus, for example, though this 
dissertation has solidarity as a central concern, our emphasis should not actually be on the virtue 
alone, but on the telos toward which it directs us. Grounded in a particular vision of the human 
person (that is, a moral or theological anthropology), solidarity designates a particular dimension 
of happiness or human flourishing – whether perfected in union with God or realized imperfectly 
on Earth. The emergence of this virtue implies that we have a developing appreciation for a 
previously undervalued dimension of human life or happiness. As a virtue, solidarity is a habit 
that disposes the agent toward the good. Authentic solidarity makes not only our actions good, 
                                                 
241 ST Ia-IIae, q. 90, a. 2. To the criteria of the common good, Aquinas adds two additional 
requirements: it must designed by one who has authority and care over the community (a. 3) and 
appropriately promulgated (a. 4).  
242 ST Ia-IIae, q. 90, a. 2. 
 
 
147 
but our character good as well. Moreover, as rational beings, humans have the capacity for 
solidarity, but it is not automatic. Rather, it must be infused through grace or habituated through 
practices. 
 
4.2. Locating the Virtue of Solidarity in the Summa Theologica 
 To this point, we have examined solidarity through the lens of Catholic social teaching, a 
task that proves much more difficult than one would initially expect. The language of solidarity 
varies among the authors of the social encyclicals in many ways. It has been described as a duty, 
a principle, and (most productively) a virtue. After examining the basic virtues framework that 
Aquinas develops in the previous section, we now turn to consider how solidarity might fit into 
his moral scheme. Once again, immediate problems and contradictions emerge. In his 
foundational definition articulated in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, John Paul II notes that there are 
“many points of contact” between solidarity and charity (no. 40). Yet in its most basic 
articulation, he defines solidarity as “a firm and persevering commitment to the common good,” 
which is the central concern of justice (no. 38). It would seem, in fact, that this definition is 
directly drawn from Aquinas’s definition of general (or legal) justice: “The virtue of a good 
citizen is general justice, whereby a man is directed to the common good.”243 Yet though the 
common good is an essential element of solidarity, it does not compose the entirely of its 
definition. 
 From the perspective of virtues, this shorthand definition of solidarity immediately 
implies two insights: as a firm and persevering commitment to the common good, the virtue’s 
subject is most appropriately the will, while its object is the common good. These remain the two 
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most defining characteristics. Yet we have seen other conditions that flesh this virtue out further 
(see page 127 for a summary of the addition six elements). To propose the virtue of solidarity as 
John Paul II does signifies an emphasis on a distinctive aspect of the good life that to this point 
has gone unrecognized or underappreciated. 
 Immediately following John Paul II’s articulation of solidarity as a virtue, a plurality of 
authors attempted to align the concept with either charity or justice.244 This section considers the 
prospects of each of these virtues in turn. For each, I briefly sketch Aquinas’s definition of the 
virtue, points of contact between the virtue and solidarity, and points of dissimilarity. I then 
consider solidarity as related to friendship, a concept that Aquinas does not develop directly in 
the Summa but draws on extensively. It is argued that solidarity is best understood neither as 
charity nor justice, but rather as a sort of civic friendship which goes far beyond mere 
concordance, and further, as a Christian virtue is perfected by charity. 
 
Solidarity and Justice 
 Aquinas’s exposition on justice follows a pattern that Thomas establishes for his 
treatment of all cardinal and theological virtues, examining first the virtue in itself, its 
constitutive parts, its gifts, and its precepts. In the Summa, the most fundamental definition of 
justice is “the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right.”245 From this short 
definition, many implications can be identified. The object of justice is the right, which Aquinas 
further distinguishes into natural and positive rights (respectively, equality through nature and 
those adjusted or reached by agreement).246 The phrase “perpetual and constant will” designates 
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justice as an enduring habit located in the will. Thus, it is not right knowing, but right willing 
that makes a person just (an important reminder for moral educators). Justice chiefly governs 
one’s relation with others, whether another individual, the community, or God, striving to give 
each its proper due. So, for Aquinas, religion is included under justice as one’s rendering unto 
God what God is due (albeit imperfectly).247 As a general virtue, justice stands foremost among 
all moral virtues.248 Indeed, Aquinas affirms that any act or habit, insofar as it brings good to a 
person (even oneself) is an act of justice.249  
 Aquinas distinguishes general justice (relating an individual to the community) from 
particular justice, which is directed toward an individual.250 Aquinas terms the broadest category 
general or legal justice (he uses the terms interchangeably). This is the virtue through which one 
is directed toward the common good, and as such, is most properly understood as the form of all 
moral virtues: 
It is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation to that 
community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that 
whatever is good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It follows 
therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to 
himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the 
common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to 
justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that 
justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct to the 
common good…it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is 
called legal justice, because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs 
the acts of all the virtues to the common good.251 
As social animals, humans find themselves within communities and networks of social relations. 
While the rights of individuals can never be revoked, the rights of the community take 
precedence. Thus, for example, while Aquinas (and modern Catholic social teaching in turn) 
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affirms the right to private ownership of property, the right is relative to the needs of a 
community. Even theft is justified when one in need takes from another who has excess.252 It is 
one role of general justice to balance the needs of the community with those of the individual. 
Under particular justice, Thomas further distinguishes commutative and distributive 
justice.253 Commutative justice governs specifically the relations and interactions between two 
individuals. Distributive justice is concerned with what the common good owes to each person. 
In addition to focusing on different sets of relationships, these later two virtues calculate the 
mean differently.254 Commutative justice seeks the ‘arithmetical mean’, or strict equality 
(fulfilling a contract to the letter or paying the agreed price for a product, as examples). 
Distributive justice requires a more difficult calculation determined by one’s location within 
society. Following ‘geometrical’ proportionality, what one receives from the common good is 
dependent upon one’s prominence, which: “in an aristocratic community is gauged according to 
virtue, in an oligarchy according to wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in various 
ways according to various forms of community.”255  
Social equality and fairness cannot be reduced to contractual obligations alone, but must 
encompass that which we owe the common good (including our own participation) and what the 
common good owes to every citizen. Modern Catholic social teaching adopts these categories of 
justice that Aquinas develops and builds upon them. In particular, the tradition has developed a 
notion of social justice that implies the proper functioning of the system as a whole and the right 
and responsibility of each person to participate within said system. Though the strict equality of 
contractual agreements and commutative justice must be upheld, genuinely social justice requires 
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that all members of society be free to contribute to the common good as far as there are able and 
receive from the common good that which they need and rightly deserve. Indeed, participation 
itself is an essential characteristic of the Catholic church’s definition of social justice.256 
 
Evaluation of Solidarity as Justice 
Evidence for solidarity’s close alignment with Aquinas’s conception of justice, and 
general justice in particular, is readily available. As with solidarity, general justice entails an act 
of the will, directing one’s actions toward the common good. It determines the rights of the 
individual and what the person is due. One can observe the connection particularly strongly in a 
statement such as Pope Francis’s definition of solidarity, which affirms:  
Solidarity is a spontaneous reaction by those who recognize that the social 
function of property and the universal destination of goods are realities which 
come before private property. The private ownership of goods is justified by the 
need to protect and increase them, so that they can better serve the common good; 
for this reason, solidarity must be lived as the decision to restore to the poor what 
belongs to them.257 
Centrally concerned with the common good and that which the community owes each individual, 
justice and solidarity are undeniably linked. 
 Such is the argument that Bilgrien makes in annexing solidarity as a potential part of 
justice.258 In IIa-IIae q. 80 Aquinas considers the ‘potential parts of justice’ – those virtues which 
are similar to justice but that fall short either because they cannot return what is due (in the case 
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of religion, piety, and respect) or because their obligation is moral rather than legal (gratitude, 
vengeance, truth, friendliness, and liberality). Though they do not reach the perfection of justice, 
these virtues contribute to just actions. Some, such as gratitude and liberality, for example, focus 
more on emotional states than external actions. While justice is always chiefly concerned with 
action, these internal movements nevertheless contribute to the realization of justice. 
 Bilgrien notes that Aquinas himself engages a fluid list of virtues in considering the 
potential parts of justice and suggests that solidarity might be imagined as a newly evolving 
addition. Thus, as with the other potential parts, solidarity must be in some way related to justice 
but in another fall short (else it be simply synonymous). Chiefly concerned with the common 
good, solidarity’s connection to justice is clear. Perhaps as our conception of general or legal 
justice is deepened toward a view of social justice, solidarity augments the character of our 
response to include an awareness of participation in civic life as an essential element.  
Locating how solidarity falls short of perfect justice is more difficult. This may occur in a 
number of ways. For example, solidarity may in fact go beyond giving what is due, seeking to 
contribute more than the minimal requirements of the common good. Conversely, the 
preferential option for the poor, developed in the same chapter of Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, 
suggests that though solidarity considers all as equals, it has a particular concern for the 
marginalized and vulnerable. As Josef Pieper notes, justice for Aquinas is chiefly concerned with 
rigorously and impartially seeking the right: “In the relationship of justice, men confront each 
other as separate ‘others,’ almost as strangers.”259 Solidarity strives to go beyond this perfect 
impartiality, recognizing the other intimately, or even as another self.  
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 While there is much merit to Bilgrien’s proposal, the practical insights and contributions 
it offers are limited. Aquinas demonstrates openness to adapting the list of virtues annexed to 
justice, and solidarity would indeed fit as a habit that contributes to justice while remaining 
distinct. Yet locating solidarity in this way does little to deepen our understanding of the concept 
itself. It offers no further resources for understanding authentic solidarity and its implications, let 
alone how to foster it within a community. Bilgrien herself concludes that solidarity remains an 
evolving idea that will only become intelligible after more practice and reflection: “[Solidarity] 
is still in the process of becoming and being accepted on the worldwide basis that justice 
is…Solidarity will have to function for some time as a virtue before it can have the influence and 
stability that justice has because of its longer history.”260 In this process of emergence, simply 
locating solidarity under the banner of justice does little to deepen our understanding of the 
virtue and its implications.261 
 
Solidarity and Charity 
 Any investigation into charity must begin by emphasizing what charity is not. Popular 
conceptions of the term generally commit at least one of two common errors. First, charity is 
often imagined as an alternative or contrast to justice. Its proponents err in imagining that charity 
fulfills one’s obligations to one’s neighbor while its opponents deride the paternalism of charity 
for neglecting the duty of justice. Neither side recognizes the compatible and mutually edifying 
roles of the two virtues. Yet our conception of charity in itself has become impoverished in 
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recent times. Far from its rich theological legacy, charity today is most commonly associated 
with social pity, good deeds, and giving a small share of one’s excess. Considering the ‘points of 
contact’ between solidarity and charity requires first establishing an appropriate conception of 
the virtue. 
 Charity for Aquinas is the principle virtue directing our relationship with God. As God is 
the ultimate and perfect end of human life, charity is thus the greatest virtue.262 Indeed, insofar as 
any virtue directs an agent to her ultimate end, charity is the form of all virtues: “Just as 
revelation does not extinguish natural reason, and grace does not destroy human freedom, so 
charity is effective in justice and through justice, in courage and through courage, and in the 
tactful conduct of prudence and through the tactful conduct of prudence.”263  
At its most basic, charity for Aquinas is “the friendship of man for God.”264 This 
friendship implies a sort of mutuality and likewise a communication. This mutuality suggests 
that friendship only exists where love can be returned: one may claim to love wine, but no one 
would claim to be friends with wine. Likewise, someone may greatly admire a famed musician, 
wish him well, and even (through biographies and celebrity gossip) be familiar with his life 
story; yet he could not claim the musician as a friend unless the knowledge and affection were 
reciprocated. What is communicated in friendship includes goodwill, but goes beyond it: “Love, 
which is in the intellective appetite, also differs from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union 
of affections between the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as 
                                                 
262 ST, IIa-IIae, q. 23, a. 6. 
263 Eberhard Schockenhoff, “The Theological Virtue of Charity (IIa IIae, Qq. 23-46),” in The 
Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope, trans. Grant Kaplan and Frederick G. Lawrence 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 251, emphasis original. 
264 ST, IIa-IIae, q. 23, a. 1. 
 
 
155 
somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends toward him.”265 In the truest 
expression of charity, we come to see the other as another self. Indeed, the first act of charity is 
simply willing the existence of another.  
As friendship and union with God (our ultimate telos), charity is the ultimate and sole 
measure of merit. Yet one aspect of any friendship is loving that which the beloved loves. 
Through charity, we recognize in the other a common origin as the image of God and a common 
potential destiny in happiness with God. Thus, out of friendship with God, we love those whom 
God loves, including our neighbors, our enemies, and ourselves. However, against the 
impartiality of justice, Aquinas recognizes that there is a hierarchy and ordering to charity.266 It 
is natural and appropriate to love those nearest to us more than we love those further away. Thus, 
we ought to love God above all else, ourselves before our neighbors (though our neighbor’s 
before our own bodies), and family before friends or acquaintances. Aquinas goes further and 
argues that we ought to love father before mother and parents before spouse or children. Finally, 
Aquinas compares the love of one’s benefactors to the love of those who have received one’s 
beneficence. He affirms that the latter is the greater love, for it is the more active and through it 
we realize our own virtue.267 
 
Evaluation of Solidarity as Charity 
 Because Aquinas’s conception of charity is rooted in his understanding of friendship, the 
topic of the next section, we must necessarily pause for the moment to consider the merits of 
aligning solidarity with charity before looking at the question of friendship more broadly. There 
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are undoubtedly benefits to interpreting solidarity through this framework. When we accept that 
solidarity is not an alternative to justice but rather perfects it, we begin to recognize the virtue as 
an impulse to go beyond the strict duties of justice. Specifically, solidarity suggests a greater 
partiality and concern than the naturally ordered of bonds of familial and social relations alone 
would suggest. Good will and beneficence are extended to the other across traditional boundaries 
and frameworks. 
 The trouble with directly aligning solidarity with charity in Aquinas’s framework is the 
status of the later as a theological virtue. As a friendship oriented to the transcendent, charity is 
for Aquinas only possible through the direct infusion of grace.268 Though the exercise of charity 
requires the use of our natural capacities (contrary to Peter Lombard’s assertion that charity is 
the Holy Spirit dwelling and acting within us), it cannot be realized without grace, which 
Aquinas extends only to those who are justified. Thus for Aquinas charity is a specifically 
Christian virtue and not to be expected from all people. Given the aspirations expressed in 
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis and other social documents that solidarity be embodied globally, it would 
seem that charity lacks the breadth necessary. Thus, attempts such as John Paul II’s to align 
solidarity with Christian charity would imply a supererogation that is not binding on all people. It 
is only through a relationship with God that one extends charity to the neighbor. As Bilgrien 
concludes, “John Paul II’s adamant statement that solidarity is a virtue for all, seems to preclude 
the possibility of solidarity being linked to charity rather than justice.”269 
 
Solidarity and Friendship 
 Aquinas does not directly develop the notion of friendship as a virtue in the Summa. 
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Rather, he assumes several characteristics of Aristotle’s treatment of friendship in his 
development of charity. Charity for Aquinas is friendship with God. Thus for Aquinas what is 
true of charity is true of friendshiop. Yet friendship itself is not limited to charity. Even if we 
accept that charity is only possible through an infusion of grace (a presupposition which many 
today would rightly contest), this does not imply that all such bonds of affection are thus limited. 
Rather, the directionality is the reverse: Aquinas recognized several positive attributes of 
Aristotle’s treatment of friendship that he sought to locate more particularly within the virtue of 
charity. Friendship is the larger category encompassing natural capacities and relationships that 
Aquinas seeks to give a theological interpretation. 
 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics provides the framework of friendship that Aquinas 
develops into his notion of charity. It is thus a necessary place to begin exploring Aquinas’s 
implicit understanding. Aristotle’s discussion begins with the question of whether or not 
friendship is a virtue, a question that he can only answer with some ambivalence: “it is a kind of 
virtue, or implies virtue, and it is also most necessary for living.”270 Two distinct elements drive 
Aristotle’s location of solidarity as a virtue: it is an aspect of the good life, and it implies a 
habitual disposition. Friendship is more than any particular individual actions. Friendship 
continues even when friends have been separated by distance or time. One does not cease to be a 
friend when she is asleep or busy at some other task. 
 As exhibited in Aquinas’s definition of charity, friendship for Aristotle in its most basic 
form is mutual and reciprocated goodwill: each wishing well of the other for their own sake.271 
To this, Aristotle adds the requirement that the goodwill be recognized. Strangers may be well 
disposed to each other, but it is not friendship until they are aware of these sentiments in the 
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other. From this definition, Aristotle immediately distinguishes three types of friendships 
identified by their underlying motivation. Two forms of friendship are imperfect: those grounded 
in utility and those of pleasure. Both limit the friendship to a somewhat instrumental role: 
providing some sort of desired good. When these relationships cease to provide their motivating 
benefit, the friendships themselves cease. The third, perfect, and rare form of friendship Aristotle 
examines is that of virtue, in which it is the goodness of the other than generates the attraction 
and motivation. Just as goodness itself is an enduring quality, these friendships endure. 
Moreover, because goodness is in itself pleasant and the good friend is a helpful friend, 
friendships of virtue encompass friendships of utility and pleasure. However, without virtue, 
these imperfect forms are not necessarily themselves good.272 
 With a particular appreciation for politics as “the science that studies the supreme good 
for man,”273 Aristotle offers an extensive reflection on the role of friendship within a community. 
Multiple times, Aristotle recalls the adage “Between friends there is no need for justice.”274 
Rather than permitting friends to ignore the obligations of justice, Aristotle affirms, “people who 
are just still need the quality of friendship; and indeed friendliness is considered to be justice in 
the fullest sense.”275 This is not to imply that there cannot exist degrees of inequality or injustice 
within a relationship. Rather, it suggests that only to the extent that justice is honored can a 
relationship be a genuine friendship. Aristotle maintains that both justice and friendship are 
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necessary for community.276 Moreover, the deeper the bonds of affection the higher expectations 
of justice: the betrayal of kin is more offensive than the betrayal of a stranger. As Aristotle 
analyzes the different forms of government, this link of friendship and justice remains: the just 
king demonstrating “outstanding beneficence” toward his subjects, the relations of an aristocracy 
mimicking those of a husband and wife, and so forth. Where the social structure lacks justice, it 
likely lacks friendship as well. 
 Aristotle further reflects on the friendliness encountered by companions on a journey. 
Fellow soldiers and voyagers find themselves cooperating toward shared goals, and consider 
each other friends in the undertaking. This too reflects the friendship Aristotle views as 
necessary for life in community. Aristotle’s definition of concord bears a remarkable resonance 
with the notion of solidarity developed thus far: 
There is said to be concord in a state when the citizens agree about their interests, 
adopt the same policy and put their common resolve into effect. Thus concord is 
concerned with practical ends, and among these only with such as are important, 
and can be achieved by both parties or by the whole body of citizens.277 
Concordance, or civic friendship, implies a unity of wills toward a shared goal – a common 
good. Like social capital, concordance is the common bond that makes social collaboration 
possible. Yet, concordance would seem to fall short of the ideals of solidarity in two ways. First, 
as Aquinas himself notes when discussing concord, the union of wills it implies is not necessarily 
for the good.278 Two thieves can be said to have concordance in their conspiring toward 
burglary. Thus while concordance may be a necessary element of solidarity, it does not 
encompass the virtue in its fullness. Second, for Aristotle concordance as political friendship 
falls under the subset of friendships of utility. Its motivation is the mutual goals that occasion the 
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collaboration, and friendship lasts exactly as long as the partnership is beneficial. Were the other 
not necessary for accomplishing one’s ends, there would be no reason for friendship. 
 A potentially rich understanding of solidarity is the retrieval of civic friendship in a way 
that overcomes these shortcomings. Like concordance, solidarity implies a union of wills toward 
a shared set of goals. However, the end is precisely the common good that is the concern of 
general justice. Further, it is not motivated by utilitarian necessity but a deeper recognition of the 
good of another (the root of Aristotle’s friendships of virtue). In Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, John 
Paul II grounds his argument for solidarity in the inescapability of interdependence in the 
modern world. Indeed, this given reality suggests that were utility the sole motivation of political 
friendship, it alone would be sufficient to necessitate concordance. Yet the encyclical goes 
beyond de facto interdependence. It first raises interdependence to a moral reality, then calls on 
the reader to recognize the dignity of the other. Here, Aquinas’s notion of charity is telling. For 
Aquinas, charity extended toward others flows directly from our friendship with God: we love 
those whom God loves. Further, this charity is rooted in a mutuality we share with all people: a 
common origin as made in the image of God and a common destiny as potential friends with 
God. For Aristotle friendships of virtue are exceptionally rare and difficult to cultivate, with few 
persons possessing adequate virtue to even be considered. For Aquinas on the other hand, though 
there is an ordering to charity, it is a virtue that strives to extend toward all, including one’s 
enemies. Made in the image of God and created as potential friends of God, the dignity and 
worth of all human beings is limitless. 
 This notion of solidarity as friendship helps to illuminate its close affiliation with both 
charity and justice. Like charity, solidarity recognizes a commonality with the other. Friendship 
recognizes in the other an alter ego – another self. It is not simply that friends refuse to tolerate 
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injustice as a violation of rights, they feel it as though it happened to themselves. The other is a 
part of one’s own journey and life quest. Those with whom we are in solidarity become an 
essential element of the good life we imagine for ourselves. At its deepest level (and undoubted, 
solidarity is an ideal that is realized gradually and to differing degrees), solidarity is the 
recognition that my flourishing is never exclusively my own. Rather, I can only experience 
fullness or liberation when this other whom I love does as well.279  
 This does not imply a total loss of one’s personal identity and individual commitments. 
Solidarity is not the total abnegation of self. This is a point that Megan J. Clark makes in a 
compelling fashion. Adopting Aristotle’s notion of virtue as the ‘golden mean’ between two 
vices, Clark suggests that solidarity as a personal and social virtue is finding the right balance 
between the extremes of excessive individualism and collectivism.280 For Aristotle, every virtue 
governs the appropriate expression of a particular human capacity. The vices indicate an 
inappropriate exercise of that capacity, either in excess or deficiency. For example, courage for 
Aristotle entails feeling the appropriate amount of fear in a given situation; too much is 
cowardice, too little is foolhardiness. For Clark, solidarity is in part the proper identification of 
one’s self with another person or group. While excessive individualism is a vice of deficiency, 
collectivism is likewise a vice of excess. Thus, though this dissertation is primarily concerned 
with overcoming the atomistic mindset of our contemporary culture, we must be wary of falling 
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into any sort of collectivism. To deny the dignity and autonomy of another (or one’s own) is to 
act against solidarity. 
 This definition of solidarity grounded in a perfected form of civic friendship seems to 
resolve some of the tensions found in Aquinas’s sharp contrast between natural and specifically 
Christian theological virtues. As a natural virtue, solidarity is a form of friendship that goes 
beyond mere concordance, but requires no appeal to the transcendent. Our recognition of the 
good of the other may be rooted in any number of secular or religious perspectives. However, as 
John Paul II suggests, solidarity can likewise become a specifically Christian virtue by taking on 
the aspects of Christian charity: noting a common origin and destiny in God, and becoming 
marked by gratuity and mercy. For Christians, solidarity is rooted in the recognition that the 
other is the image of God and thus endowed with infinite dignity. For non-Christians, the 
motivation is likely different, but the bond is the same. 
 Emphasizing the dynamics of friendship within solidarity as I have here raises a distinct 
set of questions and challenges, particularly concerning issues of mutuality and degrees of 
extension or boundedness. Friendship for Aristotle is a quality residing within the person, as 
opposed to hovering somehow between persons. Nevertheless, it is only authentic when there is a 
degree of mutuality and reciprocity. Though I can be very fond of Belgian Trappist Ales and Bob 
Dylan, I cannot rightly claim to be friends with either. Is it possible, then, to declare myself to be 
in solidarity with people on the other side of the globe and who have no idea that I exist? To a 
degree, undoubtedly I can. Through study and reflection, I may begin to feel the struggles and 
triumphs of others as my own. As I envision fullness and form practical strategies for it pursuit, I 
can and should include others in my deliberations. Yet, we should always be cautions when 
unilaterally defining our relationships with others, particularly those who are vulnerable or 
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marginalized. To declare myself to be in solidarity with another may in fact rob that person of his 
or her agency and perpetuate dynamics of privilege. In this way perhaps, the mutuality of 
solidarity requires that I allow the other to define our relationship. 
 Somewhat related is the question of how far we can realistically extend our capacity to be 
in solidarity. To what extent is extending solidarity to every human being on Earth possible? 
Does it extend beyond the human race? Ron Pagnucco and Peter Gichure, for example, 
distinguish bounded and cosmopolitan schools of thought.281 Proponents of bounded solidarity 
argue that extending goodwill and beneficence universally is an impossible ideal. Thus, one’s 
ethical duty extends only to those with whom one is in relation (though some authors recognize a 
universal moral minimum, such as ‘do no harm’). Conversely, the cosmopolitan school proposes 
a vision of solidarity that extends to all human beings. Within this perspective, some argue for 
impartiality and radical equality. Others acknowledge a degree of partiality and heightened 
responsibility for those closest to us. The authors locate Catholic social teaching within this 
school of thought. 
 Once again, the most productive course is perhaps to not advocate a single position, but 
rather to recognize the varying degrees in which solidarity can be expressed. While the 
obligations of justice extend universally, relationships of solidarity progress over time and with 
deepening intimacy. We strive to treat our neighbors more like friends and our friends more like 
kin. Part of the challenge is our proclivity to think of solidarity in individualistic terms. I 
question how far I am capable of giving myself to others and internalizing the struggles and 
sufferings of different lands. My capacity for such relations is undoubtedly limited, and there is a 
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genuine risk of constantly extending oneself further until no sense of unified identity remains. I 
close this chapter with an examination of how virtue can be embodied not only by persons, but 
by communities and institutions. By helping to build virtues structures and by participating in 
virtuous organizations, our capacity to extend solidarity to others is greatly expanded. Parishes 
enter into solidarity with other parishes, and campuses stand in solidarity with their neighboring 
communities. 
 
4.3. A New Horizon: Structures of Virtue 
 This proposed definition of solidarity as political friendship perfected in its origin and 
purpose accounts for most of the distinguishing aspects of solidarity identified in the previous 
chapter. It expresses the roots of solidarity in human interdependence and unity amidst diversity. 
Likewise, it identifies the central role of the common good. What remains to be examined is the 
specifically social dimension of the virtue: what makes it, in John Paul II’s terminology, a 
habitus socialis (SRS, no. 38). An ethic of virtue always communicates an implicit human 
anthropology. Historically, the emphasis in virtue ethics has been on the individual agent, even 
when acting within society. Thus for Aquinas, the cardinal virtues govern the different parts of 
the human person: the intellect, the will, and the passions. Similarly, when James F. Keenan 
proposed a new set of cardinal virtues rooted in an anthropology of relationality, his virtues of 
justice, fidelity, and self-care continued to govern the acts of an individual amidst varying sets of 
relationship (respectively: universal relations with all people, particular relationships, and a 
unique relationship with ourselves).282  
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 Yet, as Hobgood forcefully argues, SRS runs a strong risk of sentimentalizing and 
spiritualizing the structural challenges to development that we face.283 Though individual virtue 
and moral conversion are good and undoubtedly necessary elements of striving toward the 
common good, there is a risk that an overemphasis on these privatized components can 
overshadow or negate the structural questions we face. The promotion of the virtue of solidarity 
cannot supplant or replace organized (and often conflictive) struggles for social justice. A 
recognition of the structural dimensions of virtue (and, in turn, a view of structures through the 
lens of virtue) provides a possible avenue through which SRS’s apparent vulnerability becomes a 
strength. Rather than deemphasizing the social and political dimensions of justice and 
development, solidarity as a structural virtue raises the stakes: it looks beyond what we do as a 
society and considers who we are. A vocabulary that adequately expresses the functioning of 
virtues on a social level remains underdeveloped. While such a project remains far beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, this chapter will conclude by highlighting one recent and fruitful 
attempt at cultivating such a language. 
 Drawing on the development of ‘structures of sin’ as a central theme in Catholic social 
teaching over the past forty years, and recognizing the post-Vatican emphasis on virtue in moral 
theology, Daniel J. Daly proposes structures of virtue and vice as new moral categories.284 
Whereas structures of sin properly highlight the moral dimension of social action, structures of 
virtue and vice both broaden and deepen this insight. Daly defines a structure thusly:  
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A structure is an institution, a practice, a value laden narrative, or a paradigmatic 
figure that people find already existing or which they create on the national and 
global level, and which orientates or organizes economic, social and political life. 
Once objectified, structures tend to become fixed and fossilized as mechanisms 
relatively independent of the human will, thereby promoting or paralyzing social 
development and causing either justice or injustice. 
While the notion of structures is not foreign to Catholic social thought, Daly offers two distinct 
insights: first, on their own structures are neither inherently good nor evil, it is rather how they 
are constructed and to what ends that determines their moral merit. Second, though human 
autonomy always plays a role in their creation and maintenance, they in turn have a formative 
role within the community, shaping each individual and the society as a whole with a particular 
moral character.  
 Recognition of the formative dimension of society stretches back to Leo XIII’s Rerum 
Novarum who himself draws on the classical tradition.285 It was a given in Greek political 
thought that one role of politics was the creation of a virtuous people. In contemporary Catholic 
social thought, the emphasis has almost universally been on the negative dimension of society’s 
influence: the formative role of consumerism and the culture of death. Yet the inescapable 
process of socialization is itself neither good nor evil. Rather, it is the content that the culture 
communicates that determines moral merit or culpability. Shifting the terminology to reflect this 
ambiguity reveals a broader spectrum of possibilities. 
 Moreover, the language of virtue and vice more accurately reflects the moral quality of 
social structures. These structures, whether capitalism, participative democracy, or institutional 
racism, are not realized in any single act or omission. Rather, like personal virtues, they are 
perpetuating systems that suggest consistent outcomes across an array of specific situations. 
Moreover, they share with virtues a certain reflexivity: they not only determine the quality of the 
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outcome but also the character of the community. A society whose structures are just is not only 
more likely to realize the common good, it is more likely to form a community committed to this 
end. Conversely, a society whose structures are shaped by possessive self-interest is more likely 
to internalize this vice in its population. 
 A challenge that this new frontier shares with structures of sin is the location of the virtue 
or vice’s accountability. For any moral action, there must be a degree of freedom and 
intentionality. As John Paul II makes clear in his most extensive systematic treatment of social 
sin in Reconcilatio et Paenetentia, though agency may be diffuse and difficult to discern, it is 
never lost.286 We are each individually accountable for our freely participating in sinful social 
structures, no matter how remote their origin or outcome. So also must structural virtues and 
vices as moral categories retain roles for individual human agency. Fortunately, efforts to discern 
this mechanism have already begun in theologians’ analysis of structural sin. The most fruitful 
model remains Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s Social Construction of Reality, who offer 
the dictum: “Society is a human product, society is an objective reality, the human is a social 
product.”287 Berger and Luckmann present a dialectic relationship in which the individual is first 
formed by society and in turn actively participates in society’s formation. Yet through this 
process, social structures become an objective reality of their own. Yet while it is helpful to think 
of society operating with a degree of agency, it is important to remember that its autonomy is 
only analogous: social structures remain human constructs which we shape and participate in 
freely. 
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 This emphasis on structures of virtue suggests fruitful opportunities for the central 
concern of this dissertation: solidarity as a virtue and its realization within Catholic higher 
education. Traditionally, educating for justice has emphasized the formation of individual moral 
agents capable of resisting and someday transforming unjust social policies and structures. 
Creating such moral giants is a daunting task, and not getting easier in our contemporary context. 
It requires teaching students to recognize, challenge, and resist elements that they were 
socialized to accept willingly. By shifting our attention from individual pupils to the social 
structures themselves, not only does society itself more closely achieve the common good, the 
individual is more virtuously formed through mere participation in the community’s narratives 
and practices. While this perspective is still emerging within the field or moral theology, 
religious educators have wrestled with the question of socialization within a community for 
several decades. In part inspired by MacIntyre’s After Virtue but also drawing on earlier theorist, 
religious education is undergoing a ‘turn to practices’ which in fact reflects a much older 
classical approach to educating in virtue. It is to these new trends that the next chapter turns. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Forming Character Through Practices 
 
 Defining solidarity as a virtue immediately raises questions about its origins and growth 
within the person and community. As we have seen, Aquinas identifies three modes through 
which the virtues take root: by nature, divine grace, and habituation. With the first two largely 
beyond our control, virtue ethicists and moral educators have dedicated their attention to the 
promotion of virtue through practices. From the perspective of the classical Aristotelian tradition, 
humans are not born with a fully developed moral compass, but rather must train their natural 
capacities through a lifetime of intentional and purposeful moral action. The community, in turn, 
has both the potential and the responsibility to assist in this process of becoming morally mature. 
This is more than theoretical education however; it is an immersion into the distinctive habits 
and way of proceeding that gives the community its particular moral character.  
 In contemporary scholarship, this emphasis on habituation has evolved into a focus on 
practices as a locus of theological reflection and faith formation. We examine the practices of a 
community to discern the theology embedded within, and propose practices as a means of 
shaping its moral vision and character of the. Since the Second Vatican Council, Catholic moral 
theology has increasingly shifted to an emphasis on virtue.288 MacIntyre’s own influence in 
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shifting the conversation is widely recognized.289 Yet it is in the realms of practical theology and 
religious education that the ‘turn to practices’ is most fully underway.290 With MacIntyre again 
serving as a seminal figure, contemporary theologians have adapted and expanded his notion of a 
practice in seeking to more clearly analyze and shape Christian communities. As Dykstra and 
Bass observe, practices are an effective, yet “manageable size” for theological reflection: 
Thinking of a way of life as made up of a constitutive set of practices breaks a 
way of life down into parts that are small enough to be amenable to analysis, both 
in relation to contemporary concerns and as historic, culture-spanning forms of 
Christian faith and life. At the same time, practices are not too small: each 
Christian practice is large enough to permit us to draw together the shards and 
pieces of particular understandings, beliefs, events, behaviors, actions, 
relationships, inquiries, and skills into sets that are capacious and cohesive 
enough to show how they might guide one into a way of life.291 
Individual deeds are too small, transitory, and diverse to provide substantive material for 
theological reflection. Culture, on the other hand, is too cumbersome, diverse, and complex. 
Practices find a middle ground within which clear markers of a Christian community can be 
identified and analyzed. Conversely, how we understand, shape, articulate, and engage in 
practices profoundly shapes the character of a community. Attempting a total transformation of 
one’s culture at once is foolish, while aiming to control individual actions can be frivolous. Yet a 
community and its leaders do have some control over the practices they engender and promote. 
For those hoping to cultivate or sustain a particular charism or virtue within a population or 
organization, attention to practices provides an effective means for generating meaningful 
change. 
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 The focus of this chapter is the role of practices in shaping the vision and character of a 
moral community. I begin with an extended examination of Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of 
social practices and the role that they play in his constructive proposal. The first section 
concludes by acknowledging the spectrum of meanings of the term ‘practice’ employed in 
scholarly discourse. I further propose a distinction between practices and structures rooted in 
MacIntyre’s notion of internal goods. In the second section, I explore how religious educators 
and practical theologians have adopted and expanded MacIntyre’s notion in developing their 
own praxis-centered methodologies. I conclude with an evaluation of practice-centric modes of 
moral formation with particular attention to the possibility and necessity of cultivating critical 
awareness. A common and justified critique of some practice-oriented religious educators is their 
profound mistrust of modern society and the human capacity for autonomous judgment. Drawing 
from the notion of ‘independent practical reasoners’ found in MacIntyre’s Dependent Rational 
Animals, I argue that critical reasoning is not only possible in practice-oriented modes of 
formation, but necessary for the flourishing of the community. Adopting this emphasis on 
practices is a promising means toward realizing the virtue of solidarity within the community and 
as a community. 
 
5.1. Building Communities of Virtue through Social Practices 
 Chapter Two examined only half of the argument in After Virtue. MacIntyre’s critical 
assessment of the failure of the Enlightenment project narrates the decline of social capital and 
need for solidarity in our contemporary social context in the starkest of manners. Yet, this is far 
from the entirety of MacIntyre’s intention. As we move forward, it is important to keep in mind 
that though MacIntyre goes further than most in identifying and critiquing the ambiguities and 
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moral confusions of modern liberal democracy, he also acknowledges the great gains Western 
society have made in modernity and recognizes that no viable alternative social systems exist. 
His proposal should not be seen, then, as a counter-proposal to liberal democracy, but rather a 
proposition for how moral inquiry and discourse can survive and advance in a society that has no 
established vision of the common good. MacIntyre’s vision entails neither social withdrawal nor 
exclusion. Yet, he also rejects attempts at establishing universal consensus through the 
cultivation of some sort of moral Esperanto. The healthiest public exchanges occur when 
communities that have developed a rich moral vocabulary encounter and engage each other. In 
fact, as we shall see, MacIntyre believes that it is only in and through such moral communities 
that authentic education in the virtues is possible. 
 For MacIntyre, any legitimate retrieval of the virtues must leave behind the deficiencies 
of the past (in particular, Aristotle’s dubious metaphysical biology and the exclusion of all but 
wealthy free males from visions of the good life) and embrace the gains of modernity.292 It must 
also adapt itself to a social context in which Aristotle’s assumed city-state is no longer possible. 
At the heart of his proposal are three interrelated concepts: practices, narratives, and moral 
traditions. Through these, communities maintain and advance particular conceptions of the good 
that shape the identity of a community and moral horizons of the individual. The focus of this 
chapter section is primarily MacIntyre’s account of practices, which he emphasizes play only a 
partial and supporting role in his constructive proposal.293 Thus, brief attention must also be 
given to how practices fit into MacIntyre’s overall scheme. While these concepts are deeply 
interrelated, MacIntyre believes that there is a directionality to his concepts. A moral practice can 
exist without narratives, and narratives can exist without a moral tradition, but narratives (as 
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MacIntyre employs the term) cannot develop without a community of practice, and a moral 
tradition cannot be sustained without both. This progression, MacIntyre believes, reflects the 
actual historical development of the virtues tradition.  
 
Practices 
 More than simply restating the role of virtues, MacIntyre deliberately situates himself 
within the classical Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition examined in the previous chapter. While 
his historical survey is a work of meta-ethics (narrating how moral traditions develop and 
function), his fundamental position is that it is impossible to construct an ethical system outside 
of history and particular conversations. Such an effort is not only a futile attempt at objectivity; it 
also neglects the practical wisdom of consciously adopting and developing the insights of 
previous generations. MacIntyre’s narrative identifies two distinct uses of the virtues in the 
classical ethical system. Through epic poems and narratives, the heroic society presented the 
virtues as those excellences that facilitate the individual’s fulfillment of obligations proper to his 
or her social roles. Thus the virtues are those qualities that make a king a good king, a soldier a 
good soldier, and a farmer a good farmer. With Aristotle and later Aquinas, the virtues were 
broadened to encompass the pursuit of the human telos (personal or social, natural or 
supernatural) in general. What comes under consideration is not merely ruling well or farming 
well, but in fact living well.  
 MacIntyre emphasizes that any account of the virtues requires a prior understanding of 
those goals and objectives that we aim to accomplish.294 The heroic society developed an 
implicit, shared concept of social roles and expectations, and could only then articulate the 
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excellences needed to pursue them. Similarly, both Aristotle and Aquinas begin by first 
examining potential paths toward human flourishing and offer their own vision of the telos that 
gives meaning to their formulation of the virtues. In this way, a classical approach draws upon 
and reflects an embedded anthropology: the virtues are the perfection of the various powers and 
capacities of the individual. Speaking of virtues without first developing an understanding of the 
human person and the ends toward which we are directed is an impossible task. 
 With the classical tradition’s metaphysical biology no longer considered a viable point of 
departure, the necessary first step of MacIntyre’s constructive process is finding a new grounding 
for human flourishing and standards of excellence. To this end, MacIntyre develops his notion of 
social practices. MacIntyre’s use of the word ‘practice’ is not to be confused with the sort of 
repetitive acts necessary to gain proficiency in a given field (i.e. practicing scales on the piano or 
learning to swing a golf club). Rather, one ought to call to mind the practice of medicine or law: 
coordinated activities that require a large degree of training and competence. MacIntyre’s 
famous definition reads as follows: 
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form 
of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.295 
Within this elaborate definition are several key insights and ideas that must be understood to 
grasp the function practices play in MacIntyre’s ethical system, as well as the reason so many 
practical theologians and religious educators have embraced his notion. To do this fully (and 
opting to err on the side of tediousness), it is necessary to treat each line in the definition in turn. 
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“…any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity…” 
 At the risk of belaboring the obvious, we must begin by recognizing that MacIntyre has 
in mind distinctively human activities. As opposed to the instinctive behaviors of animals, 
practices entail intelligible and purposeful actions on the part of an agent. They are knowingly 
directed toward a particular end. Yet, practices are never the product of an individual acting 
alone. As socially established and cooperative, practices can only take root and flourish within a 
community. Even when practices are pursued individually (as in portrait painting or 
architecture), the practitioner is nevertheless participation in an established craft with shared 
measures of excellence. Spending my evenings in the basement inventing new games may prove 
to be an enriching activity that shapes my character, but it only becomes a practice in the 
MacIntyrean sense when I invite the participation of others and open myself to standards beyond 
my own creation. Much more will be said about this social dimension as the role of the virtues 
within a practice is developed below. As we shall see, the virtues are crucial not only for the 
activity to thrive, but for flourishing of the community that sustains it. 
 Not all socially established activities qualify as practices; they must be coherent and they 
must be complex. To borrow from MacIntyre’s own examples, “Tic-tac-toe is not an example of 
a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with skill; but the game of football is, and so is 
chess. Bricklaying is not a practice; architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice; farming 
is.”296 A MacIntyrean practice encompasses the full set of activities required for the completion 
of a complex task. The practice of medicine requires a great deal of specialized knowledge in 
anatomy, physiology, and pathology, as well as technical skill: the ability to interpret vital signs, 
make diagnoses, etc. Possession of any of these traits or skills individually, though praiseworthy 
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in themselves, does not qualify an individual as a legitimate practitioner of medicine. Practices 
are more than any particular activity; they are often an entire way of life. 
 As ‘coherent’ activities, the goals sought within a practice must be intelligible. It must be 
clear what constitutes levels of adequacy and mastery. Practices must have a clear sense of what 
they are trying to accomplish and whether or not they have succeeded. A community engaged in 
shared complex activities that do not share these standards cannot be said to be engaged in an 
authentic practice. For example, participation in a game of baseball requires acceptance that the 
team with the highest score after nine innings of play is in fact the winner. While there is 
undoubtedly room for healthy debate concerning who is currently the best shortstop in the 
majors, the conversation is only possible against a backdrop of general agreement concerning 
what the roles and responsibilities of the position entail.  
 
“…through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that 
form of activity…” 
 
 A second fundamental characteristic of MacIntyre’s concept of practice is the goods 
internal in their activity. In order to clarify what he means by internal goods, it is perhaps best to 
begin by defining their counterpart: external goods. Participating and excelling in any number of 
social practices (farming, medicine, baseball) may result in the acquisition of range goods, 
including money or prestige. While there is nothing inherently negative about any of these 
external goods, there is also nothing binding them exclusively to a particular practice. One may 
seek her fame and fortune through a variety of means. It is possible to provide for one’s home 
and family through a number of career paths. Likewise in sports, the thrill of victory in baseball 
is not altogether distinct from victory in soccer. If winning were one’s sole motivation, the 
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choice of sports would be at best a secondary concern. 
 Yet, in each of the above examples of social practices, along with countless others, there 
are goods that could not be known without active participation. Within baseball, there is an entire 
set of goods wholly unique from those one might experience in writing poetry or crafting 
wooden furniture. The practice of architecture is itself a good that can only be experienced by 
architects doing architecture. Others may appreciate the craftsmanship or the social contributions 
that the architect has produced, some may even develop a related practice of architectural study 
and criticism, but only the architect knows the sorts of goods internal to the practice of designing 
an edifice. This is true in two ways. First, it is only through participation that one may experience 
the goods of a practice. Second, only the veteran practitioner has the necessary experience and 
insight to properly recognize and judge the goods internal to a practice.  
 Beyond the excellence of the artifact produced and the excellence of the performance that 
produced it, MacIntyre recognizes an additional set of goods: those experienced when we come 
to recognize and know ourselves as practitioners. Employing the example of portrait painting, 
MacIntyre notes:  
What the artist discovers within the pursuit of excellence in portrait painting – and 
what is true of portrait painting is true of the fine arts in general – is the good of a 
certain kind of life. That life may not constitute the whole of life for someone who 
is a painter by a very long way or it may at least for a period, Gauguin-like, 
absorb him or her at the expense of almost everything else. But it is the painter’s 
living out of a greater or lesser part of his or her life as a painter that is the second 
king of good internal to painting.297 
Jennifer Ayers recognizes in this second set of good the power of a practice to shape the identity 
of the practitioner.298 Employing MacIntyre’s scheme in her analysis of social witness as a 
Christian practice, Ayers notes that it is often this second set of goods that is the most critical. 
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Social action and advocacy seldom yields tangible results, particularly amidst small groups with 
limited resources. Yet for those Ayers studied who were able to make commitments to social 
action that span decades, it was because they had been formed in such a way that they could not 
imagine abandoning this particular way of life. Faithfulness to the practice, notes Ayers, is the 
definition of success for practitioners of social witness.299 
 Finally, to participate in a social practice is to recognize that standards of excellence exist 
beyond one’s own making. Indeed, a precondition for entrance into a practice is the willingness 
to admit one’s own incompetence in discerning excellence within the practice (undoubtedly an 
act of humility, honesty, and courage). It is not simply that the novice has not yet gained the 
skills of a master; she must also learn the standards by which mastery is recognized. The only 
way to do this is through participation. In other words, one cannot enter a practice until she or he 
has willingly submitted to the authority of the community. So long as I insist on determining my 
own definitions and standards, I set myself outside of the community. This is not to say, 
however, that the standards of excellence are static or immune to criticism. Indeed, the 
flourishing and development of a practice requires that these standards themselves be always 
scrutinized, which brings us to the third and final portion of MacIntyre’s definition. 
 
“…with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends 
and goods involved, are systematically extended.” 
 
 It is the nature of a practice to perpetuate and extend itself through time. Apprentices 
become journeymen and eventually masters. Over time a practice changes its practitioners. Not 
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only do they become more skilled at their craft, they become more capable of recognizing and 
experiencing the goods internal to the practice. Moreover, as practitioners internalize a practice’s 
standards of excellence, they begin to push against the limits of these standards, perhaps even 
challenging their legitimacy. At times this evolution is entirely driven from within, though the 
impetus for change may also come from without (for example, in response to new technology). 
Similarly, a practice’s advancement may plod along relatively unchanged for years or even 
centuries until suddenly revolutionized. The truly great master painters do not only surpass the 
levels of their predecessors; they challenge our very conceptions of art and beauty. The vibrancy 
of a practice depends not only upon its ability to achieve the goods and standards of excellence 
recognized at any given moment, but also its capacity to continue advancing and evolving. A 
practice that cannot recognize and respond to the challenges and opportunities it faces cannot 
survive. 
 
 This outline of MacIntyre’s notion of a practice lays the groundwork for his initial and 
partial definition of virtue: “A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of 
which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of 
which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.” The benefit of this general and 
largely pragmatic definition is that it provides MacIntyre with a notion of virtue that can fit a 
broad range of particular practices while also identifying virtues that are common to all practices. 
The perfection of some human capacities is undoubtedly more essential to the flourishing of 
some practices than others (i.e. a photographer’s attentiveness to light and space verses a 
basketball player’s agility). Indeed, it is likely that some are so specific they have not been 
formally named or articulated. Yet, there are some virtues that seem to be essential to the 
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flourishing of all practices. It is to these common virtues that MacIntyre dedicates the greatest 
attention. 
 To enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship. We are in relation with our 
contemporaries, past practitioners, and future generations. Maintaining and honoring these 
relationships requires a particular set of habits: we must be honest with each other, as well as 
just. To violate these imperatives is to neglect our responsibilities to each other, to weaken the 
practice’s pursuit of its corresponding ends and goods, and to ultimately place oneself outside of 
the community. Virtues do not only allow the individual to excel, but facilitate the flourishing of 
the community of practitioners. Thus, though individual intelligence and creativity may be 
virtues, so too are the honesty and integrity required for practitioners to build trust, collaborate, 
and move the practice forward. Similarly, as mentioned above, entrance into a community of 
practice and advancement toward its standards of excellence requires the humility and courage of 
a student willing to learn from others. Whether we are hoping to learn to play soccer or the flute, 
this is true. Learning the virtues of a practice requires a prior and preliminary attainment of 
virtue. 
 This close link between virtue and the goods internal to a practice similarly implies a 
functional definition of vice. Vices, like the absence of virtue restrain us from achieving and 
experiences the goods internal to a practice. Malice and selfishness undoubted breach the 
relationships essential for the flourishing of a practice. Further, dishonesty, as with a willingness 
to cheat cards, ultimately hinders our experience of these internal goods. We may gain success 
and wealth (external goods), but we have sacrificed the goods internal to the experience. This 
might also be true for such counterfeit virtues as competitiveness. While a degree ambition is 
undoubtedly necessary for advancement within a practice, a single-minded focus on the end 
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results can cause us to lose sight of the goods found in mere participation. Indeed, it may indicate 
an eclipse of the internal goods by the external. 
 
Practices vs. Institutions 
The distinction between internal and external goods is essential to a related distinction 
that MacIntyre explores: that between practices and institutions.300 As noted above, external 
goods differ from internal goods in their relation to the practice: whereas internal goods can only 
be experienced through participation, external goods may be acquired through a variety of 
activities. Though it is the internal goods that define a practice, this does not imply that external 
goods are unnecessary. Indeed, external goods are often required for a practice to persist at all. It 
is the role of the institution to acquire and administer those external goods that are necessary to 
ensure the flourishing of the practice. A hospital sustains the practice of medicine and a 
university nourishes the practice of academic philosophy. The great danger lies in the ease with 
which external goods can supplant the internal goods of the practice. Money and political 
influence may be necessary to sustain a practice, but when they become objectives in themselves, 
the telos has been lost. This vulnerability is in part why the virtues are so necessary, and why 
their loss is so devastating. 
 Though MacIntyre is wary of an institution’s concern for external goods colonizing the 
practice’s pursuit of internal goods, he also laments the loss of institutional leadership as a 
practice of its own. The construction and support of a community – the work of politics, 
classically understood – has long lost its appeal as a moral and social practice. At best, 
organizational leadership is viewed as a necessary evil that must be tolerated in order to create 
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the space and infrastructure for individual endeavors and practices to thrive. This is not only true 
at the level of national government; parallels can be found in institutions such as Catholic higher 
education. The administration of a Catholic college or university is not a necessary evil; it is 
itself the opportunity to cultivate and employ the virtues through participation in a distinctive 
practice of its own. For either academics or administrators to draw too sharp a division between 
the virtuous practices of intellectual life and the vicious necessities of academic leadership is a 
mistake. While they are indeed two distinct sets of practices (though I would argue participating 
together in a larger shared endeavor), both are moral activities with their own corresponding 
goods.  
 In this dissertation, this emphasis on leadership and governance as a practice is critical. 
The exercise of any virtue on campus (including solidarity) is not solely the task of faculty and 
staff. Opportunities for its realization are not limited to the classroom, research, and 
extracurricular activities. Rather, Catholic higher education administration has its own particular 
set of moral opportunities and challenges. No areas of campus policies or structures are outside 
the moral purview. Rather, they are the first and foundational dimensions in which the character 
of the community is formed. Much more will be said about this in chapters six and seven. 
 
From Practices to Narratives and Moral Traditions 
 Mirroring the shift Aristotle makes in Nicomachean Ethics, MacIntyre pivots from 
excellence within a specific craft to excellence in living generally.301 MacIntyre believes that his 
conception of a practice and its corresponding goods and virtues can be extended to the craft of 
cultivating a moral life as a whole. Whereas Aristotle’s ethic assumes the political structure of a 
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city-state, MacIntyre imagines moral communities as a new form of polis. As with any social 
practice, moral communities embody and extend particular visions of those goods toward which 
we strive (the telos). Moreover, this telos can only be experienced through initiation and 
participation in a particular form of life and set of practices. As a community, this pursuit is 
enabled and sustained by the virtues – those human qualities, the perfection of which facilitate 
the attainment of our goal. Moreover, by cultivating the virtues and striving toward the telos, 
practitioners experience the goods that are internal to the practice. It is in striving for human 
flourishing that humans in fact flourish. Thus, MacIntyre believes, we are able to retain the 
classical tradition’s emphasis on the telos as the source and goal of moral inquiry in a society 
that is professedly agnostic, if not hostile, to distinctive visions of the human good. 
 The challenge, however, is that in contemporary society, we find ourselves engaged in a 
number of practices, each with their particular telos and corresponding virtues. This may include 
various guilds and associations, we well as diverse moral communities. For many, the problem is 
not a lack of vision of the good life, but rather the persistence of multiple versions, each with 
incompatible and incommensurable standards of excellence. MacIntyre readily admits that on 
this point, his own conception of the practices thus far fails (so too do others that adopt his 
notion of a practice without incorporating his additional categories). A focus on social practices 
alone cannot provide a rational system for weighing the demands of competing practices or their 
corresponding virtues. It cannot provide a unified vision of the good life amidst the plurality of 
goals and virtues present in contemporary society. Ultimately, it is an approach at risk of 
producing lives vulnerable to fragmentation and arbitrary preference of some goods over others. 
 What the account thus far lacks, MacIntyre suggests, is an account of the narrative unity 
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of a human life.302 As briefly outlined in the previous chapter, from a virtues perspective, for 
human acts to be intelligible they must be understood within their narrative context: what the 
agent is seeking to attain. An objective act cannot be comprehended without knowledge of the 
intentions.303 What this reveals is the historical nature of human life. Humans conceive of 
themselves by the stories they tell and the narratives within which they find themselves. 
MacIntyre uses the example of a gardener who, through his activity, is “‘Gardening,’ ‘Taking 
exercise,’ ‘Preparing for winter’ or ‘Pleasing his wife.’”304 While all of these may be true, and 
the man may even be conscious of several of these affiliated benefits, the actual nature of his 
behavior can only be found within the intentions that he ascribes to his actions. 
 Beyond coherence in daily activities, it is narratives that also bring a unity to one’s life. A 
potent narrative can link the varied roles, experiences, and activities of one’s life into a cohesive 
whole that provides both meaning and direction. An individual cannot arbitrarily choose which 
narratives to embrace however; rather, one is formed and by the stories he or she inherits. These 
narratives shape both our language and our imaginations. They help us to recognize the decisions 
before us and give us language to identify our choices. As MacIntyre summarizes: 
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Man is in his actions and practices, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling 
animal. He is not essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stories that 
aspire to truth. But the key question for men is not about their own authorship; I can only 
answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story 
or stories do I find myself a part?’305 
 
 
 Our life becomes meaningful when we have not only accomplished a degree of narrative 
unity, but when we can also imagine ourselves as part of a narrative quest. We begin to 
understand our actions not only in terms of proximate intentions or disparate practices that fill 
our days, but rather with an expansive view of the good toward which we are striving. Our 
participation in a moral practice equips us with a narrative that offers meaning and becomes our 
own. The narrative of one’s community striving to achieve its telos is reflected in one’s own 
journey. The challenges and risks faced by the community, as well as the virtues necessary to 
overcome them become integral to our own story. 
 A central ingredient to such a quest is the uncertainty of the exact nature of the goal that 
is sought. Social practices truly become living traditions when they recognize and embrace the 
uncertainty and conflicts about those goods toward which they strive and the means by which 
they might be achieved. MacIntyre defines traditions as follows:  
A living tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, 
and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that 
tradition… Hence the individual’s search for his or her good is generally and 
characteristically conducted within a context defined by those traditions of which 
the individual’s life is a part, and this is true both of those goods which are 
internal to practices and the goods of a single life.306  
A tradition gives practices a narrative history and ensures that the history has not yet concluded. 
A tradition is never settled, and the health of the tradition in fact depends on its ability to engage 
divergence and disagreements. Internally, a living tradition must be able to maintain and nourish 
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rival interpretations about the good that it seeks. The telos must always lie beyond a single 
articulation, and practitioners must embrace their task of constantly discerning a clearer 
understanding of the good that they seek. A tradition must further recognize and address the 
challenges posed to it by other moral traditions.  
 It is in his later work Whose Justice? Which Rationality? that MacIntyre fully develops 
his theory on the development and rationality of moral traditions.307 When a tradition has 
consistently excelled and satisfactorily engaged both internal and external challenges to its 
conception of the good, it develops a greater sense of authority. As we have noted above, the role 
of exemplars is central to measuring and advancing any practice. Certainly, these figures are one 
source of authority within the practicing community. Yet a more profound authority emerges 
when a tradition upholds its task of critically engaging its own conception of excellence. 
Authority is not established by the lack of critique and dissention within a community. Rather, it 
is product of lively and thorough debate. Without this willingness, a tradition is no longer living, 
and does not deserve the authority to which it lays claim. 
In his definition of traditions, MacIntyre explicitly affirms the possibility not only of 
(albeit imperfect) translation between traditions, but of one tradition being challenged by, 
learning from, and even being overtaken by another. History is full of examples of traditions 
engaging in discourse (civil or otherwise) with both being fundamentally changed by the 
encounter. This does not necessarily imply, however, that a Hegelian synthesis will occur in 
every instance. Most often barriers of logical incompatibility and incommensurability will 
forestall any such outcome, with neither able to prove superiority. Exchange and debate are 
possible, but superficial attempts at literal translation or the construction of some sort of 
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universal moral language are dubious at best. Genuine learning and conversion is as much about 
what is occurring within a tradition as it is about conversation at the frontiers. 
 Although we cannot ignore completely our common biological heritage, the language and 
narratives that we inherit continue to profoundly shape our moral vision and self-understanding. 
Moral traditions and communities of practice are necessary to sustain the telos and virtues that 
shape our moral quest. We are no longer organized into the sort of city-states that Plato and 
Aristotle assumed, and modern liberal nation states are explicitly structured to avoid any 
collective pursuit of common goods. If we are to overcome this third challenge to Aristotle’s 
ethic, the dubious role of the polis in sustaining virtue, we must do so as moral communities. 
 
Implications for Moral Education 
 Though moral and religious educators have readily embraced his theories, MacIntyre 
himself has written very little directly concerning education. His purpose in After Virtue was 
primarily to propose a new approach for moral inquiry in a context of social fragmentation and 
emotivism. While he is attentive to the formative nature of moral communities and emphasizes 
the moral development that occurs throughout the lifecycle (as ethics of virtue tend to be), he 
leaves it to others to work out how his theories look in practice. Nevertheless, there are scattered 
traces that help us to piece together his perspective on education. 
 This first can be found in After Virtue. Amidst his discussion on practices and the goods 
internal to them, he offers as an example how he might go about introducing and initiating a 
child into the practice of chess.308 Initially, one must resort to motivation through external goods 
(in this instance, offering candy for playing, and more candy for winning). Yet so long as the 
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child remains motivated solely by external good, there will be no incentive not to cheat. Over 
time, however, the instructor hopes that the child learns to recognize the particular goods internal 
to the game, and sees how cheating would destroy those goods. So too in moral education 
through service-learning, for example, the initial motivation of the student may be external (i.e. 
extra credit or a more impressive resume). The moral educator from this perspective would not 
rebuke these initial intentions. Rather, she would trust that through participating in a particular 
way of life, the student would come to recognize the goods internal to the practice and become 
the sort of person who is motivated by more benevolent impulses. 
 The challenge in a pluralistic and liberal context such as ours is helping students to 
identify and articulate the goods of such a practice. One location in which this become clear is 
MacIntyre’s aptly titled essay “How to Seem Virtuous Without Actually Being So,”309 in which 
he denies the possibility of educating for civic virtue in a liberal setting that marginalizes 
particular visions of the good. He articulates his thesis frankly: “There can be no rationally 
defensible shared programme for moral education for our society as such, but only a number of 
rival and conflicting programmes, each from the standpoint of one specific contending view.”310 
While civic education and service-learning in a liberal democracy may promote a particular set 
of pro-social behaviors, it cannot provide thicker elaborations or justification for why these 
activities are desirable. Students may recognize that a set of behaviors pleases their instructor or 
helps to attain a good grade (both of which are external goods), but will not be able to generalize 
from these acts to a more fundamental moral disposition. Nor will they learn how to recognize 
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when it is necessary to act in a way that displeases authority or sacrifices one’s good for those of 
others. 
 The benefit of moral education within a specific moral community and tradition is that it 
can provide a more distinct, particular, and cogent visions of the good. A moral community 
sustains well-defined arguments, narratives, and practices that convey not just which behaviors 
are desirable, but why they are so. It offers a vision of the good toward which the actions are 
directed as well as methods for determining when it might be necessary to sacrifice particular 
lower goods for the sake of those that are higher. Moral education within a tradition has the 
capacity to engage students at a level far deeper than a lowest-common-denominator approach is 
capable.  
 Going beyond MacIntyre’s own arguments, I might add that the benefits of such an 
education within a moral community are not limited to those students that personally identify 
with the particular tradition. For several decades now, Catholic education (at all levels) has 
recognized and embraced the fact that its mission extends beyond the Catholic community. For 
the most part, adjusting to this new reality has not meant abandoning the distinctiveness of the 
Catholic moral and social traditions. Rather, it presents the tradition as a dialogue partner and 
resource from which all students can draw. Students are not compelled to identify with the 
tradition, but they must know its arguments, and where they stand in relation to them.  
 The great benefit of this approach in our contemporary context is that it provides what for 
many is their first exposure to a developed and comprehensive moral tradition of any sort. At 
times, students will arrive deeply formed by and identifying with another faith community or 
moral tradition (and are often welcomed gratefully by the teacher). Yet, the majority of students 
(including those who are Catholic) has not been so formed, and struggles to identify the sources 
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of their moral framework. As MacIntyre would argue, they have at best inherited the fragments 
of traditions that they must somehow piece together into a coherent moral vision. Whether or not 
students choose to identify with the Catholic tradition, they frequently express appreciation for 
the ways in which the language it has developed has helped them to articulate their own 
experiences and insights. Concepts such as subsidiarity and the preferential option for the poor 
expand students’ moral vocabulary and help them to name the experiences they are having. Far 
from feeling assaulted by an insular and sectarian tradition, these students are grateful for 
exposure to a deeper moral tradition than they have previously encountered. 
 
Practices and Communities of Practice: A Note on Terminology 
 Before tracing the theological adaptation of MacIntyre’s notion and its emergence in 
contemporary theological reflection, it is necessary to pause and recognize the plurality of ways 
in which the term ‘practice’ is used in theology. Even among those directly drawing from 
MacIntyre, usage varies. Gordon Mikoski, writing from the perspective of religious education, 
identifies three uses of the term ‘practice’.311 Though distinct in important ways, these various 
uses can likewise be viewed to fall along a spectrum. On the one extreme is the notion of a 
practice as a community committed to a distinct endeavor or way of life. In contemporary 
society, this is the usage behind such professional associations as the practice of law (wherein 
gaining employment in a firm is often described as joining a practice). Here the focus is not on 
the distinctive activities, but on the community itself. A Christian corollary might be the practice 
of discipleship or, to follow the terminology of the earliest communities, practitioners of The 
Way. There is good evidence that this is the primary notion MacIntyre has in mind in After 
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Virtue. While he investigates distinct activities such as portrait painting and chess, his principle 
concern is the community that sustains the endeavor. This is most evident in his discussion on 
the role of virtues within a practice. Here, his emphasis is not on the habits and qualities 
necessary for success in the activity, but rather the moral qualities necessary for the community 
itself to thrive. Ultimately, his discussion of these other crafts is geared toward his proposal for 
practices as a moral community – a creative retrieval of Aristotle’s polis.  
 On the other extreme, most religious educators and practical theologians employ 
MacIntyre’s notion of practices in discussing and analyzing the distinct and formative activities 
of Christian communities. From this perspective, distinct activities such as Eucharistic 
celebration or private devotions present patterned behaviors that convey the implicit theology of 
the community. Practical theologians embark on qualitative and ethnographic studies of these 
practices, discerning this underlying theology. 312 Religious educators, conversely, propose 
immersion into these practices as a central means toward formation in faith.  
Between these two extremes, Mikoski notes that other theologians will speak of practices 
as a set of activities directed toward a common and coordinating principle, such as the practice of 
hospitality or social witness. Here, the focus is not on the particular activity, but the good toward 
which the overlapping set of activities points. One might be tempted to add practices of solidarity 
as such a set of interrelated activities. However we might hope to promote the virtue of solidarity 
within Catholic higher education, it will undoubtedly require far more than a single endeavor or 
initiative. Yet this middle position may in fact blur more boundaries than it clarifies. A great 
benefit of attending to practices is its emphasis on the particular: the character of this particular 
                                                 
312 An example of the formalization of growing field: Helen Cameron and Catherine Duce, 
Researching Practice in Mission and Ministry: A Companion (SCM Press, 2013), Researching 
Practice. 
192 
community or the theology embedded in this particular practice. To affirm or promote the 
practice of a generalized principle or virtue risks losing this attentiveness. 
From the purview of this dissertation, Mikoski’s identification of these three uses of the 
term ‘practice’ raises two critical insights. First, we must be mindful of our use of language. We 
must be clear at what level we are employing the term and how we understand it to fit within the 
broader Christian tradition and community. Yet secondly, we must also recognize that these 
varying usages are not antagonistic or mutually exclusive. In fact, while existing along a 
spectrum, they are deeply interrelated. It is the practice as a moral community that sustains and 
advances particular formative practices. In turn, it is these distinct practices that bind together 
and shape the community of practice. If our aim is to transform the moral character of a distinct 
social group, we must do so by attending to these concrete and specific pursuits 
If there is indeed a legitimate spectrum of socially established activities that rightfully 
bear the name practices, one understandably wonders what the upper and lower limits of a 
practice might be. At what point has our inquiry become too broad or too narrow to rightly be 
considered a practice? Toward the upper end, is it appropriate to speak of all of Catholic higher 
education as a practice? Education of any sort? While specific boundaries may be impossible, a 
couple of guidelines might be suggested. First, a MacIntyrean practice is centered upon the 
commitment to realization of some particular good. While the exact nature of the good may be 
legitimately debated, there must be come common understanding for the conversation to 
continue. The more broad and generalized our conception of a practice becomes, the more 
difficult it is to identify a common goal for all practitioners.  
Second, practices on even the largest of scales often have some criteria for legitimate 
participation, if not a designated authority ensuring professional standards are met. Simply 
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claiming to participate in a practice or tradition does not guarantee recognition by other 
practitioners. Thus, though we may have varying notions of the practice of medicine, there are 
clear requirements and protocols that determine whether an individual can legitimately operate. 
This, it would seem, is part of what separates the practice of medicine from the practice of 
healing. Though I might understand a good hug or a bowl of soup as acts of healing, claiming 
that they thus qualify me as a medical doctor will nevertheless get me thrown in prison. In a 
similar way, the Society of Jesus owns the name Jesuit and dictates which schools and 
organizations may identify themselves by it. The conversation surrounding Ex Corde Ecclesiae 
arose in part around concerns over the Magisterium’s ability to regulate an institution’s claim to 
Catholicism. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, when we speak of practices as the formative 
activities of a community, there is a risk of our scope becoming too narrow. The celebration of 
the Eucharist undoubted qualifies as a practice for theologians engaged in this conversation. Yet, 
the attentive observer would recognize dozens of meaningful and formative details present in 
each celebration. From the selection to songs to the manner in which hands are folded in prayer, 
it is the particulars that ultimately convey the theological vision of the community. Indeed, it is 
not that the community gathers in celebration, but how it gathers that determines the significance 
of the practice. It is here that MacIntyre’s insistence on the complexity of a practice proves a 
helpful guideline. While these details are worthy of our mindful attention, they are each 
employed for the realization of a common good. Nevertheless, it is wise to keep in mind that we 
can say very little about a practice when it is detached from all concrete manifestations. It is the 
way in which a practice is performed within a particular community that determines the good it 
realizes. 
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Practices vs. Structures 
A further distinction must be made between practices and structures. Undoubtedly 
related, these terms are frequently employed in distinctive discourses, with social ethicist 
focusing on structures and practical theologians investigating practices. Even once we set aside 
the plurality of definitions within each of these disciplines, a clear overlap remains in the 
respective definitions and lists of activities that authors consider either a structure or a practice. 
In the Catholic church for example, mandatory celibacy for the priesthood could be interpreted 
as both a structure and a practice. In higher education, the same could be said of requiring six 
credits of theology. Both instances reflect policy decisions, but are articulated in terms of the 
realization of some internal good. Indeed, in proposing structures of virtue, Daniel Daly includes 
practices among his list of structures: “A structure is an institution, a practice, a value laden 
narrative, or a paradigmatic figure that people find already existing or which they create on the 
national and global level, and which orientates or organizes economic, social, and political 
life.”313  
In this dissertation, I wish to propose a distinction rooted in MacIntyre’s notion of 
external and internal goods. What distinguishes structures and practices is the goods that they are 
established to attain. Specifically, to be a practice, a patterned social activity must be purposely 
directed toward realizing an internal good.314 From this perspective, practices are indeed a subset 
                                                 
313 Daly, “Structures of Virtue and Vice,” 354. 
314 The distinction that I am proposing is similar to the distinction William Spohn makes between 
practices and techniques. Adapting MacIntyre’s notion of practices in an attempt to integrate 
spirituality and ethics, Spohn suggests spiritual practices are done for their own sake, while 
techniques are employed to achieve “tangential” benefits. He notes that practices and techniques 
exist along a spectrum, and it is possible to techniques to develop into practices over time. Go 
and Do Likewise: Jesus and Ethics (New York: Continuum, 2000), 43. 
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of a more generalized notion of structures, which may also be deliberately established for the 
acquisition of an external good, or may naturally arise within a community or society without 
any intentional design. If this distinction holds, the structures listed above (celibacy and the core 
curriculum) could both at least potentially qualify as practices, depending on the intended 
outcomes behind them and recognizing potential doubts as to whether they accomplish the 
anticipated goods. Conversely, payroll and general maintenance would usually be seen as 
structures: undeniably necessary for the preservation of the practice, but more geared toward 
securing external goods. Beyond these intentionally constructed processes, any community 
includes countless social patterns and ‘ways we’ve always done things’ that profoundly shape 
the moral character of the community but have never been the object of premeditated design or 
critical deliberation. It is not their absence of moral implications but intentionality that keeps 
these structures from becoming practices. 
From this perspective, two points cannot be forgotten. First, though many structures lack 
the intentionality of practices, they are nevertheless formative. They largely shape the moral 
quality of the community and are themselves objects that deserve study. Structures play a central 
role in determining both the quality of goods the community produces and the moral character of 
all those that are a part of a common life. This is the insight behind the developing conversation 
around structures of virtue. Second, many of those activities and patterns that we consider 
structures have the potential to become practices. That is, when examined closely, we may 
recognize opportunities within the most mundane of tasks to promote and pursue the goods 
internal to the practice. Development, for example, is not simply a matter of procuring the funds 
necessary for keeping the institutions afloat. Rather, it is an opportunity to invite others into the 
distinctive mission of the institution. This is a central insight behind MacIntyre’s distinction 
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between practices and institutions. Like institutions, structures are necessary, but not a necessary 
evil. To say that administrators are engaged in politics is in fact to raise the moral profile of their 
vocation. Through the design and implementation of structures that are just, honest, or perhaps 
even courageous, institutional leaders profoundly shape the moral character of their schools. I 
will develop this theme further in Chapters Six and Seven. 
 
5.2. The Turn to Practices in Practical Theology and Religious Education 
 MacIntyre did not write After Virtue intending to reshape how practical theologians and 
religious educators approach their enterprise. His concern was the status of moral inquiry in 
contemporary society and his goal was to propose a way in which philosophical investigation can 
remain vibrant and relevant today. Nevertheless, his insights were recognized and engaged 
across a diverse spectrum of fields.315 MacIntyre did not specifically develop Christianity or 
Catholicism as moral traditions, yet it took very little time for theologians and religious 
communities to recognize themselves in his proposal.316 Whereas Catholic ethicists have 
frequently cited MacIntyre as a seminal figure in moral theology’s return to the virtues, practical 
theologians have embraced and adapted his notion of practices in articulating the perspective 
                                                 
315 A small sampling: Matthew Sinnicks, “Practices, Governance, and Politics: Applying 
MacIntyre’s Ethics to Business,” Business Ethics Quarterly 24, no. 2 (April 2014): 229–49; Jose 
Alberto Garcia-Aviles, “Online Newsrooms as Communities of Practice: Exploring Digital 
Journalists’ Applied Ethics,” Journal of Mass Media Ethics 29, no. 4 (2014): 258–72; Derek 
Sellman, “Professional Values and Nursing,” Medicine Health Care and Philosophy 14, no. 2 
(May 2011): 203–8; John Halliday and Mary Johnsson, “A MacIntyrian Perspective on 
Organizational Learning,” Management Learning 41, no. 1 (February 2010): 37–51; S. van der 
Burg and A. van Gorp, “Understanding Moral Responsibility in the Design of Trailers,” Science 
and Engineering Ethics 11, no. 2 (April 2005): 235–56. 
316 An early critique of MacIntyre’s work was the observation that he himself was not part of any 
moral tradition of the sort he proposes. In subsequent years, MacIntyre became Catholic and 
identified himself as a Thomistic Aristotelian.  
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their own discipline. Religious educators have made a parallel shift, emphasizing insertion into 
and reflection upon Christian practices as central to faith formation. 
 The focus of this chapter section is this embrace and adaptation of MacIntyre’s notion of 
practices. I begin by tracing the emergence of practices as a locus of reflection within practical 
theology and religious education, highlighting some of the key figures, moments, and themes. 
While MacIntyre’s proposals were readily embraced, they were also expanded in important 
ways, with theologians developing his concepts in a theological key. I close by evaluating these 
efforts and this approach, highlighting some of the challenges and critiques posed to both 
MacIntyre and his adherents. In particular, I suggest ways in which the insights from this 
perspective can be embraced without fully accepting and adopting the post-liberal perspective 
and critique of modernity. 
 
Practices in Practical Theology and Religious Education 
 Mirroring recent shift in moral and systematic theology outlined, religious education and 
practical theology has recently undergone a ‘turn to practices’ in its research and outlook. While 
this turn can be discerned in the post-liberal theology of authors such as Stanley Hauerwas,317 the 
                                                 
317 As a very brief overview: Hauerwas draws from the thought of MacIntyre, Iris Murdoch, and 
John Howard Yoder in emphasizing the church as a distinctive community, with its own moral 
vision, narratives, and grammar. He advocates a radically faithful form of discipleship that 
rejects attempts to participate in broader shared discourses. Rather, he suggests, the duty of the 
church is to be church, witnessing to a truth that the world does not recognize. Stanley 
Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic, 1st ed. 
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1991); Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer 
In Christian Ethics (University of Notre Dame Press, 1991); Emmanuel Katongole, Beyond 
Universal Reason: The Relationshiop between Religion and Ethics in the Work of Stanley 
Hauerwas (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 2000). His thought is emblematic of the ‘post-
liberal’ or ‘countermodern’ school of Christian theology which responds to late-modern 
challenges by bemoaning Christianity’s attempts to accommodate modern secular discourse, in 
turn abandoning its claims to revealed truth (see: Paul Lakeland, Postmodernity: Christian 
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recognition of Christian practices as a distinct are of research is a relatively recent development. 
The influence of MacIntyre in this development is clear. The perspective and set of categories 
that he develops have provided a unique lens through which to analyze Christian communities. 
As Nancy Murphy observes, “MacIntyre’s concept of a practice…helps us to recognize a level of 
social reality that might well have gone entirely unnoticed, except perhaps for a few instances 
such as organized sports and some of the professions such as law and medicine.”318  
Attention to practices in theological reflection creates room for both descriptive analysis 
and normative proposals. Within Christian practices are embedded distinctive theological 
assumptions that provide a lens through which to identify the implicit beliefs of the community. 
Conversely, by proposing Christian practices, we offer potential means for shaping the vision 
and character of the community. Practices are larger than the individual, yet more open to 
adaptation and manipulation than culture. Simply proclaiming that the character of a community 
ought change through the cultivation of virtue is never enough; we cannot expect to effectively 
changing a culture by fiat. Proposing and implementing new practices or new approaches to old 
practices, however, has the potential to enact powerful change. 
While it is impossible to trace a direct line from After Virtue to the understanding and use 
of practices in practical theology today, some figures and events play a central role. To a large 
extent, this work is happening in Protestant churches, particularly those within the Reformed 
tradition. This is not to deny MacIntyre’s influence within Catholic approaches to spirituality and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Identity in a Fragmented Age (Augsburg Fortress Publishers, 1990), 68–76). While there is 
undoubtedly a great deal or resonance between this perspective and MacIntyre’s critique of 
modernity, I am convinced that one may benefit from MacIntyre’s insights without entirely 
accepting this rejection of modernity. 
318 Nancey C. Murphy, “Using MacIntyre’s Method in Christian Ethics,” in Virtues & Practices 
in the Christian Tradition: Christian Ethics After MacIntyre, ed. Nancey C. Murphy, Brad J 
Kallenberg, and Mark Thiessen Nation (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997), 33. 
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religious education. The Jesuit William Spohn, for example, draws heavily from MacIntyre in 
efforts to link scripture, virtue ethics, and Christian spirituality.319 Yet, MacIntyre’s influence is 
more readily apparent in Catholic moral theology than in Catholic religious education. At least 
some of this hesitancy, it will be argued, is rooted in the theological assumptions of those who 
have more often embraced MacIntyre’s notions of practices.  
This emphasis on practices is frequently rooted in a mistrust of the capacities of a modern 
individual. We are not free, it is argued, to narrate our own lives, but rather must draw on the 
truthful vision of a community – in this case, the church. The corollary of this perspective is a 
heavy affirmation of the trustworthiness of the church. It is the church that, through the 
narratives and practices it sustains, gives the individual the reliable perspective that we cannot 
develop for ourselves. Many Catholic theologian and religious educators become nervous when 
such language meant to describe an ideal moral community is in fact applied to a very concrete 
and hierarchical institution. This chapter concludes with an evaluation of this tension and argues 
that developing the practitioner’s capacity to critically examine the moral tradition and faith 
community is not only possible, but necessary. 
 
 The two figures perhaps most responsible for this MacIntyrean view of practices taking 
hold in religious education and practical theology are Craig Dykstra and Dorothy Bass. Their 
own writing openly acknowledges the influence of MacIntyre, and Bass’s co-edited volumes 
(one with Dykstra, another with Miroslav Volf) provide some of the foundational essays that 
outline the underlying logic and perspective of this turn to the practices.320 The influence of these 
                                                 
319 Spohn, Go and Do Likewise. 
320 Dorothy C Bass and Craig R Dykstra, For Life Abundant: Practical Theology, Theological 
Education, and Christian Ministry (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2008); 
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two is rooted in more than their writings. As the Senior Vice President of Religion for the Lilly 
Foundation for 23 years, Dykstra oversaw the disbursement of more than 1.8 billion dollars to 
support spiritual and vocational programs for congregations and religiously affiliated higher 
education institutions.321 Bass is director of one of the most influential of these Lilly grant 
programs, the Valparaiso Project on the Education and Formation of People in Faith, whose 
website offers resources for faith formation though thirteen distinct practices.322 
Dykstra’s work in particular embodies the perspective cultivated by MacIntyre, and 
demonstrates the post-liberal suspicion of the modern individual. His dissertation, subsequently 
revised and published in 1981, cites Iris Murdoch as a principal resource, but also draws heavily 
from Hauerwas. Both the influence of Hauerwas and Dykstra’s mistrust of independent critical 
reasoning are clear from the title of this work: Vision and Character: A Christian Educator’s 
Alternative to Kohlberg.323 In this work, Dykstra begins by rejecting the model of moral 
development proposed by Kohlberg on a number of fronts. First, he denies that the moral life can 
be reduced to single virtue, justice.324 Second, he rejects Kohlberg’s proposition that moral 
growth simple requires the ability to see moral challenges from increasingly complex 
                                                                                                                                                             
Miroslav Volf and Dorothy C. Bass, eds., Practicing Theology: Beliefs and Practices in 
Christian Life (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001). Many 
essays explicitly acknowledge MacIntyre’s influence, while others affirm that they are drawing 
more from the thought of Pierre Bourdieu. 
321 “Craig Dykstra: Religion and Lilly Endowment,” Religion & Ethics NewsWeekly, accessed 
October 23, 2014, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/2012/06/29/june-29-2012-craig-
dykstra-religion-and-lilly-endowment/11553/. 
322 www.practicingourfaith.org, accessed October 23, 20114. 
323 Craig R Dykstra, Vision and Character: A Christian Educator’s Alternative to Kohlberg 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1981). 
324 Kohlberg’s notion of justice differs greatly from the ancient Greek tradition, which indeed 
viewed justice as encompassing a rightly-ordered life and society. Kohlberg famously dismissed 
an Aristotelian classical perspective as a “bag of virtues” view of the moral life. Lawrence 
Kohlberg, “Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View,” in Moral 
Education: Five Lectures, ed. Nancy F. and Theodore R. Sizer (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1970), 59. 
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perspectives.325 Ultimately, Dykstra insists that a true moral vision is grounded not in cognitive 
dexterity, but revelation: 
Justice is conditioned and shaped by the covenantal relationship that the people 
have with God. This conditioning and shaping cuts two ways. First, human beings 
cannot understand what justice means unless the meaning of God’s justice is first 
revealed…Second, God’s justice cannot be revealed unless persons are 
themselves restored by God to the covenantal relationship with God.326 
Rather than deepening the individual’s cognitive capacity, Dykstra proposes a religious 
education program that emphasizes the role of the community in cultivating a distinctive moral 
vision and character. After developing the philosophical and theological foundations of this 
approach, Dykstra concludes by proposing three disciplines that might aid in this formation: 
repentance, prayer, and service. The use of the term disciplines is telling. Written before 
MacIntyre’s After Virtue, Dykstra already shows an inclination toward practices, but not the 
language. Eighteen years later, his subsequent work, Growing in the Life of Faith, clearly adopts 
a MacIntyrean perspective and offers a list of fourteen practices that “appear consistently 
throughout the tradition and that are particularly significant for Christians today.”327 
 
 While MacIntyre’s influence is readily acknowledged, theologians working with his 
categories in practical disciplines make critical adaptions. As outlined above, a central distinction 
is the focus that these authors place on practices as activities of a Christian community, rather 
                                                 
325 It should be noted that Kohlberg himself does not equate higher levels of moral reason with 
greater moral merit. One may reason at a relatively simple level yet embody goodness in both 
character and actions. Nevertheless, he would argue, increased moral cognition is a beneficial 
asset when faced with complex moral dilemmas. Dykstra, on his part, allows that Kohlberg 
traces the emergence of social reasoning, or the ability to recognize and consider multiple claims, 
but denies that is the most important (let alone critical) aspect of moral growth. Vision and 
Character, 28–29. 
326 Ibid., 13. 
327 Craig Dykstra, Growing In The Life Of Faith: Education And Christian Practices, 2nd ed. 
(Louisville: Geneva Press, 1999), 42–43. 
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than MacIntyre’s emphasis on the community of practice. This is clear in the definition of 
Christian practices Dykstra and Bass develop: “By ‘Christian practices’ we mean things 
Christian people do together over time to address fundamental human needs in response to and 
in the light of God’s active presence for the life of the world.”328 Further, for MacIntyre, 
practices (here considered as formative activities) are entirely human constructs. It is the 
community that develops and governs their proper functioning. Likewise, the goods that 
practices convey are human in origin. A practice is accountable to its wider social and historical 
context, but is nevertheless a product of the community. It is the task of practitioners to 
determine whether the practice is indeed achieving the goods for which it was established. 
Conversely, Christian practices, according to Dykstra and Bass are not only “normed” by the 
community, but also in relation to God.329 They are not solely human constructs, but are 
established and maintained actively by God as conveyers of grace.  
 Dykstra develops this distinction further, arguing that practices bear not only moral 
weight, but epistemological weight: “In the context of participation in certain practices we come 
to see more than just the value, the ‘good’ of certain human activities: we may come to 
awareness of certain realities that outside of these practices are beyond our ken. Engagement in 
certain practices may give rise to new knowledge.”330 A central insight from this perspective is 
the impossibility of separating beliefs and practices. One cannot be understood without the other. 
It is by participating in the practices of the Christian community that we come to recognize and 
                                                 
328 Dykstra and Bass, “A Theological Understanding of Christian Practices,” 18. Emphasis 
original. 
329 Ibid., 22. 
330 Craig Dykstra, “Reconceiving Practice in Theological Inquiry and Education,” in Virtues & 
Practices in the Christian Tradition: Christian Ethics After MacIntyre, ed. Nancey C. Murphy, 
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understand the active presence of God in the world. Indeed, it is through participation that we 
become collaborators with God. As socially established and historically extended, the church 
participates in God’s ongoing activity in history. 
 It is this epistemological weight of practices that makes them advantageous loci for 
theological reflection. Practical theologians do not study Christian practices as an anthropologist 
might (though they often employ a similar set of methods), but rather examine them for signs of 
God’s activity in our lives. This should not imply that Christian practices are free from human 
influence or corruption. Practices always take on the specific context, values, and concerns of the 
practicing community, often with detrimental results. If the community is racist, sexist, or in any 
number of ways vicious, its practices will likely be as well. A central task of practical theology 
therefore is to not only examine the beliefs embedded within a practice, but to help the 
community get its practices right. Theologians remind the church when its practices have 
become unfaithful and dishonest: when it is no longer realizing the goods for which the practices 
were established. 
 Amy Plantinga Pauw develops the relationship between belief and practice further, noting 
that it is in fact the rare exception in which stated beliefs and practices correspond. In truth, 
Christian communities and individuals seldom practice what they preach. Those rare figures that 
do we name saints. More often, there is a tension between our beliefs and practices, if not 
outright crisis. Our community practices fail to embody the highest standards of the tradition, or 
our faithful participation masks our spiritual emptiness. Plantinga Pauw draws two conclusions 
from this reality. First, affirming the role of practices in no way alleviates the necessity of 
sustained and often critical reflection. This perspective calls our attention to a new level of social 
reality, but does not ameliorate any of the challenges facing Christian communities. We must 
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examine our practices with a discerning eye, willing to acknowledge moments of grace and 
failing. Frequently, the most profound and insightful critiques come from outside of the 
community. The faithfulness of the community requires a wiliness to hear these voices, wherever 
they may originate. 
Yet second, Plantinga Pauw does believe that an attention to practices offers concrete 
benefits. As social activities extended through time, practices have the potential to overcome 
individual and communal lapses. The cultivation of a flourishing communal practice alleviates 
the necessity of raising up (or expectantly awaiting) individual heroes. This implications for 
justice education are clear. Rather than relying on a single prophetic voice, the community 
cultivates a shared practice of witness and testimony. Rather than seeking a single champion for 
the poor, the community sustains a practice of outreach in which each can play a small role. 
Moreover, when individuals alone may falter, “The community’s practice may eventually have a 
reforming influence on recalcitrant individuals, and their willingness to stay in that community 
may mark an openness to this reformation.”331 We stay faithful to a community and its practices 
even when our inner disposition lacks the motivation. Gradually, we hope, the practices of the 
community transform our own resistance or disbelief.  
Kathryn Tanner similarly emphasizes the discrepancies between formal theological 
doctrines and concrete Christian practices.332 Too often, she argues, academic theology 
articulates practices in a static and isolated way that fails to recognize the deeply particular and 
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organic context in which they in fact reside. In fact, Tanner argues that the informal nature of 
Christian practices is in fact a strength: 
In order to maintain themselves as ongoing forms of coordinated social action, 
Christian practices do not in fact require (1) much explicit understanding of 
beliefs that inform and explain their performance, (2) agreement on such matters 
among the participants, (3) strict delimitation of codes for action, (4) systematic 
consistency among beliefs and actions, or (5) attention to their significance that 
isolates them from a whole host of non-Christian commitments.333  
For Tanner, Christian practices are open-ended and ambiguous. Indeed, they are often nothing 
more than basic human activities (eating, conversation, etc.) done in a Christian way. They are 
realized over time and in response to the immediate situation. Yet, this ambiguity also permits a 
degree of flexibility. Diverse communities can come together around a common set of practices 
in a way that is not possible when we lead with our theological assumptions. Practices likewise 
create a forum through which to engage broader culture. Because they are rooted in common 
human activities, practices are necessarily in dialogue with daily life and broader society. Tanner 
heavily emphasizes the inescapable overlap of Christian practices and broader social networks. 
We are always a part of many communities of practice, each of which challenging the others: 
“Like those of most subcultures, Christian practices are bifocal in nature, involving constant 
processes of negotiation with, and critical revision of the practices of the wider society.”334 
 
Evaluation 
 While MacIntyre’s proposal has profoundly influenced discourse in philosophical ethics 
as well as moral and practical theology in recent decades, his thought has also been subject to 
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critiques on multiple fronts. Many question the veracity of the historical narrative he offers,335 
while others accuse MacIntyre of refusing to recognize the positive contributions of the 
Enlightenment.336 His rejection of the human rights discourse is particularly problematic for 
many.337 Perhaps the most common critique, however, is rooted in the fear that MacIntyre and 
his adherents are advocating a rejection and withdrawal from contemporary and civil discourse. 
This accusation has particularly followed post-liberal theology’s development of the church as a 
contrast society.338 In a dissertation concerned with society’s withdrawal into social enclaves and 
the promotion of solidarity across differences, such an indictment, if true, would seem a decisive 
and definitive obstacle. As a preliminary response, we might note MacIntyre’s theory of the 
development of a tradition outlined above. MacIntyre, as well as many theologians influenced by 
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of Morals and Their Discontents (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 252–259. For 
Hauerwas’s response to the ‘sectarian’ label, see: “Will the Real Sectarian Stand Up?” Theology 
Today 44 no. 1 (1987): 93. MacIntyre likewise responds to Stout’s claim that our disagreement 
occur against a backdrop of profound agreement in: Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Privatization of 
Good: An Inaugural Lecture,” The Review of Politics 52, no. 3 (1990): 344–77. 
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him, do not reject the possibility of engaging other communities and moral traditions. Rather, the 
health of the tradition and flourishing of conversational justice requires it.  
 A stronger challenge to a practice-based approach concerns the theological foundations 
of its approach to moral formation and their implications regarding the authority of the church. 
Hauerwas, and Dykstra following him, frequently collapse their notion of church as both a 
practice and an institution. This affirmation of the role of the church over the individual has 
potential to be problematic. To enter into a practice undoubtedly requires a willingness to submit 
to the authority of the community. The apprentice cannot learn a craft if she is unwilling to 
acknowledge standards of excellence that are not only beyond her reach, but also beyond her 
imagination. So too, participation in the church requires the humility necessary to admit that 
others know better than I. Yet, a practice’s authority is located within the masters of the craft, not 
the leaders of the institution. There is little guarantee that these will be one and the same persons. 
Within the church, it is not hierarchy that sets the standards of excellent, but the saints. 
 At the heart of this tension is the question of theological anthropology: to what degree do 
we trust the moral autonomy of the individual? To what degree are we reliant on the church to 
provide a truthful moral vision? Answers to these questions usually reflect a theologian’s 
appraisal of modernity.339 Dykstra’s theology clearly embodies a mistrust of the world and the 
Enlightenment ideal of the autonomous individual, and the influence of the Reformed tradition is 
readily apparent in his emphasis on practices. Rather than trusting the student to develop his or 
                                                 
339 Paul Lakeland distinguishes late-modern, counter-modern, and radically post-modern 
theological responses to modernity’s decline: Postmodernity: Christian Identity in a Fragmented 
Age (Augsburg Fortress Publishers, 1990). This typology has been adapted by Kathleen Cahalan 
adopts Lakeland’s typology in her analysis of practical theology (“Three Approaches to Practical 
Theology, Theological Education, and the Church’s Ministry,” International Journal of 
Practical Theology 9 (2005): 63–94) and Harold Horell does the same with religious education: 
Harold Daly Horell, “Fostering Hope: Christian Religious Education in a Postmodern Age,” 
Religious Education 99, no. 1 (December 1, 2004): 5–22. 
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her own character, faithful formation for Dykstra is a matter of immersion within the narratives 
and vision of the church. This is evident in Dykstra’s critic of Thomas Groome’s late-modern 
Shared Christian Praxis approach to religious education,340 which emphasizes the critical 
appraisal of the tradition in light of lived faith:  
Where does the capacity for critical reflection come from? Groome’s answer to 
this is not entirely clear. He seems to suggest that critical reflection is possible for 
all people, given the appropriate developmental capacities…This is probably true, 
if we do, in fact, have the internal freedom to reflect critically on our present 
lives. But whether we are really free to do this is not evident. Reflecting critically 
on our present lives is a scary business. Much is at stake – namely, our present 
lives. To be free to reflect critically on our present lives, we must be willing to 
allow our lives to be changed, in a sense, to be given up. We ought not to be too 
optimistic about people’s freedom to do this.341 
Dykstra’s solution is participation in a worshipping community that embodies a contrasting ethos 
to that of contemporary society. While such an immersion will indeed cultivate a moral vision 
that is distinct from the predominant values of contemporary society, it provides no resources for 
the sort of internal debate and norming that is necessary for the flourishing and development of 
any moral community. 
 MacIntyre anticipates this critique, proposing a process by which one gains the skills and 
virtues necessary to become an “independent practical reasoner.”342 Though he is similarly 
suspicious of our inborn capacity to critically evaluate and determine our vision of the good, he 
does believe that learning this skill is both possible and necessary. The work begins in early 
                                                 
340 Groome proposes a method of religious education in which learners engage their life and the 
Christian story/vision through five ‘movements’: 1) Naming present praxis; 2) Reflecting 
critically on praxis; 3) Presenting the Christian story/vision; 4) Dialectical hermeneutic between 
present praxis and the Christian story/vision; 5) Making a decision in the light of faith. While 
Groome emphasizes the formation of the whole person in his approach, these movement are 
modeled after the cognitive process through which one comes to know and makes a decision. 
Groome, Sharing Faith. 
341 Dykstra, Growing In The Life Of Faith, Second Edition, 84. 
342 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2001), ch. 8. 
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childhood (an age, he notes, that most philosophers neglect). Almost as soon as a toddler is able 
to vocalize his desires, his parents begin to teach him to distinguish immediate impulses from 
higher goods and needs.343 This process continues through adolescence and adulthood. 
Gradually, we learn that acting for the sole reason of pleasing our authorities does not and should 
not please our authorities. We learn to negotiate contending viewpoints and conflicts with grace. 
These skills not only serve the individual well, but also the community.  
 While the skills and virtues of independent practical reasoning are essential, MacIntyre 
emphasizes that we are dependent upon other to learn them: “What we need from others, if we 
are not only to exercise our initial animal capacities, but also to develop the capacities of 
independent practical reasoners, are those relationships necessary for fostering the ability to 
evaluate, modify, or reject our own practical judgments.”344 This demands teachers who 
themselves possess a degree of virtue and immersion in practices through which one’s 
apprehension of standards or excellence and acquisition of virtue are made possible. Thus for 
MacIntyre, the flourishing of independent practical reasoning is not antagonistic to formation 
within the practices of a community, but in fact requires precisely that. 
 This insight casts new light on the apparent tension between Groome’s late-modern 
pedagogy and Dykstra’s counter-modern emphasis on practices. It likewise suggests a nuanced 
vision of autonomy in which human freedom is neither automatically assumed nor flatly rejected. 
Rather, it is a necessary human capacity that is best cultivated within the practices of a 
community. One might go so far as to suggest that Groome’s Shared Christian Praxis is itself a 
Christian practice, communicating its own set of intrinsic goods and cultivating the virtuous 
                                                 
343 Such a distinction, it should be noted, is only possible when standards outside of human 
desire are recognized: a problem for emotivist societies. 
344 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 83. 
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character of its practitioners. That is, it is a formative discipline of the community, through 
which participants pursue a distinctive set of internal goods. As with any practice, there are 
standards of participation and excellence. While these are constantly negotiated, there is a clear 
sense that some get it more right than others. Critically evaluating and appropriating the faith 
tradition is a skill that we learn with and through the community.  
 
Conclusion 
 Growth in any of the moral virtues requires habituation. While we can never dismiss the 
intellectual and cognitive aspects of ethical deliberation, one’s character is ultimately shaped by 
the practices he or she maintains. MacIntyre offers a particularly insightful perspective on 
practices both as moral communities and the formative activities of communities. Practical 
theologians and religious educators have adapted these insights in their own investigations of and 
proposals for distinctively formative Christian practices.  
 For the current study, two questions remain. First, how and where are practices of these 
sorts to be found in Catholic higher education? What are the moral communities and formative 
activities that shape the moral character of a campus? Second, how can the virtue of solidarity be 
realized through such practices? The next chapter explores the first of these questions, 
identifying a spectrum of practices in Catholic higher education. In particular, I offer empirical 
data from a survey of Catholic senior mission offers to gain better insight into how this key 
constituency understands the mission of their institutions and aims to realize this vision in 
practice. The final and concluding chapter offers initial proposals for the practice of solidarity in 
Catholic higher education. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Mission Leadership: An Empirical Survey 
 
 The moral character of a community is rooted in and shaped by the practices it sustains. 
Any attempt to cultivate the virtue of solidarity within a Catholic college or university must 
therefore be grounded in the structures, policies, and activities that shape the distinctive character 
or culture of the institution. This raises three interrelated sets of questions, however. First, who 
are the agents on campus that are most responsible for sustaining and promoting the moral 
horizon of the institution? Second, how do they themselves understand this vision? Third, what 
practices do they employ to promote it? 
 An investigation into these questions could take many forms. There exists an extensive 
body of literature examining both the Catholic intellectual tradition and the promise of Catholic 
higher education today, with new volumes added each year. This chapter breaks with the critical 
reading approach of previous chapters, however, and offers instead a national empirical survey 
of senior mission leaders at institutions of Catholic higher education. Tasked with safeguarding 
the distinctive Catholic and congregational identities of their schools, these leaders are uniquely 
positioned to both illuminate the mission of their institutions and speak to the efforts they 
employ to put that mission into practice.  
 This chapter begins with an overview of some of the central events and trends that have 
shaped the contemporary conversation on the mission and identity of Catholic colleges and 
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universities in the United States. Next, I briefly outline how we might best apply the language of 
virtue and practices developed in earlier chapters to Catholic higher education. With the 
theoretical framework established, I offer an overview of the background and methodology of 
the study, followed by a summary of the results. Final observations are offered, though a more 
extensive discussion will be developed in the concluding chapter. 
 
6.1. Senior Mission Leadership: and Emerging Strategy 
 There are very few straight lines in the history of Catholic higher education. With 
intellectual roots older than Christianity itself, the distinctive character of Catholic intellectual 
life is constantly evolving. Further, shifts in educational practice are most often the product of 
organic adaptations and responses to new challenges and opportunities rather than top-down 
implementation of pre-established norms. As such, tracing the emergence and evolution of the 
ongoing conversation surrounding the mission and identity of Catholic colleges and universities 
is a complex (if not impossible) task. In one sense, these questions were present in nascent form 
in the earliest texts and practices of Catholic higher education.345 Conversely, the intentional 
focus on institutional charism and its articulation through mission statements is still only a recent 
and evolving approach.  
 Tracing a full chronological narrative of Catholic higher education is impossible. 
Nevertheless, key trends and documents establish the context for the empirical study that 
follows. The recent shift toward entrusting a senior administrator with the promotion of the 
school’s mission has its roots in three interrelated developments in Catholic higher education: the 
                                                 
345 Already in the 16th Century, for example, the Jesuit Diego de Ledesma articulated four 
characteristics of Jesuit education: utilitas, iustitia, humanitas, and fides. Social Justice and 
Ecology Secretariat, “The Promotion of Justice in the Universities of the Society,” Promotio 
Iustitiae 116, no. 3 (2014): 8. 
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Second Vatican Council’s call for a revitalization of religious congregations’ charisms, the shift 
to governance by lay boards, and the decline in vowed religious on campus. Combined, these 
movements have challenged Catholic colleges and universities to not only ask how they might 
best realize their mission today, but how they can ensure their distinctive legacy for the future. 
The full impact of Vatican II on Catholic intellectual life is far too large and complex a 
question to address here.346 More than any particular theological shift however, the greatest 
impact was perhaps the church’s stance toward the modern world. In affirming its commitment 
to stand with and engage humanity in all its endeavors, the Council offered a blue print for 
Catholic universities’ presence in public life. By affirming the dignity and autonomy of secular 
sciences and communication, questions of academic freedom were largely (though certainly not 
entirely) resolved.  
The impact manifested itself through Vatican II’s influence on the caretakers of most 
Catholic colleges and universities: the founding religious communities. Perfectae Caritas 
(“Decree on the Adaptation and Renewal of Religious Life,” 1965), encouraged religious orders 
to rediscover their distinctive charisms and adopt them in our contemporary context. This began 
a process of discerning not only the distinctively Catholic identity of these colleges and 
universities, but also the particular institutional expression of the school’s founding order. Thus, 
institutions began to ask more deliberately not only what makes them Catholic, but also Mercy, 
Dominican, or Salesian. The Society of Jesus’ articulation of their mission as the promotion of a 
                                                 
346 As with many questions concerning the history of Catholic higher education in the United 
States, Philip Gleason offers one of the most thorough and persuasive accounts: Contending with 
Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), Ch. 13. 
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faith that does justice, for example, has profoundly shaped Jesuit institutions’ understanding of 
their educational mission.347 
Shortly following the close of the Council, the question of Catholic identity would 
acquire a renewed urgency. With St. Louis University leading the way in 1967, almost every 
religious community ceded partial or full control of their institutions to predominantly lay 
governing boards. Phillip Gleason identifies three motives behind this shift.348 The first, and 
most theological, is rooted in Vatican II’s appreciation for the dignity and vocation of the laity. 
In this way, university leadership recognized the potential of lay collaborators and companions. 
Second, and closely related, this shift in appreciation occurred just as Catholic institutions were 
becoming increasingly complex. College leadership realized the need for and the benefit of 
drawing on the expertise of local civic and business leaders. Their background in financial and 
operational management greatly increased Catholic universities’ capacity and effectiveness. 
Third, around this time new fears arose about religiously-affiliated institutions’ eligibility for 
government funds. In this concern, the shift to lay boards was somewhat of a preemptive 
measure; colleges ensured that they were owned and governed by lay boards before the 
opportunity to revoke funds fully materialized. 
Internally, there was a general confidence that the particular identity and charisms of the 
university could be preserved under this new structure. From the perspective of Rome, however, 
this process was much more troublesome. As long religious congregations maintained legal 
                                                 
347 Since 2000, the definitive document from the perspective of Jesuit higher education in the 
United States has been Peter-Hans Kolvenbach's address at the university of Santa Clara 
reprinted in: “The Service of Faith and Promotion of Justice in American Fesuit Higher 
Education,” in A Jesuit Education Reader, ed. George W. Traub, S.J. (Chicago: Loyola Press, 
2008), 144–62. During the writing of this dissertation, the Social Justice and Ecology Secretariat 
of the Society of Jesus produced a profound expansion on many of Kolvenbach's insights: Social 
Justice and Ecology Secretariat, “The Promotion of Justice in the Universities of the Society.” 
348 Gleason, Contending with Modernity, 315. 
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authority over the universities, the Catholic hierarchy was assured of influence. With the 
governing structure in the hands of lay boards with no canonical ties, however, preserving the 
institution’s Catholic identity became much less certain.  
The same year that St. Louis University transitioned to a lay board, twenty-six Catholic 
leaders met at a retreat house in Land O’ Lakes Wisconsin to articulate their vision of what it 
means to be a Catholic university.349 The roots of this meeting actually stretch back earlier, 
however, with the International Federation of Catholic Universities’ 1965 decision to organize a 
series of regional conferences with the intention of working toward a consensus vision of 
Catholic higher education in the modern world. The Land O’ Lakes statement thus becomes the 
first in an ongoing dialogue between leaders of American Catholic higher education, the 
international community, and Rome.350 This process reaches its culmination in the promulgation 
of Ex Corde Ecclesiae in 1990, the clearest and most robust statement on what it means to be a 
Catholic college or university today. Yet as muddled as this relationship between church and 
university may become, the tension has kept the question of Catholic identity a living concern in 
board meetings and on campuses. 
The third major trend unfolded over the next two decades and for many remains the most 
pressing concern today. According to the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate 
(CARA), the total number of religious sisters in the United States declined from 179,954 in 1965 
                                                 
349 Alice Gallin, American Catholic Higher Education: Essential Documents 1967-1990 (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 5–6. 
350 As executive director of the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities from 1978 to 
1992, Alice Gallin offers an insightful behind-the-scenes account of these (often contention) 
conversations: Negotiating Identity: Catholic Higher Education Since 1960 (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2000). 
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to 49,883 in 2014.351 Over that same time, total religious priests and brothers fell from 34,978 to 
16,328. The average and median ages of these remaining religious have also increased 
dramatically. If the mere presence of vowed religious on campus was ever enough to ensure the 
institutional identity of one’s school, that time has since passed. In its wake, two questions have 
emerged. The first concerns how to position the remaining religious on campus in such a way 
that they could most effectively shape the culture of the institution. Second, and closely related: 
how can a congregation’s charism be passed on and realized through lay employees? The 
increasing prevalence of mission offices on Catholic campuses reflects both of these trends.  
Combined, these dynamics have contributed to a rapidly evolving conversation on how to 
ensure the distinctive identities of Catholic colleges and universities. Internally, the question 
concerns how to secure the distinctive charism of the institution in the context of declining 
vocations. Externally, it is a question of what makes our schools Catholic, and how to safeguard 
fidelity when there are no juridical bonds. While challenges undoubtedly remain, we need not 
despair over what some have described as a culture in crisis.352 In truth, the question of Catholic 
mission is more vibrant today than it has ever been in the past, and while declining vocations 
have undoubted triggered a more purposeful response, the increased attention to lay 
collaboration and formation is also a natural expression of Vatican II theology. This shift, one 
hopes, would occur even if religious vocations remained at historic highs. 
The conversation surrounding how to best ensure the distinctive charisms of our 
institutions continues. The turn toward senior mission officers is promising, but the field itself is 
still very new. More than best practices, questions of how to imagine and implement the mission 
                                                 
351 Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, “Frequently Requested Church Statistics,” 
2015, http://cara.georgetown.edu/CARAServices/requestedchurchstats.html. 
352 Melanie Morey and John Piderit S.J., Catholic Higher Education: A Culture in Crisis (Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2010). 
217 
on campus remain. In this, it is possible to employ a number of theological and organizational 
frameworks. Before examining the senior mission position more closely, I will briefly outline 
how the perspective developed in the previous chapters might inform our approach to Catholic 
mission leadership. The virtues tradition, with its emphasis on striving toward a telos and 
building character through practices, provides a natural lens through which we might view 
mission leadership. 
 
6.2. Locating Practices Within Catholic Higher Education 
The previous chapter briefly explored the range of ways in which the term ‘practice’ is 
employed in moral theory and theological reflection. I suggest that the diversity of meanings are 
in fact interrelated and fall along a spectrum from practices as moral communities engaged in a 
common endeavor to practices as distinct formative activities which those communities sustain. I 
further argue that those committed to shaping the culture and character of a community might be 
best served by channeling their resources into the formative practices and structures that shape its 
moral horizon. In that chapter, I identified some immediately apparent implications for Catholic 
higher education, but avoided developing a comprehensive framework for practices in these 
institutions. It is to this work that I now turn. 
From the perspective of this dissertation, I propose that the clearest example of a 
MacIntyrean moral community is an individual college or university. As a community 
accountable to itself, its history, and its stakeholders, a college or university must struggle to 
determine the particular good toward which it strives and the appropriate means of achieving that 
end. In living its particular mission, it realizes the goods internal to its practice.  
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This is not to say that an individual institution is the largest or smallest level at which 
such moral communities exists in Catholic higher education. Indeed, a number of smaller 
communities flourish on any campus, each dedicated to their own purposes and ambitions. Each 
academic department, administrative office, and co-curricular activity is itself a community of 
practice, dedicated to the realization of its own particular goals and ends. These divisions often 
understand themselves as part of larger practices and associations beyond campus (the practice 
of student affairs or biochemistry, for example). They commit themselves to shared standards of 
participation and excellence. Yet (we may hope) they share a common identity and purpose with 
others participating in the institution. Even as they aim for the highest standards of their 
particular disciplines, they recognize that a college or university sustains their work for the 
purpose of advancing the overarching mission of the institution.  
Similarly, most colleges and universities identify themselves with larger consortiums that 
are dedicated to distinctive visions of flourishing in higher education (embodied in such 
institutions as the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities or the Conference for Mercy 
Higher Education). They perhaps even acknowledge the authority of these networks in dictating 
their own standards of excellence. Yet, it is the specific college or university that must maintain a 
unity within itself amidst the plurality of practices and traditions that it sustains and in which it 
participates. It is up to the administrators, trustees, and other key stakeholders to determine not 
just what it means fulfill a specific role on campus, but further what it means for any constituent 
(student, staff, etc.) to be a member of the community. Conversely, it is this same group that 
must negotiate the implications of engaging its specific social and religious location. No single 
element fully determines the particular mission of the school, and no other institutions share a 
particular college or university’s specific social and historical context. It is up to each institutions 
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to identify and respond to its unique heritage and opportunities; to determine what it means, for 
example, to be an American, Catholic, Jesuit, NCA accredited, Master’s I level university in 
Omaha, Nebraska.  
The mission statement of an institution is so vital precisely because it articulates this 
distinctive vision.353 The use of mission statements has become a pervasive practice in higher 
education.354 While almost all Catholic colleges and universities have mission statements, the 
question of how to use them is far from settled. Generally speaking, these statements give voice 
to the particular character and goals of the community. As Charles Strain argues: “Institutional 
missions, when effective, mediate. They distill local history and tradition, linking past to future. 
They also mediate between public expectations of the academy and the purposes articulated by 
the faculty and staff who inhabit it.”355 They are often accompanied by a list of values or 
charisms that define the core identity of the community. While they are meant to carry a degree 
                                                 
353 In this dissertation, I will refer to solely to mission statements, though it should be noted that 
approximately half of all Catholic colleges and universities have both a mission statement and a 
vision statement. As Abelman and Daelssandro argue, when an institution has both, the mission 
statement most often provides a portrait of who they understand themselves to be, while the 
vision statement outlines what they hope to accomplish. When the institution has only a mission 
statement, it generally encompasses both topics. Therefore, vision statements are included in the 
nature and role of mission statements that I develop. Robert Abelman and Amy Dalessandro, 
“An Assessment of the Institutional Vision of Catholic Colleges and Universities,” Catholic 
Education: A Journal of Inquiry and Practice 12, no. 2 (n.d.): 221–54. 
354 Christopher Morphew and Matthew Hartley trace the ubiquitousness of mission statements, 
but also their ambiguous nature, wryly observing, “Mission statements are normative-they exist 
because they are expected to exist, much the same way that students expect colleges and 
universities to award credit in the form of hours and persons inside and outside higher education 
expect college campuses to include ‘quads,’ well-landscaped gardens, and football stadiums.” 
“Mission Statements: A Thematic Analysis of Rhetoric across Institutional Type,” The Journal 
of Higher Education 77, no. 3 (May 1, 2006): 458. 
355 Charles R. Strain, “Creating the Engaged University: Service-Learning, Religious Studies, 
and Institutional Mission,” in From Cloister to Commons: Concepts and Models for Service-
Learning in Religious Studies, ed. Richard Devine, Joseph A. Favazza, and F. Michael McLain, 
AAHE’s Series on Service-Learning in the Disciplines (Washington D.C.: American Association 
for Higher Education, 2002), 28. 
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of authority and their composition is often a matter of fierce debate, there is nevertheless no 
small amount of ambiguity about their role in day-to-day governance and long-term strategic 
planning of the institution. I want to suggest that the most helpful, and indeed, appropriate lens 
through which to view these lists and statements we all make is that of virtue: through them we 
articulate distinctive dimensions of the good life that we are striving to foster and sustain.  
In this way, an institution’s mission statement functions as a telos of the community. It is 
a normative vision of the distinctive good that the community is striving to realize. By 
articulating this vision, mission statements bring a central intelligibility to the diverse policies 
and practices that constitute a contemporary institution of higher education. It reminds every 
department and division of their reason for being. A good mission statement provides a clear 
vision through which every constituency can recognize their role. Moreover, just as a moral 
community’s vision of the good is always in question and a matter of debate, a college or 
university’s mission is never settled. The statement itself is open to constant interpretation and 
may eventually require reformulation. Yet, this task is always done in continuity and with 
faithfulness to the institution’s history and legacy. 
Stretching the analogy further, we can recognize in the lists of values many institutions 
cultivate something akin to the virtues. That is, these lists identify particular dimensions of the 
good life. It is through their exercise that the good is realized and extended. From a theological 
perspective, the role and nature of values lack a certain depth. Most often, when they are 
interpreted theologically, it is through the lens of charism. Without denying the insights this 
perspective provides, there are added benefits to recognizing these lists as virtues. In particular, 
this construal raises up their normative function within the community. It reminds members of 
their shared commitments and provides a common language through which to engage each other. 
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Particularly in times of transition or change, the values provide a normative framework through 
which difficult strategic decisions can be made. Scott Flanagan, for example, traces the central 
role that the values played in the construction of a new core curriculum at two universities, one 
Franciscan and one Jesuit.356 In his analysis, Flanagan determined that both the religious and 
academic values articulated by the institutions frequently aligned while guiding the strategic 
process. 
Viewing the mission of Catholic higher education through the lens of virtue raises at least 
three interrelated sets of questions. The first concerns the content of these statements and the 
telos that they articulate. What specifically is the mission embodied in these documents? Are 
there commonalities across all Catholic institutions? How do the particular charisms of different 
religious congregations influence this mission? What about a school’s social and academic 
location (in other words, what are the differences between national research universities and 
small baccalaureate colleges)? Second, who are the figures on campus responsible for 
implementing this mission? Where are they drawn from and what sorts of resources are they 
given? Third, how do these leaders aim to realize this work? Which constituencies do they work 
with more frequently, and what practices do they strive to establish? Where do they achieve the 
greatest success, and how is it measured?  
 
6.3. The Catholic Senior Mission Leader: An Empirical Study 
There is a strong and growing body of literature around questions such as these. Authors 
have drawn on their own experience in the classroom and higher education leadership, and have 
                                                 
356 Scott Flanagan, “Navigating and Utilizing Values during Change Processes at Catholic 
Colleges and Universities,” Journal of Catholic Higher Education 29, no. 2 (June 23, 2011): 
133–54. 
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compiled best practices and common resources.357 Arguments are frequently drawn from history 
as well as theological reflection. While all of these avenues are important, this section will 
primarily focus on a quantitative survey of 87 senior mission leaders in Catholic higher 
education.  
The value of these leaders is twofold. As the title suggests (and our research 
demonstrates) these individuals are centrally involved in the mission of their schools. They have 
a deep knowledge and appreciation for this mission and are directly engaged in efforts to realize 
it on campus. As Michael Caruso observers, “The chief officers charged with developing and 
implementing mission and identity strategies are in a unique position to assess the cultural 
climate of their communities.”358 They are thus exceptional collaborators and informants in any 
attempt to discern the role of mission on a campus and efforts at its implementation. Second, 
these figures are themselves fruitful objects of study. The emergence of the office and officer are 
relatively recent trends in Catholic higher education. There are many insights to gain by 
examining who they are, where they come from, and what responsibilities and resources they are 
given. By identifying underlying trends in hiring and authority, we have a clearer sense of how 
Catholic colleges and universities strive to promote their mission through this office.  
 
 
 
                                                 
357 For example, the ACCU has now published two volumes of collected essays on best practices 
for mission offices: A Mission Officer Handbook: Advancing Catholic Identity and University 
Mission, ed. Michael Galligan-Stierle, vol. 1 (Washington D.C.: Association of Catholic 
Colleges and Universities, 2014); and: A Mission Officer Handbook: Advancing Catholic Identity 
and University Mission, ed. Michael Galligan-Stierle, vol. 2 (Washington D.C.: Association of 
Catholic Colleges and Universities, 2015). 
358 Michael Caruso, “An Ignatian Analysis of the Walt Disney Company: Lessons for Jesuit 
Higher Education (Part II),” Journal of Catholic Education 5, no. 4 (June 1, 2002): 454. 
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Purpose 
The current study is grounded in previous research by Michael James, Oscar Mayorga, 
and Joseph Lehman.359 In 2010 the team conducted an extensive, national, online survey of the 
senior mission leaders at Catholic institutions of higher education. The first of its kind, this 
survey sought to establish a baseline record of the mission office and leader, seeking a clearer 
portrait of who they are and what they do. To this end, much was gained by examining simple 
demographic data: the age, education, and previous employment of these figures. Beyond these 
measurements, the team sought a deeper understanding of two related and emerging questions in 
mission leadership: effectiveness and assessment. With a broader scope and more empirical 
focus than any study before it, this survey produced documented evidence of many of the trends 
that were readily apparent but never systematically measured.  
As a snapshot of the position and office at that moment, the survey proved an invaluable 
resource. Nevertheless, as with all good studies, it raised as many questions as it answered. 
Broadly speaking, these further inquiries fall into two categories. The first concerns the evolution 
of the position over time and the emergence of new trends. It is possible to determine answers to 
some of these questions by, for example, filtering data according to date of hire, but asking the 
same questions at a later date reveals longitudinal shifts. Indeed, as shall be show below, several 
critical benchmarks were crossed in just the few short years between the initial and current 
studies. 
The second set of questions consists in those generated by the findings themselves. The 
first survey frequently produced surprising results. Elsewhere, responses raised concerns that 
                                                 
359 Selected findings from this study are reported in the first volume of the ACCU Mission 
Officer Handbook. However some of the longitudinal finding presented in this chapter draws 
directly from the raw original data.  
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demanded closer examination. From the perspective of this dissertation in particular, results from 
the first survey elicited significant questions about how senior mission officers define and 
interpret their mission – what they believe to be the actual content of the mission that they are 
tasked to promote. Much more difficult to empirically measure, the first survey largely avoided 
questions along this theme.  
Beyond identifying the demographic trends that outline the emergence of this position 
and office (numbers which themselves tell a narrative), the emphasis in this chapter will be 
specifically these questions of mission content, as well as related questions concerning sources of 
inspiration and corresponding practices. Without directly employing the language, these 
questions were deliberately constructed with the virtue and practice theory outlined above in 
mind. Of course, to do so required significant adaptation and translation. The language of virtue 
is largely foreign to conversations pertaining to Catholic higher education mission and identity. 
As noted above, mission leaders are far more likely to speak in terms of values than virtues. 
Though mission statements enjoy a privileged and even normative status on campus, their 
analogous parallel to teloi is seldom identified. While it would perhaps be possible to construct 
survey questions with virtues terminology, such an effort would likely bias the respondent, 
rendering less authentic and trustworthy results. 
 
Participants, Method, and Response Rate 
As of 2012, the National Center for Education Statistics IPEDS database identifies a total 
of 262 higher education institutions that are affiliated with the Roman Catholic church.360 Of 
these, 245 are degree granting institutions. Through online searches, phone calls, and emails, the 
                                                 
360 “FAQs,” Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities, updated November 2012, 
http://www.accunet.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3797#sthash.a6fKm02z.dpbs. 
225 
research team with the help of a graduate assistant identified 160 Catholic colleges and 
universities with a specified senior mission leader (SML). That is, an individual other than the 
president tasked with promoting the institutional mission on campus. The team excluded those 
institutions with a committee structure but no designated leader.  
All 160 senior mission leaders whom the team could identify were recruited to participate 
in the study. The SMLs were sent an initial invitation via electronic mail on September 28, 2013. 
The survey remained open through December, with periodic follow-up emails to SMLs that had 
not yet begun or completed their surveys. The study was conducted via an online survey through 
Qualtrics software, and consisted of both quantitative and qualitative questions (see Appendix). 
Emails contained a hyperlink to the survey as well as a description of the study’s aims and 
potential risks, which were minimal. The initial email included an Informed Consent Form for all 
participants, and the first page of the survey required SMLs to give consent before continuing. 
Subjects were not compensated for their participation, though entry into a raffle for free copies of 
Volume One of the ACCU Mission Officer Handbook were offered in a follow-up email.361 The 
principle benefit offered to participants was the increased understanding of their position and 
their peers that the survey would provide. In addition, the final page of the survey provided the 
opportunity for participants to update their contact information for the ACCU database. 
The research team made every effort possible to ensure the confidentiality of participants 
– both their own identities and those of their institutions. All responses were reported in 
anonymous and aggregate forms. All data collected via Qualtrics was (and is) password 
protected, and only transferred to other applications (SPSS and Microsoft Excel) through secure 
networks. All data was secured on the Boston College Lynch School of Education secured 
                                                 
361 These were awarded during an initial presentation of the data at the ACCU National 
Conference in Washington, D.C. on January 31, 2014. 
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Server. Members of the research team were the only individuals with access to the data. 
Participants were free to withdraw or skip questions at any point. Each member of the research 
team received certification for conducting research with human participants, and the study was 
submitted to and approved by the Boston College Institutional Review Board. 
The initial email resulted in a number of bounce-backs and recently vacated positions. 
Follow-up phone calls and emails determined that the final pool of potential respondents was 156 
senior mission leaders. 17 of these positions (11%) were newly established since the previous 
study. In total, we received complete surveys from 87, yielding a response rate of 56% and a 
margin of error of 7%. To ensure a representative sampling, we sorted by Carnegie classification 
and compared the response rate of our sample to the overall population of Catholic colleges and 
universities with mission leaders. In no Carnegie class did our sample vary by more than 2.5%, 
making us confident that our sample was representative of the overall population of mission 
leaders.  
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6.4. Survey Results 
Mission Leadership: A Growing Trend 
 Raw number alone indicate a telling narrative of American Catholic colleges and 
universities’ attempts to ensure the Catholic and congregational identities of their schools. The 
first dedicated mission unit was founded in 1980. For the next decade, the number of mission 
officers remained relatively low until growing exponentially in the 1990s and 2000s (see figure 
1).362 The greatest period of growth occurred between 2006 and 2009, with a leveling off in 
recent years that suggests that we are reaching a degree of saturation. The periods of fastest 
growth correspond with the promulgation of Ex Corde Ecclesiae in 1990 and the US Bishops’ 
application of the document in 1999. For many institutions, these documents brought the 
question of Catholic identity into focus, and the correlation suggests that the founding of mission  
                                                 
362 James, Mayorga, and Lehman, “Mission Matters: An Evolving Portrait of the Senior Mission 
Leader in Catholic Higher Education,” 10. 
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Figure 1. Total mission offices by year. 
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Figure 2. Establishment of mission offices and hiring date of senior mission leaders. The dotted line marks the date of the 
previous SML survey. 
 
offices as a strategy for directly addressing the concern many US Bishops raised during the 
process.363 
 Comparing the date that this office was established at an institution to the date of the 
responding mission leader’s hire produces interesting insights and emphasizes the necessity of 
this follow-up survey (Figure 2). 55% of respondents were hired within the past five years. 
Critically, in the period between the first survey and the second, the mission leader position has 
shifted from one composed primarily of founding officers to a majority of second-generation 
leaders or later. Most mission leaders today are not the first in their position; in fact, 
approximately a quarter are not even the second. As these units and positions become more 
established, new questions arise about hiring authority and responsibilities. Feasibly, these 
                                                 
363 Ibid., 9. 
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institutions have a great understanding of what the role requires and what they seek in a potential 
candidate. New vacancies likewise create opportunities in which the job description and 
responsibilities can be reconfigured or amended. 
 
Senior Mission Leader Profile 
 Our findings indicate that mission officers are recruited into senior level positions, with 
corresponding levels of education, authority, and compensation. 91% of respondents report 
directly to the president. While the president remains the most common hiring authority, 
differences between the two surveys indicate an emerging trend. In 2009, 77% of the respondents 
were hired by the president alone. In the most recent study, that number decreased to 60%. For 
28%, the hiring process included the institution’s sponsoring religious congregation (up from 6% 
in the earlier study). Sponsoring religious communities are exercising a stronger role in the 
selection of these mission leaders. The majority (73%) of SMLs are internal hires, suggesting 
that an intimate knowledge the particular institution is a top priority in mission officers. 
 One critical change within the past few years can be observed in the mission leaders who 
have joint appointments. The overall number of joint appointments has not changed. As with the 
2009 study, roughly one half (48%) reported a joint appointment. The other appointment ranges 
across the institution. Campus ministry or chaplaincy constitute the largest grouping at 33%, 
followed closely by faculty member at 31%. A newly emerged joint appointment is academic 
administrator – up from 0 to 13%. Of this group, however, the percent that report the mission 
leader position as primary has more than doubled from 33% to 68%. In other words, at the time 
of the initial survey, the role of designated mission leader was most commonly an additional but 
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not primary assignment or responsibility. Now, even when the SML has a joint appointment, the 
work of mission promotion is prioritized. 
There is no single demographic profile for a senior mission leader, though there are 
discernable patterns and trends. The profile continues to be overwhelmingly white (93% down 
from 97%) and entirely Roman Catholic (100%). Likewise, the position remains largely filled by 
ordained and religious, with only 24% laypersons. 66% are members of the institution’s 
sponsoring religious congregation. Among other recent shifts, the mission officer profile is now 
more female than male (60% in 2014 vs. 47% in 2009). The research team expected to see the 
typical age mission leader trend younger in recent years, but in fact, the age of the average 
mission leaders has actually increased. 70% of mission leaders are aged 60 or older, and the 
number of mission leaders in their 70’s has also increased. Moreover, this is not simply the result 
of mission leaders aging in the position. Of the mission leaders hired in the past five years, 44% 
are 60 or older, and 20% are 70 or older. Thus, the profile of the typical new appointment 
remains a priest or vowed religious from the institution’s sponsoring congregation, over 60 years 
old, and already working at the institution.  
 
The Mission Unit 
 The emergence of mission leadership as a strategy can be further demonstrated by an 
analysis of the mission office and unit. The structure of mission units and the offices that report 
to them varies greatly across institutions. Our research indicates a total of 19 different 
configurations. The most common reporting division is campus ministry, which reports to the 
mission leader at 68% of the surveyed institutions. Other divisions reporting at more than 10% of 
survey institutions include centers for service (24%), academics (15%), congregational 
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spirituality (13%), and social justice (11%). Only 7% have no other offices reporting to them. 
The median mission unit operating budget is $20-30 thousand, but this number varies greatly by 
Carnegie classification. Overall, 61% of respondents report a budget of $0-$9,999, while 10% 
report a budget greater than $2 million. 
 
Defining the Mission 
 The previous study largely limited itself to questions concerning the mission officer, role, 
and measures of effectiveness; it largely avoided inquiries into the actual content of the mission 
that these leaders seek to promote. As the data outlined above makes clear, these measures alone 
articulate a provocative narrative about this this emerging field; yet, the senior mission leaders 
are also a group that is highly attuned to the distinctive mission and charism of their institutions. 
They are acutely aware of the Catholic intellectual tradition and the particular and distinctive 
vision they are tasked with promoting. Thus while the focus of this survey was on the emerging 
roles of mission leaders within their institutions, it also provides the opportunity to gain a better 
picture of how these practitioners image the mission they are striving to foster. 
In the 2009 survey, one question did approach this topic but the responses suggest a need 
for further verification. Senior mission leaders were asked whether in their work they place 
greater emphasis on the Catholic identity of the school, the sponsoring congregation’s identity, 
or promote both equally. Over 90% responded that their mandate was to promote both aspects of 
the institution’s identity equally. It is very likely, however, that this balance is more aspirational 
than actual. When time and resources are limited, difficult decisions about allocation must be 
made. The tension between the Catholic mission and congregational identities has long been a 
difficult conversation within Catholic mission and identity, a tension that David O’Brien neatly 
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captures in the subtitle of an essay on the topic: “Jesuit Sí, Catholic…Not So Sure.”364 Even if 
we assume that this balance is indeed maintained, we still have very little insight into how senior 
mission leaders understand the content of these two interrelated aspects of identity and how they 
are integrated in practice. 
 The challenge is measuring these dimensions within the confines of an empirical survey. 
New volumes are written each year on the Catholic intellectual tradition and the mission of 
Catholic higher education. Religious congregations invest heavily in resources that articulate the 
distinctive charisms of the institutions. While there are some generally accepted common 
themes, there is no set list of defining dimensions of Catholic higher education. Indeed, even 
selecting possible dimensions to include in the survey risks allowing the researchers’ own biases 
to influence the choices. To avoid committing this error, the team turned to a previous empirical 
analysis of a representative sampling of Catholic college and university mission statements. In 
2006, Estanek, James, and Norton published a quantitative analysis of mission statements that 
identified common categories and themes in these documents.365 Among other findings, this 
study determined the twelve most commonly named outcomes in Catholic higher education 
mission statements.366 Ranging from Service and Justice to Intellectual and Spiritual 
Development, this list provides a strong sense of the spectrum of values prioritized in Catholic 
higher education.  
                                                 
364 David J. O’Brien, “Conversations on Jesuit (and Catholic?) Higher Education: Jesuit Sí, 
Catholic…No So Sure,” in A Jesuit Education Reader (Chicago: Loyola Press, 2008), 217–31. 
365 Sandra M. Estanek, Michael J. James, and Daniel A. Norton, “Assessing Catholic Identity: A 
Study of Mission Statements of Catholic Colleges and Universities,” Catholic Education: A 
Journal of Inquiry and Practice 10, no. 2 (December 2006): 199–217. 
366 They are, in descending order of representation: Intellectual Development (32%), Social 
Justice/Social Responsibility (28%), Religious or Spiritual Development (26%), Service (26%), 
Leadership (24%), Moral Development (24%), Personal Growth (24%) Education of the Whole 
Person (22%), Responsible Citizenship (10%), International Perspective or Awareness (10%), 
Professional Competence (10%), and Lifelong Learning (10%). 
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 In the current survey, participants were presented with a list of all twelve outcomes and 
instructed to rank them according to the level of priority for their mission unit. The outcomes 
themselves were randomized so that each outcome would initially appear in each rank an equal 
number of times. After participants submitted their rankings, they were asked to briefly describe 
(in an open-ended format) how they promote their top priority outcome on campus. This 
provided a clearer understanding how they interpret the outcome and what practices they employ 
to realize it. 
 The resulting data presents a concise narrative of how the Catholic colleges and 
universities and the senior mission leaders they appoint imagine their mission today – both the 
commonality and diversity. It must be emphasized that we recognize each of the outcomes as 
themselves valid and legitimate goods toward which to strive. In that sense, what we were asking 
was somewhat unfair. Some outcomes must necessarily be ranked before others, and one 
legitimate value must ultimately be ranked last. Yet we believe that mission leaders often feel 
pressure (real or perceived) to uphold and pursue any number of goals at once. Indeed, as the 
2009 survey question regarding the balance of the broader Catholic mission and particular 
charism suggests, if given the chance to affirm all possible dimensions, the respondent is likely 
to do so. There are no right or wrong rankings. While the research team hoped for and uncovered 
distinct patterns in the top choice and choices, we also hoped for a degree of diversity in 
responses. Varying rankings do not demonstrate that some mission officers’ priorities are better 
than others. Rather, it indicates that the Catholic intellectual tradition sustains a rich diversity of 
perspectives. 
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Figure 3. Frequency of outcome ranked as top choice. 
 There are innumerable ways to parse and analyze the resulting ranking. The most basic is 
simply tallying the frequency with which each outcome was ranked first overall (see Figure 3). 
This simple measure gives an immediate picture of what values are most central to mission 
officers and units. By far, the most commonly listed top outcome was Educating the Whole 
Person, ranked first 38% of the time – more than twice the frequency of its closest rival 
(Intellectual Development at 17%).367 On the other end of the spectrum, neither Responsible 
Citizenship nor International Awareness were ever ranked first overall. Again, both of these 
outcomes are undeniably good; but they are not the priorities of Catholic mission offices and 
officers. 
                                                 
367 It is worth noting that in Estanek, James, and Norton’s quantitative analysis of mission 
statements, Education of the Whole Person was just the eighth most commonly named outcome, 
represented in 22% of mission statements.  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Top Ranked Outcome 
235 
 The primacy of Educating the Whole Person is itself ambiguous. There are at least two 
interpretations of this outcome. The first would be as an integrative dimension to Catholic higher 
education – teaching students to incorporate the various fields of knowledge and activity into a 
unified and comprehensive way of life.368 The second would be as an ‘all of the above’ response. 
Faced with the dilemma of ranking some positive outcomes over others, respondents choose the 
value that best seems to cover all the others. In other words, we must ask whether SMLs see 
Educating the Whole Person as a specific integrative and unifying task, or a catchall description 
of the attempts to engage and form students in the multiple dimensions of life. 
It is impossible to know with absolute certainty how respondents defined any of the listed 
outcomes, but the follow-up open-ended question provides some clues to which interpretation of 
Educating the Whole Person was favored. Some responses clearly indicate that it is the later: “It 
includes each of the priorities listed.” Yet, for others, the responses indicate specific programs 
directed at integrative formation. For example, respondent writes: “We are developing a ‘co-
curricular’ transcript which intends to measure, track and produce a record of the contributions 
and learning opportunities of each student, in addition to their traditional academic transcript.” 
Overall, 15 of the 24 valid written responses indicate that this outcome is promoted by providing 
a wide variety of diverse programing. Those that did emphasize the integrative dimension of 
Catholic higher education most commonly pointed to the liberal arts curriculum or capstone 
courses. 
 
                                                 
368 John C. Haughey offers one of the clearest articulation of the Catholic intellectual tradition's 
inclination toward wholes. Drawing from the thought of Bernard Lonergan, Haughey emphasizes 
the spiritual dimension of cognition. The Catholic intellectual tradition, he argues, aims to not 
only expand our boundaries of knowledge, but pushes for an integrated vision of the true and the 
good. Where Is Knowing Going?: The Horizons of the Knowing Subject (Georgetown University 
Press, 2009). 
236 
 
Figure 4 The twelve outcomes were ranked according to whichever was greater: the frequency with which it was ranked 
in the top three or the frequency with which it was ranked bottom three. Thus, because professional competence was 
ranked in the bottom three more often than the top three (51% to 10%), its is the frequency with which it was ranked in 
the bottom three that places it behind responsible citizenship, even though it was ranked in the top three more frequently. 
 
 A second approach to discerning the overall trends is to look at the frequency with which 
a particular outcome was ranked within the top or bottom three (Figure 4). This gives a more 
general sense of what values tend to gravitate toward the top and which tend to fall toward the 
bottom. The results from this analysis remain somewhat consistent with the frequency of the top 
choice. Educating the Whole Person remains the top overall outcome (listed in the top three 66% 
of the time), followed by intellectual development (42%). Religious or Spiritual Development, 
however, loses its third overall ranking to Service (40%). Toward the other end, international 
awareness remains the lowest priority, ranked in the bottom three 61% of the time. Responsible 
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citizenship, however, moves closer to the ‘muddled middle’ – those outcomes that usually find 
themselves in neither the top nor bottom three.  
 From this analysis, we might imagine that the ‘cardinal virtues’ of Catholic higher 
education begin to emerge. Educating the Whole Person, Intellectual Development, Service, 
Religious or Spiritual Development, and Social Justice outpace all others by at least 13%. These 
describe the most common characteristics senior mission leaders strive to preserve and promote. 
While the other outcomes may be undeniable goods, they are not the priorities, at least from the 
purview of the mission office. It may be, for example, that the mission leaders’ institutions value 
a particular outcome, but it is realized by a different campus constituency. For example, 
professional competence ranks among the bottom three 51% of the time. We know is that this is 
not a priority for the mission unit; but for others on campus (such as the dean of the medical 
school), it may be the highest priority. 
 A similar phenomenon (the distinction of the priority of the mission office versus that of 
the institution as a whole) appears to emerge when outcome rankings are broken down by 
Carnegie classification. For example, among research universities, intellectual development is 
ranked in the top three just 27% of the time, significantly below the 42% overall ranking. 
Religious and Spiritual Development, on the other hand is ranked in the top three 64% of the 
time (against 38% overall) and in fact is the most frequently named top choice (36%). 
Conversely, the smallest colleges and universities were the most likely to name intellectual 
development as the top priority (20%). These results would seem to contradict what we take for 
granted about the largest and smallest institutions: namely, that it is the larger research 
institutions that are most committed ‘real intellectual work.’  
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While it is impossible to draw definitive conclusions from these numbers alone, one 
potential explanation may be that the priorities of a mission office reflect the aspirations of the 
institution, or the areas where it feels most vulnerable. Thus, for top research universities, 
intellectual development is assumed; the challenge is ensuring that the religious and spiritual 
development of students is not neglected. Conversely, it may be that the smaller schools feel the 
most pressure to assert the intellectual dimension of their mission. Once again, the follow-up 
question sheds light on this finding. Among those smaller institutions that emphasize the 
intellectual development of their students, the work is in fact an expression of their commitment 
to justice and the common good. As one respondent from an associate’s college which prioritizes 
Lifelong Learning commented: “We service a first generation college population for whom 
education has not been a primary goal. So empowering the students to learn for the sake of 
learning is essential.” 
Top Outcomes by Institutional Charism 
 
 
Figure 5. Frequency of rank within top 3 by sponsoring religious congregation. Green indicates frequency is greater than 
overall average by at least 10%. Red indicates frequency is less than overall average by at least 10%. 
 Another way of parsing the data is by institutional charism (Figure 5). For many 
sponsoring religious congregations, the response rate was sufficient to discern a general sense of 
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how they understand the mission of their organizations.369 Looking to these responses offers a 
glimpse of the distinctive missions of colleges and universities animated by a particular charism. 
Far from expecting a normative distribution, the variances that we discovered are a sign of 
healthy diversity within the Catholic intellectual tradition. The findings indicate that SMLs at 
Dominican colleges and universities, for example, are far more likely to emphasize Intellectual 
Development, while Mercy schools emphasize Service, Jesuit schools lean toward Leadership, 
and Franciscan schools seem to be uniquely concerned with Responsible Citizenship. The ways 
in which these institutions vary from the overall response rates suggests how their particular 
charism distinguishes their mission from a more general vision of Catholic higher education. 
 
 
                                                 
369 The table includes institutions with at least five responses from institutions affiliated with the 
same sponsoring congregation as well as the three responses from diocesan schools. With such 
low response rates, these figures do not share the same overall reliability as the full survey, but 
the findings are nevertheless noteworthy. 
240 
 
Figure 6. Percentage of responses that named each resource. Includes all responses greater than 5%. Note: 'Religious 
Congregation' abbreviated 'R.C.' 
 
The mission of Catholic higher education can be further discerned by examining what 
resources senior mission leaders draw upon in articulating their vision and purpose (Figure 6). 
Seeking to limit the bias of the research team, SMLs were invited to list the documents that 
inform their vision and mission in an open format rather than from a provided list. The results 
again demonstrate both the diversity and commonalities behind the inspiration of SMLs. It 
should be emphasized that the open-ended nature of the question demonstrates what resources 
immediately come to the SML’s mind, but we should not assume that any unnamed resources are 
not consulted. It is highly improbable, for example, that only 6% of mission leaders are 
influenced by scripture. Never the less, the list demonstrates that mission leaders do indeed draw 
both from their religious congregations and universal church documents. Ex Corde Ecclesiae, for 
example, is cited just as often as the sponsoring congregation’s founder and history.  
 
36 
33 
25 25 
18 
13 12 10 9 9 9 9 9 7 6 
Most Commonly Named Resources:  
Vision/Purpose 
241 
Implementing Mission 
 A third set of questions concerns how senior mission leaders seek to implement the 
mission and vision entrusted to them. The research team sought to better understand the activities 
and areas of involvement for the mission officer. To draw from the language developed above, 
this is a question of practices: what formative activities do mission leaders sustain to shape the 
character of their communities? With which constituencies are they most engaged? Where do 
they not have impact or access?370 The findings portray an interesting narrative concerning areas 
of access and involvement of mission leaders, particularly from the perspective of formative 
structures developed above. 
 
                                                 
370 The previous study established a link between degree of involvement and perception of 
effectiveness. That is, SMLs felt most effective in areas where they were most involved. While 
self-reported perceptions are not an ideal measure of effectiveness, this finding does establish at 
least a baseline correlation. 
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Figure 7. Percentage of SMLs reporting at least moderate involvement with various campus activities and constituencies. 
 
 Survey questions sought to understand the degree of involvement with a number of 
campus constituencies (students, faculty, trustees, etc.) in a number of activities (hiring/selection, 
orientation, evaluation, etc.). The results provide a clear picture of where mission leaders are 
most involved and where their impact remains minimal (Figure 7). Overall, the survey shows a 
small increase in at least moderate involvement in nearly all activities over the 2009 survey. 
Mission leaders’ presence on campus is increasing. Yet there remain large discrepancies 
concerning areas of engagement. For example, involvement in the selection and evaluation 
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process lags far behind involvement in orientation and ongoing formation, regardless of the 
constituency. 
 More than 80% of mission leaders report at least moderate involvement in the orientation 
and formation of faculty, staff, students, and administration, with correspondingly high numbers 
for the ongoing formation of faculty and staff. Though slightly lower, the mission officers report 
similarly high levels of involvement in the orientation and formation of trustees (76% and 65% 
at least moderate involvement, respectively). One outlier is the orientation and formation of 
alumni, with less than 30% reporting even moderate involvement with either. One possible 
explanation for this divergence is that the lower levels of involvement in the orientation and 
ongoing formation of alumni more likely represent an area of untapped potential. It is not that 
they are being formed and oriented by other members of the community; they simply are not 
being formed at all. 
 Compared to the orientation and ongoing formation of faculty and staff, mission leader 
involvement in their hiring and review process remains significantly lower. Less than half (45%) 
of mission leaders are even moderately involved in the selection of faculty. Only 11% report 
moderate involvement in the tenure process. While each of these numbers is a small increase 
over 2009, it remains far lower than levels of involvement in orientation and formation. Reported 
involvement in the selection of trustees has actually decreased, from 20% in 2009 to 15% in 
2013.  
Once again, one must be caution not to read too much into these figures alone. The 
survey did not seek to objectively verify the most effective usages of mission leader’s time. Nor 
can we be certain of why these different levels of involvement exist (whether or not it is of the 
SML’s choosing or part of the job description). Even further, the survey measures only the 
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involvement of the mission leader in each activity – it may be that another figure on campus is 
entrusted with ensure that the mission is present and operative in these processes. Nevertheless, 
these finding raise difficult questions concerning what opportunities the SML has to promote the 
mission on campus. While orientation programs are undoubtedly important, they occur after an 
employee has already been hired.371 Similarly, ongoing formation undoubtedly helps young 
faculty appreciate the distinctive charism of the institution, but they are likely far more 
concerned with the requirements for achieving tenure, a process in which only 13% of SMLs are 
moderately involved. Trustees are ultimately responsible for governance and strategic direction 
of the university, yet mission leader involvement in their selection remains below 50%. 
In the past two chapters, this dissertation has argued that the character of a community is 
shaped to a large degree by the institutional structures and policies that it sustains. While co-
curricular and voluntary programming are undoubtedly beneficial, they frequently only reach 
those already congenial to the mission. Even when attendance or participation in an orientation 
or ongoing formation program is required, it only occurs after the position has already been 
secured. If mission is not a primary focus in the hiring process, potential employees have little 
motivation for actively incorporating its study into their preparation and formation. If it is not a 
regular theme in their periodic reviews, there is no reason to give mission priority over other 
pressing demands. The time and energy of every community member are finite and limited. 
                                                 
371 James L. Heft and Fred P. Pestello offer a two-part analysis of the growing trend towards 
hiring for mission. Their findings indicate that usually administrators' concerns do not match the 
faculty attitudes about the institution. “Hiring Practices in Catholic Colleges and Universities,” 
Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education 20, no. 1 (January 1999): 89–97; James L. Heft, 
Ronald M. Katsuyama, and Fred P. Pestello, “Faculty Attitudes and Hiring Practices at Selected 
Catholic Colleges and Universities,” Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education 21, no. 2 
(January 2001): 43–63. 
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While external incentives are seldom the motivation for lasting commitments, they are frequently 
the reason behind initial engagement in a practice. 
Yet beyond these admittedly pessimistic observations, there is also the hope that senior 
mission leaders might be in a position to more fully realize the virtuous vision of their learning 
communities. The previous chapter highlighted the potentially beneficial role of institutional 
leadership. In MacIntyre’s purview (as well as that of the classical tradition), politics is 
ultimately the art of building a virtuous community. Administration is not a necessary evil, but 
an opportunity to design structures and policies that realize the deepest values of the polis. With 
the constant threat of concern for external goods (capital, prestige) eclipsing the pursuit of goods 
internal to the practice, even the best-intentioned stakeholder must at times be reminded of the 
raison d'etre of the organization. As an administrator reporting directly to the president, the 
senior mission leader has at least the potential to be this voice of conscience. Yet the question 
remains: to what degree is this voice is backed by legitimate authority? 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 This senior mission leader survey, with its predecessor, remains the most extensive study 
of mission officers and units ever attempted. The results present a comprehensive snapshot of the 
emerging field and identify clear and provocative longitudinal shifts and trends. Nevertheless, 
the survey raises just as many questions as it can answer. The quantitative nature of most 
questions often permits only speculation regarding the interpretation of our findings. Many of the 
intuitions suggested by the findings could only be verified by close ethnographic examinations of 
particular mission leaders and offices. As a preliminary step, however, this data identifies what 
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some of the critical issues and questions may be. It gives us a program for deeper engagement 
and exploration. 
 An immediate limitation from the perspective of this dissertation is the absence of 
language or questions directly investigating solidarity in the vision and practices of mission 
officers. Though self-imposed, this restriction was necessary to ensure minimal undue influence 
from the research team. Solidarity was not identified as an outcome in Estanek, James, and 
Norton’s analysis because such language remains largely absent from the mission statements of 
Catholic colleges and universities. This is not to say that similar themes cannot be found. 
Service, Justice, Citizenship, and International Perspective all imply some element of social 
mutuality and commitment to the common good. Yet, again, we can only speculate how mission 
leaders imagine such connections from the data presented.  
 The next, concluding chapter will offer a further reflection on how solidarity can be 
identified in this empirical survey and what questions the study suggests need further 
investigation. I will offer a brief proposal for how the virtue of solidarity can further animate the 
efforts of mission officers and the practices of their institutions. I will also draw out implications 
for a practice that senior mission officers frequently named as a means toward promoting their 
mission: service learning. 
 
 
247 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Conclusion 
 
 As an interdisciplinary exercise in practical theology, this dissertation has attempted to 
weave together what are frequently disparate themes and conversation. Even when addressing 
similar challenges, moral theologians, religious educators, and leaders in Catholic higher 
education too often remain anchored in their particular discipline without engaging the insights 
and perspectives of other fields. Employing a praxis methodology, I have developed an argument 
from concrete social realities through philosophical theories, theological reflection, and empirical 
research. Work of this kind is difficult to manage. To the proficient in any single dimension, 
many sections of this dissertation will seem unnecessarily cursory; while to others, the same 
pages will perhaps be entirely foreign. I do not doubt that each chapter addresses a question 
broad enough to be a dissertation of its own (I have read several on each given topic). Yet I am 
convinced that if theological reflection is to indeed be a practical discipline, it must be willing to 
engage numerous modes of human knowing, and must allow clear reasoning and concrete 
experience to critically engage each other. 
 I began this dissertation with the notion of a ruined life, and wish to return to it now in 
the conclusion. The virtue of solidarity, I believe, is rooted in the awareness that our telos is 
never our own; our goals and horizons are intimately linked and can never be achieved alone. It 
is cognizance of this moral reality that leads to our commitment to the common good. We work 
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for the recognition of the dignity and rights of our neighbor because they matter to us, to the 
point that we see in them another self and the very image of God. To recognize this is both an 
experience of liberation and loss – liberation because we realize that we are never alone; loss 
because we know that our schemes and aspirations are never solely ours alone. Nevertheless, this 
willingness to join with others in a common struggle remains essential in this American 
experiment, and I am convinced that Catholic colleges and universities are in a unique position to 
foster solidarity among their students and communities. 
 This dissertation concludes with observations on two areas of Catholic higher education 
in which practices of solidarity could be particularly profitable: mission leadership and service-
learning. At this stage, both sets of remarks will be only sketches of how more comprehensive 
arguments might proceed. The discussion of mission leadership flows naturally from the 
previous chapter, drawing concrete proposals from more general observations. As with other 
virtues, I will argue that promoting solidarity requires attentiveness to not only curricular and 
extracurricular programming, but to the underlying structures of this institution. I make concrete 
suggestions for fostering what David Hollenbach entitles ‘intellectual solidarity’ on campus as 
well as social solidarity with the surrounding neighborhoods and communities. Service-learning 
pedagogies have received less sustained treatment in this dissertation and will thus be developed 
further here. The potential of these practices has been well documented elsewhere, and will 
largely be assumed. Instead, I will address the more difficult problem of grounding community 
partnerships in a sincere ethic of solidarity rather than one of mutual exchange. Finally, I will 
briefly acknowledge avenues for future inquiry. 
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7.1. How to Ruin Your Institution: Practicing Solidarity in Mission Leadership 
 There is no single, immediate, and top-down solution to sustaining a campus culture of 
solidarity in Catholic higher education. The very notion of solidarity itself demands active and 
full participation from a diversity of campus constituents. On the one hand, it is only possible 
when there is a sincere commitment from the highest levels of administration, yet any efforts 
would be ineffectual and counterfeit if they did not include the most marginalized community 
members and collaborators. While there are many potential avenues to explore, this dissertation 
offers two promising opportunities for the promotion of solidarity through mission leadership: 
intellectual solidarity on campus, and social solidarity with the broader civic community. In 
keeping with the perspective developed in earlier chapters, I will focus on how these ideals can 
be pursued through the shaping of structures and policies, rather than voluntary and 
extracurricular offerings. While such programs are undoubtedly beneficial, it is often too easy to 
convince ourselves that such supplements satisfy the moral demands of the institution without 
critically analyzing the more fundamental structures. 
 
Building Intellectual Solidarity on Campus 
 Campus culture broadly reflects that of American society as a whole. This often is 
equally true of Catholic colleges and universities. Whereas Bellah argues that American civic life 
has devolved into individualistic pursuits and self-segregation into social enclaves, higher 
education has become increasingly characterized by hyper-specialization and stratified silos of 
knowledge. The ideals of a liberal arts education have been replaced by utilitarian and vocational 
rationale. Already in 1963, University of California president Clark Kerr was warning that our 
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universities were becoming “multiversities,” lacking any unified vision of human knowing.372 If 
educating the whole person is indeed a central value of Catholic higher education, this popular 
trend must be a grave concern. Yet while there are undeniably wide-ranging social and economic 
pressures behind these trends, they are also the results of deliberately adopted policies and 
practices. In a ‘publish or perish’ environment, there is seldom incentive for academics who are 
already stretched thin to commit energy to wider campus initiatives. When this publishing must 
be by a single author and pass the peer-review of a specialized audience, incentives for 
interdisciplinary work evaporate. We have helped to construct this reality and have the capacity 
to change it.  
 This work begins by building a common sense of purpose and mission on campus. If a 
university’s mission can indeed be viewed as the telos of the community, campus solidarity 
implies building a shared sense of appreciation and commitment to this vision. It is realized 
when the institution’s goals and aspirations fuse with one’s own (with neither obliterating the 
other). This is precisely the work of mission leadership. When senior mission leaders were asked 
in our survey to describe the vision and purpose of their work, answers (which were often 
directly copied from official documents and job descriptions) echoed common themes: 
• “To work with others so that our Mission Statement is alive and well in the minds, hearts 
and actions of the employees and students of the college as well as expressed in our 
policies and procedures.” 
• “To promote a shared understanding of and responsibility across the entire campus, with 
the Boards of Trustees and Regents, and alumni for carrying out the mission of the 
university.” 
• “To increase among faculty and staff understanding of, respect for, and appreciation of 
Catholic identity in order that they will infuse it in their curricular and co-curricular 
activities with the students. This is a mission-driven institution and permeation of our 
Catholic identity, through the creativity of faculty and staff, is the goal.” 
                                                 
372 Kerr first made these remarks as part of the Godkin Lectures at Harvard University, later 
published as The Uses of the University (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). He 
makes his observations through heavy conversation with Newman’s Idea of the University. 
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• “To make the mission of the college known and understood and to help the members of 
the college community own the mission and make the legacy of the Sisters of 
Charity…better understood and lived out on our campus.” 
 
In all, variations on the word ‘promote’ appeared 34 times in response to this question, 
‘integrate’ or ‘integration’ appeared 32 times. Throughout this survey, respondents emphasized 
the comprehensive and collaborative dimensions of their work. The mission of their institutions 
was not the domain of a select few, and its vitality was the responsibility of the entire community 
– from senior administration and faculty to staff and adjunct professors. 
 The challenge in these efforts, of course, is doing so in a way that honors the religious 
and academic freedom of every community member. Participation in the Catholic and 
congregational identity of the institution must come as a welcoming invitation, not a rigid 
mandate. This was at times named in the responses: 
• “The Office of Mission Integration was established to foster and strengthen the Catholic 
character and Franciscan heritage of [ ] University, while always respecting the religious 
liberty of its students, faculty, and staff.”  
• “As a Catholic and Jesuit university, we respect and value the wide variety of religious 
and humanist perspectives of our colleagues. We strive to represent a “centered 
pluralism” in our offerings and respectfully engage the particular traditions represented in 
our community.” 
 
To force students, staff, and faculty into an embrace of the institution’s religious identity would 
be to violate solidarity’s respect for genuine diversity and autonomy. The line between 
motivation and coercion is seldom clear. At minimum though, we ought to strive to remove 
disincentives for collaboration and strengthen rewards for mission commitment.  
 One immediate response to this challenge is to make use of the values that are either 
embedded or explicitly listed in our mission and vision statement. While we cannot expect or 
enforce doctrinal adherence, we can emphasize the normative role of these values for the 
institution. A Benedictine college, for example, may place a heavy emphasis on community and 
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stewardship. Though grounded in a particular history and tradition, these values find resonance 
far beyond the religious community. Moreover, they provide a common language through which 
to engage others regarding how the institution is striving to realize its mission. Leadership can 
use the values to communicate expectations to new students and faculty. Students and faculty, in 
turn, can use them to challenge administration on how they are honoring the school’s legacy. 
While there is great potential in this approach, two challenges must be acknowledged. First, there 
is seldom consensus concerning the significance of a given value or its demands in a particular 
context. Second, like virtues, the values themselves can and often do conflict. Utilizing the 
values this way will not resolve every tension on campus, but they do offer a mutually 
acknowledged point of departure. All parties can trust that a dispute is in fact grounded in a 
shared desire to flourish together as a community. Structurally, the values offer an immediate 
framework for strategic planning and institutional assessment. The are the measure of our fidelity 
to mission. 
 
 Regarding faculty specifically, David Hollenbach proposes one promising perspective for 
how universities can foster solidarity on campus: building intellectual solidarity.373 It should be 
noted from the outset that while I believe our definitions are compatible, Hollenbach situates 
solidarity differently than I have in this dissertation. Recognizing a similar context of pluralism 
and social challenges that tolerance alone cannot solve, Hollenbach proposes solidarity as a 
willingness to engage with others in striving for the common good, even when our visions of that 
                                                 
373 Hollenbach, The Common Good and Christian Ethics, 137–170. These arguments are applied 
to the topic of Catholic higher education in: David J. Hollenbach, “Is Tolerance Enough? The 
Catholic University and the Common Good,” in Vision and Values: Ethical Viewpoints in the 
Catholic Tradition, ed. Judith A Dwyer (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1999), 
179–95. 
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good differ. He is particularly attentive to how faith communities can fully participate in civic 
life and discourse. The difference lies in my suggestion that through solidarity the Other 
becomes a part of our own eudaimonistic scheme (a much more stringent requirement). The 
emphasis here is on a fusion of moral horizons, rather than engagement despite differences. 
Likewise noting the parallels with Aristotle’s notion of civic friendship, Hollenbach cautions 
human limitations in how far we can extend this goodwill.374 For him, solidarity is a more 
universal disposition, whereas I accept this limit and emphasize a vision of solidarity that is 
grounded in more particular relationships. The difference, therefore, is more one of degree than 
substance.375 
 Our willingness to cooperate on share social projects requires, Hollenbach argues, 
intellectual solidarity: a commitment to engage openly with others on our vision of the common 
good. 
It is an intellectual endeavor, for it calls for serious thinking by citizens about 
what their distinctive understandings of the good imply for the life of a society 
made up of people with many different traditions. It is a form of solidarity, 
because it can only occur in an active dialogue of mutual listening and speaking 
across the boundaries of religion and culture. Indeed, dialogue that seeks to 
understand those with different visions of the good life is already a form of 
solidarity even when disagreement continues to exist.376 
Our visions of the good are shaped by the moral traditions we receive and the moral communities 
in which we participate. Even when we cannot reach consensus on the nature of the good, we 
must remain committed to the conversation, which is a good in itself. It is through this dialogue 
that mutual understanding and appreciation deepens. 
                                                 
374 Hollenbach, The Common Good and Christian Ethics, 190–192. 
375 This, too, he recognizes as foreseeable: “There are varieties of solidarity appropriate to 
differing sorts of relationships. Solidarity is not a univocal reality that is either present or absent. 
It can be present in a community in different ways and to different degrees.” Ibid., 191. 
376 Ibid., 137–138. 
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 Hollenbach’s aim here is deliberative democracy: an active and participatory polity in 
which our visions of the good are openly engaged. Against the thinner liberalism of Rawls, 
Hollenbach advocates openly acknowledging our moral perspectives while honoring those of our 
interlocutors. Though civic discourse is his primary concern, Hollenbach emphasizes that 
intellectual solidarity is possible and desirable at all levels: “The need for such mutual learning 
and teaching is evident in all domains of human life. Ideally such give-and-take occurs in all 
forms of human thought, from the acquisition of elementary skills to the highest levels of 
scientific understanding, literary imagination, and philosophical wisdom.”377 All education is 
situated in a network of social relationships. Learning thrives when we are willing to expose 
ourselves to diverse perspectives and differing opinions. 
 Intellectual solidarity on Catholic campuses begins when faculty are encouraged to 
engage each other across both disciplinary and ideological boundaries. While we often sing the 
praises of interdisciplinary research, we seldom reward it. Co-authored articles are much more 
difficult to coordinate, yet are usually evaluated lower in tenure reviews. Our departments and 
tenured lines continue to fall along traditional categories. It cannot be left to the faculty to seek 
interdisciplinary exchanges under their own initiative. Promoting intellectual solidarity requires 
an institutional and indeed financial commitment. While interdisciplinary chairs and centers of 
thought are undoubtedly promising avenues, their unique status is often the exception that proves 
the rule. We develop these programs because we know that scholarly exchange is not occuring in 
the more conventional pursuits of the institution. Mission leaders can strive to foster dialogue 
among faculty, but must also work to ensure that the policies of the institution are constructed 
with the assumption that this sort of exchange is an integral part of campus and professional life. 
                                                 
377 Ibid., 139. 
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Building Social Solidarity with the Community 
 The virtue of solidarity must extend beyond our campus boundaries. Our schools always 
find themselves situated within specific geographic and social locations. Urban campuses are 
often deeply enmeshed in their neighborhoods. These relations are seldom uneventful. Colleges 
often buy up adjacent properties in preparation for future expansion and students living in off-
campus housing of fail to represent the moral ideals of the institution. In this context of 
interdependence, the minimums of respect and justice must be upheld. Universities usually enjoy 
privileged status and frequently have the power to define the relationship with their 
neighborhood. I want to suggest, however, how solidarity challenges us to go further than the 
obligations of fairness. 
 A recurring question in this dissertation is what solidarity adds to our commitment to and 
vision of justice. Commutative justice, for example, demands that the rights and privileges of 
others be respected. When parties enter into a contract or relationship, the process must be 
accomplished in a spirit of freedom and equality. This minimal threshold cannot be violated. Yet 
this generally occurs in a spirit of exchange: through this agreement, you will be able to further 
meet your ends while I advance my own. Solidarity strives for something more. Rather than 
seeking to fairly achieve our mutually exclusive ends, we come to recognize them as one and the 
same. The needs and goals of the community become those of the institution. More than a benign 
bystander, solidarity calls for our colleges and universities to join fully in the life and struggles 
of our neighborhoods, cities, and society. The resources and privileges of our schools are 
mobilized to address the obstacles and opportunities of our communities. 
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 There is no single initiative or ultimate measure for the realization of this ideal.378 
Scholarship and efforts in this direction fall under the general heading of an ‘engaged 
campus.’379 Barbara Holland has developed a matrix for assessing institutional commitment to 
service that identifies seven dimensions: Mission, Promotion/Tenure/Hiring, Organizational 
Structure, Student Involvement, Faculty Involvement, Community Involvement, and Campus 
Publications.380 Crucially, she identifies four levels of engagement in each of these components, 
from low relevance to full integration. Reaching the ideal in any single category remains 
exceptionally rare. Yet, her scale demonstrates that there is always room for incremental 
improvements, from involving the community more fully in research design to establishing (and 
developing specific fundraising materials for) centers and institutes that directly partner with the 
community.  
 This expansive view of institutional engagement highlights the need for a commitment 
from the highest levels of leadership. Building a culture of social solidarity cannot be effectively 
realized by a single entrepreneurial faculty member or committed group of undergraduates.381 As 
our research shows, senior mission officers usually hold cabinet-level positions and report 
directly to the president. They are in a unique position to advocate for community engagement 
                                                 
378 One can point, however, to encouraging efforts in this regard. For example, Washington 
Monthly has developed a college ranking system that rates schools according to their 
contribution to the public good, a gauge that combines social mobility (recruiting and graduating 
low-income students), research, and service. Institutions that committed themselves to exceling 
in these dimensions rather than the more traditional measures of prestige would and do 
undoubted look much different. http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/college_guide/ 
379 Campus Compact, a coalition of 1,100 higher education institutions committed to serving the 
public good, has developed an entire initiative around these efforts: 
http://www.compact.org/initiatives/engaged-campus-initiative/. 
380 Barbara Holland, “Analyzing Institutional Commitment to Service,” Michigan Journal of 
Community Service Learning 4 (1997): 33. 
381 This is not to deny that the efforts of such groups have been successful. For example, it is 
frequently student leadership (with faculty support) that has paved the way for their schools 
becoming fair trade: http://fairtradecampaigns.org/campaign-type/universities/. 
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and community representation in the core dimensions of campus life. Of course, any such efforts 
will only be effective to the degree that they themselves are actively building relationship with 
civic partners. While the core functions of mission officers are generally articulated in terms of 
promoting and integrating the mission on campus, they must not contribute to the thickening 
‘bubble’ that so often encompasses our institutions. Active engagement with community partners 
to the point of allowing them to help define the mission of the institution is central to building a 
campus culture of engagement in solidarity. 
 
7.2. How to Ruin Your Students: Practicing Solidarity in Service-Learning 
 The above mentioned article by Barbara Holland on measures of community engagement 
appeared in the Michigan Journal of Community Service Learning, which was founded in 1994 
as the nation’s first peer-reviewed journal dedicated to service-learning practices and pedagogies. 
Holland’s intention was to emphasize that community engagement extends beyond developing 
community-based classes.382 She is right to recognize that the obligations of community 
engagement cannot be satisfied through the design of courses alone. Nevertheless, after years of 
designing and implementing service-learning pedagogies both within and beyond a classroom 
setting, I am keenly aware of the capacity of this approach to form students for solidarity and 
express the mission of the institutions.  
 My own experience is bolstered by responses from the national survey of senior mission 
leaders. Approximately 13% of respondents named service-learning courses as a means of 
promoting the mission of their institution, with some noting that it is now a mandatory element 
                                                 
382 The terms service-learning and community-based learning will be used interchangeably in 
this dissertation. While both monikers refer to similar practices, some use the language of 
community-based learning to emphasize that the relationship is one of mutual engagement rather 
than service. 
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in the curriculum. Interestingly, only twice in these responses was service-learning listed as a 
means of promoting service or justice (once each). Multiple times it was linked to educating the 
whole person, and it was also named as a means of pursuing intellectual and moral development. 
For those familiar with these pedagogies, this diversity in responses should not be surprising. By 
directly immersing students into the concrete realities of the world and challenging them to 
reflect on their experiences and the course content in a critical dialectic, service-learning 
dismantles our traditional distinctions between theoria and praxis. When the course includes 
opportunities for reflection (which has been widely shown to be an essential element of 
successful implementation), service-learning engages not just the head and hands, but also the 
heart. 
 Undeniably, service-learning holds great potential as a practice of solidarity in Catholic 
higher education. Indeed, these pedagogies closely align with the notion of formative practices 
developed in Chapter Five. That is, they are socially established activities with standards of 
excellence that communicate a set of internal goods that could not be known outside of direct 
participation. Through building relationships with concrete persons and communities, and 
through joining their efforts to overcome innumerable obstacles, participation in service-learning 
courses deepens students’ affiliation with the marginalized and commitment to the common 
good. Moreover, by bringing these activities into the curriculum, service-learning classes bring 
the practice of solidarity into the core function of the university.  
 However, it is not my intention here to develop an argument for the effectiveness of 
service-learning. That it increases student apprehension of course material as well as their 
capacity to think critically has been well established. Already in 2001, for example, Campus 
Compact produced a 121 page annotated bibliography that surveys and summarizes research on 
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service-learning in higher education.383 Among the findings, the report cites 31 studies 
measuring increased student learning, 33 studies demonstrating a positive impact on student 
development, and 12 studies confirming positive faculty experiences. Studies also demonstrate 
that service-learning increases students’ commitment to their institution, appreciation for 
diversity, sense of social responsibility, capacity for complex reasoning, and preparedness for a 
career. From the purview of this author, the merits of service-learning as a pedagogical technique 
have been clearly established. 
 This should not imply that the conversation surrounding service-learning should cease, 
simply that we are now free to move on. As proponents of these pedagogies sought recognition 
in the academy, studies such as those outlined above were essential to establishing the legitimacy 
of the approach. Over time, the literature on has adopted a more critical tone. The emerging 
question for these authors is not whether service-learning is a valid practice, but whether it is 
honoring its highest ideals. For example, Stewart and Webster offer two collections of essays 
directly engaging these issues. Problematizing Service-Learning raises questions about the 
theoretical foundations of service-learning as well as challenges in its implementation.384 Their 
follow-up volume, Exploring the Cultural Dynamics and Tensions within Service-Learning, 
examines how issues of race, privilege, and power arise in community-based placements.385 
Studies like these are fully appreciative of service-learning’s potential, yet strive to faithfully 
challenge the practice so that it may better achieve its aims. This is an area of inquiry that, 
                                                 
383 Janet Eyler et al., At A Glance: What We Know About the Effects of Service-Learning on 
College Students, Faculty, Institutions, and Communities, 1993-2000: Third Edition. (Vanderbilt 
University, 2001), http://www.compact.org/wp-content/uploads/resources/downloads/aag.pdf. 
384 Trae Stewart and Nicole Webster, eds., Problematizing Service-Learning: Critical Reflections 
for Development and Action (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2010). 
385 Trae Stewart and Nicole Webster, eds., Exploring Cultural Dynamics and Tensions Within 
Service-Learning (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2011). 
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though difficult for practitioners to examine honestly, holds great promise for refining practices 
in the future. 
 It is in this spirit that I want to challenge practitioners of service-learning to consider the 
full implications of solidarity for their relationships with community-based agencies and the 
clients they serve. An emerging collection of studies examine service-learning from the 
perspective of partnering agencies, identifying both the benefits and challenges of hosting 
volunteer students.386 These studies question whether the partnership between class and agency 
is equally beneficial to both parties. Though general feedback has affirmed that agencies do 
indeed find these relationships beneficial, problems can and often do arise. These include 
unreliable and under-prepared student volunteers, as well as a lack of communication with 
faculty. Generally speaking, good policy and procedures can greatly minimize the burden on 
agencies and maximize the contributions of the volunteer. Yet I believe that the challenge goes 
deeper than simply striving to get the balance right. 
 Instead, I wish to contest the framework of costs and benefits implicit in these studies and 
many of our programs. Service-learning is most often described using a language of exchange: 
students give a portion of their time and energy to a needy agency and receive in return valuable 
experiences upon which to reflect in conversation with course material. Once again, the 
governing principle is commutative justice: ensuring a fair and equal exchange between 
individuals. Though at times student can be irresponsible or ineffective, the help they provide 
                                                 
386 Cf. Randy Stoecker and Elizabeth A. Tryon, The Unheard Voices: Community Organizations 
and Service Learning (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2009); David D Blouin and 
Evelyn M Perry, “Whom Does Service Learning Really Serve? Community-Based 
Organizations’ Perspectives on Service Learning,” Teaching Sociology 37, no. 2 (2009): 120–35. 
Critically, I have found no studies that look at these relationships from the perspective of clients 
being served. In some ways, this is understandable. Agencies work with vulnerable populations 
and are keen to protect them from public scrutiny. Yet being unable to communicate their own 
experiences through formal channels greatly diminishes the mutuality of these programs. 
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outweighs the resources required to train them and address any troubles they may cause. From 
the perspectives of the college or university, the students will provide any help necessary, just so 
long as they are also receiving meaningful interactions with clients. Of course these two sets of 
needs are often in tension, and when there is a conflict, it is usually the volunteers’ needs that 
prevail.387 If an agency cannot provide the sort of experience that the student or curriculum 
requires, it is easy enough to find another that will. 
To a degree, this prioritization of student development is understandable. Almost by 
definition, service-learning is intended as a temporary and transformational experience. The 
assumption is that students will eventually move on to new projects and careers. Though the 
context may change, we hope that the insights and values gleaned from the experience remain. 
Nevertheless, such good intentions perpetuate a dangerous imbalance that is all too familiar to 
marginalized communities. College students are often accustomed to focusing their energies on 
their own personal and professional growth. There is a risk service experiences and the 
relationships they foster can become valued as objects of self-esteem and professional 
development rather than as goods with intrinsic worth. Moreover, when this attitude is viewed 
from an institutional perspective, clear concerns emerge. Though volunteers may come and go, 
the institution’s relationship with the community agency remains. Emphasizing the personal 
transformation of the participants permanently relegates the community to a subservient role. 
Agencies and clients become the means to achieving institutional ends. A college or university 
that prioritizes the personal transformation of its students risks unwittingly encouraging this 
attitude, reaffirming the very qualities that are in most need of conversion.  
                                                 
387 To use an example from the Jesuit Volunteer Corps, our policy was a minimum of 50% of 
volunteer time had to be spent directly interacting with clients. While agencies’ greatest needs 
might be office support or development, that is not the sort of experience that would accomplish 
the formative goals of the program. 
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 When fully realized, solidarity in service-learning abandons the model of exchange for 
one in which classroom and community come together in a common endeavor. Education 
ultimately concerns the creation and interpretation of knowledge. Yet too often, the communities 
participating in service-learning encounters have no formal claim in this process. Students learn 
about the communities, but not with them. Community representatives may tell their stories or 
engage students in conversations, but it is ultimately the students who determine what to do with 
the experience and insights gained. Whether or not the encounter will lead to improvements for 
the local community – or any marginalized population – is entirely up to the student. 
 How might we practice solidarity in service-learning? Rather than an exchange of 
services and experiences, it would be collaboration surrounding a specific question or issue. As a 
partnership between class and community, it would bring the unique perspectives and resources 
of each into a common endeavor. Communities would help to identify the critical issues for their 
neighborhood, while the class would bring research methodologies and access to broader streams 
of information. Agencies and clients would have shared (perhaps even preferred) ownership of 
the entire process.388  
                                                 
388 I have in mind here an adoption of the principles and practices of Participator and Action 
Research. Several educators have begun to experiment with this model, though they have largely 
employed it in service-learning research methods courses. I believe that it could be greatly 
expanded to encompass any academic discipline. Sarah Bell, Mark Mattern, and Mike Telin, 
“Community-Action Learning,” Journal of Political Science Education 3, no. 1 (2007): 61–78; 
Joyce D Hammond et al., “PAR for the Course: A Congruent Pedagogical Approach for a PAR 
Methods Class,” Michigan Journal of Community Service Learning 12, no. 1 (2005): 52–66; Ira 
Harkavy, John Puckett, and Dan Romer, “Action Research: Bridging Service and Research.,” 
Michigan Journal of Community Service Learning, 2000, 113–18; Susan R Madsen, “Action 
Learning Unveiled: Finding Depth through Understanding Related Constructs,” Journal on 
Excellence in College Teaching 18, no. 2 (2007): 5–25; Karsten Mündel and Daniel 
Schugurensky, “Community Based Learning and Civic Engagement: Informal Learning among 
Adult Volunteers in Community Organizations,” New Directions for Adult & Continuing 
Education, no. 118 (Summer 2008): 49–60; Kenneth M Reardon, “Participatory Action Research 
as Service Learning.,” New Directions for Teaching and Learning, no. 73 (1998): 57–64; 
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 To use the example of theology, a community holds important insights and experiences 
that warrant theological reflection. Yet too often, students are only taught to employ text-based 
models of research. Indeed, even liberation theology classes frequently rely solely on the 
writings of liberation theologians. Even when there is a service-learning component to the 
course, a separation remains. Students go out into the community to encounter poverty and 
marginalization, then return to campus to reflect theologically on their experiences. I believe that 
there is great potential in directing the energy and enthusiasm of students toward exploring with 
communities their experiences of the God of liberation. Rather than theologizing about poverty, 
we do theology with the poor, creating knowledge and insights together. 
 Once again, the standard I’ve set for the practice of solidarity is a high one. I cannot say 
that any of the courses I have designed meet this criterion, though I have challenged my students 
to think about the dynamics of privilege and power at work. This constructive critique of service-
learning should not be viewed as a negation of its benefits. Even when operating under an ethos 
of fair exchange and mutual enrichment, community-based pedagogies offer advantages for the 
student, institution, and agencies that far outweigh the potential costs. In a context that highly 
values educating the whole person, service-learning is particularly promising. As I have already 
argued, this value is best viewed as one of integration: not simply developing the distinct 
dimensions of the person individually, but helping them to integrate each element into a unified 
whole.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Stoecker and Tryon, The Unheard Voices; Randy Stoecker et al., “Can Community-Based 
Research Guide Service Learning?,” Journal of Community Practice 18, no. 2–3 (2010): 280–96; 
Kerry J. Strand, “Community-Based Research as Pedagogy.,” Michigan Journal of Community 
Service Learning 7 (2000): 85–96. 
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As Eyler and Giles observe, “Few efforts in higher education involve the chaplain’s 
office, student affairs, and members of the faculty as service-learning often does.”389 If we only 
offer various and independent curricular, service, and ministry programming, expecting student 
to do the work of integration on their own, we are setting both them and our institutions up for 
failure. Service-learning brings the struggles and aspirations of our world into the classroom, 
challenging students to recognize the real-world implications of their academic pursuits. While 
this undoubtedly shapes students’ comprehension of the material, it also engages the moral and 
spiritual dimensions of their being. Students see that the themes discussed and questions raised 
through the curriculum have powerful ramifications in the world, particularly among the most 
vulnerable. They even come to recognize, perhaps, that their education is never their own. 
 
7.3 Prospects for Further Inquiry 
I have tried to develop in this dissertation not only an argument for solidarity in Catholic 
higher education, but a way to think about how institutions imagine and implement their mission. 
To the degree that I have been successful, this approach can be expanded to consider how 
solidarity or any other virtue might be promoted through the structures and practices of other 
organizations guided by a mission statement and distinctive set of values. Of course, successful 
implementation would demand closer attentiveness to the concrete ways that communities of 
practice participate in the shaping and functioning of their institutions than I have offered 
here.390 Moreover, while I have been insistent on the need to translate our moral ambitions into 
concrete practices, I am convinced that we must always scrutinize our fidelity to mission through 
                                                 
389 Janet Eyler and Dwight E. Giles, Where’s the Learning in Service-Learning (Jossey-Bass, 
1999), 10. 
390 Etienne Wenger develops several provocative insights in this regard: Communities of 
Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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honest assessment (itself a virtuous practice). Measuring and assessing mission remains an 
emerging trend in Catholic higher education, with most leaders only developing tool in the past 
few years. I believe that perspective I am developing here (particularly my emphasis on 
structures) would suggest a particular way of doing assessments, which I hope to develop later. 
Regarding the empirical survey, there is much more to be done. The rapid evolution in 
the field of mission leadership demonstrates the need for continued longitudinal studies. We 
identified several shifts that have occurred in only a handful of years, and they will likely 
continue for some time. I anticipate exploring further the question of how senior mission leaders 
shape the policies of their institutions, and what degree of authority they have over these 
structures. Where mission leaders are heavily involved in these processes, I am curious how 
successful they have been. Of course, I have several questions concerning solidarity in Catholic 
higher education from the perspective of mission leadership – both concerning how they define 
the concept and to what extent they promote the dimensions I have advocated here (intellectual 
solidarity and community engagement). I am also aware of the limits of a national survey of this 
kind, and could imagine this data leading to more ethnographic studies of selected leaders and 
institutions. 
My conclusion points to pedagogies of solidarity in service-learning that I undeniably 
hope to develop further in the future. Yet, I am also hopefully that I might do research examining 
the perspective of clients concerning the encounter that happens through service-learning 
placements. This, I believe, is the greatest lacuna in the literature. Beyond this, there is much 
theoretical work to be done. In particular, I hope to suggest ways to think theologically about 
what occurs in these courses. Over the past several decades, religious education has greatly 
benefited from the theological reflection of theorists and practitioners. Our greatest pedagogies 
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are deeply rooted in our faith convictions. Service-learning still lacks these deeper roots. I 
believe that this would aid practitioners in both their understanding of their work and in 
articulating it to broader constituencies. 
 Beyond any of these particular avenues of inquiry, I hope to develop and sustain 
practices of theological reflection that embody both intellectual and social solidarity. I hope that 
my thinking is not simply about diverse and marginalized perspectives, but with them. I strive to 
remain mindful that my teaching and scholarship is never mine alone. I recognize the challenges 
in maintaining this disposition. Such work is always more difficult to coordinate and lacks the 
ready audience of more traditional discourses. Yet in a world where our challenges require 
cooperation across boundaries of every kind, such work is necessary, even if it may it ruin your 
career. 
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APPENDIX 
 
National Senior Mission Leader Survey 
 
Q1.1 Introduction  
You are invited to participate in the second national study of Senior Mission Leaders at Catholic 
Colleges and Universities conducted by Dr. Michael James, professor of Higher Education at the 
Boston College and Director of the Boston College Institute for Administrators in Catholic 
Higher Education. This research project is also co-sponsored by the Association of Catholic 
Colleges and Universities (ACCU). You were identified as a participant through a database 
provided by the Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities and updated by a follow-up 
phone survey conducted by the principal investigator. We have identified 160 institutions in the 
United States with an appointed Senior Mission Leader other than the president. If you are not 
currently the Senior Mission Leader please reply to this email with the name and contact 
information for the appropriate person at your institution. Over the last two decades, a growing 
number of Catholic colleges and universities have appointed a mission officer to provide a 
variety of services to the institution in regard to integrating the Catholic mission and charism of 
the sponsoring religious community. This study aims to identify characteristics about Senior 
Mission Leaders, the administrative units they oversee, the sphere of institutional influence they 
administer, and the perceptions that Senior Mission Leaders have about their role and 
responsibilities. We are collecting data through an easy to access, on-line survey instrument that 
has been developed in consultation with a number of mission officers who are considered 
pioneers in this area of work and with Executive officers of the Association of Catholic Colleges 
and Universities. The product of this research offers several tangible benefits to you. If you 
choose to participate and complete the survey, you will receive a directory of Senior Mission 
Leaders. You will also receive a summary of research findings to include, among other things: a 
macro-level view of institutional mission integration; common practices; organizational 
structures; and strategic initiatives. We hope to provide leaders in Catholic higher education with 
a greater understanding of Senior Mission Leaders that could support continued effectiveness of 
mission leaders and the strategies that they employ. We anticipate reporting the findings of this 
research during the ACCU annual meeting and in education research journals. 
 
  
275 
Q1.2 Informed Consent  
If you voluntarily agree, you will participate in a research study titled “Senior Mission Leaders at 
Catholic Colleges and Universities II.” You were selected to participate in this project because 
you have been identified as a Senior Mission Leader at your institution through an ACCU 
database. This study is a follow-up to our Mission Leader benchmark study completed in 2010. 
The purpose of this follow-up study is to research the broader field of Catholic higher education 
in the U.S. to identify common characteristics about senior mission leaders, the administrative 
units they oversee, the sphere of institutional influence they administer, and the characteristics 
that are most necessary to be an effective mission leader. We also aim to update the Association 
of Catholic Colleges and Universities directory of senior mission leaders and distribute it to all 
participants. The results from the first study were presented at two separate ACCU Annual 
Meetings. In addition, two chapters in the forthcoming ACCU Mission Book are informed by the 
initial research findings. This study will be conducted through this online survey. The survey 
should take you approximately 20 minutes to complete. We do not currently anticipate any 
foreseeable risks/discomforts to you or to your institution. The direct benefit to you, and the 
leadership of your institution is to gain a current and thorough understanding about the nature of 
the office, the person, the work, and the effectiveness of Senior Mission Leaders across Catholic 
higher education in the United States. You will not be compensated for the time you take to 
complete this survey. There are no costs to you associated with your participation. The Principal 
Investigator will exert all reasonable efforts to keep your responses and your identity 
confidential. All responses will be reported anonymously and in aggregate form. All data 
collected via this Qualtrics online survey is password protected. The data will be transferred to 
other software applications – SPSS and MS Excel – through a secure network connection. Data 
will be coded by institution-type according to the Carnegie Classification of your institution. 
Individual institutions and respondents will not be identified. All data will be secured on the 
Boston College Lynch School of Education secured Server. The Principal investigator and his 
assistant researchers will have sole access to all of the data. Please note that regulatory agencies, 
the Boston College Institutional Review Board, and Boston College internal auditors may review 
research records Your participation is voluntary. If you choose not to participate, it will not 
affect your relations with Boston College. You are free to withdraw or skip questions for any 
reason. There are no penalties for withdrawing or skipping questions. The Principal investigator 
for this study is Michael James, Ph.D, professor of Higher Education and Director of the Boston 
College Institute for Administrators in Catholic Higher Education, Oscar Mayorga, Independent 
Research Consultant, and Dan Justin, Ph.D. candidate in the Boston College Scholl of Theology 
and Ministry. If you have questions or concerns about this research you may contact the 
Principal Investigator at (617) 552-0763 or michael.james@bc.edu. If you have questions about 
your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Office for Research Protections, 
Boston College, at 617-552-4778 or irb@bc.edu. This study was reviewed by the Boston College 
Institutional Review Board and its approval was granted on September 26, 2013. 
 
Q1.3 If you agree to the statements above and agree to participate in this study, please place a 
check in the “Consent Given” box below 
 Yes, Consent Given 
 No, I do not want to participant 
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Q2.1 Mission Leader Characteristics 
 
Q2.2 What is your official title as mission leader? 
 Vice President 
 Assistant/Associate Vice President 
 Assistant to the President 
 Special Assistant to the President 
 Director 
 Dean 
 Chair 
 Coordinator 
 Rector 
 Chancellor 
 Other 
 
Q2.3 To whom do you report in your capacity as mission leader? 
 President 
 Executive Vice President 
 Senior Academic Affairs Officer 
 Senior Student Affairs Officer 
 Chief of Staff 
 Other ____________________ 
 
Q2.4 What year were you hired or appointed to serve as mission leader? 
 1980 
 1981 
 1982 
 1983 
 1984 
 1985 
 1986 
 1987 
 1988 
 1989 
 1990 
 1991 
 1992 
 1993 
 1994 
 1995 
 1995 
 1996 
 1997 
 1998 
 1999 
 2000 
 2001 
 2002 
 2003 
 2004 
 2005 
 2006 
 2007 
 2008 
 2009 
 2010 
 2011 
 2012 
 2013 
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Q2.5 Which one of the following best describes the search process for your position? 
 Internal Hire 
 Local Search 
 Regional Search 
 National Search 
 Other ____________________ 
 
 
Q2.6 Mission Leader Characteristics 
 
Q2.7 Who made the final decision regarding your appointment? (Mark all that apply) 
 Board of Trustees 
 Sponsoring religious congregation 
 President 
 Senior Academic Officer 
 Bishop 
 Other 
 
Q2.8 Do you hold a joint appointment? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q2.9 If you serve in a joint appointment, what other position do you hold? 
 Faculty Member 
 Student Affairs Administrator 
 Academic Administrator 
 Campus Minister 
 College Chaplain 
 Other ____________________ 
 
Q2.10 What position do you consider your primary responsibility? 
 Mission Leader 
 Other position 
 Both are equal 
 
 
Q2.11 Mission Leader Characteristics 
 
Q2.12 Are you the first mission leader at your institution? 
 Yes 
 No 
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Q2.13 In the history of the mission unit, what number mission leader are you? 
 1st 
 2nd 
 3rd 
 4th 
 5th 
 other 
 
Q2.14 Was your immediate predecessor a member of the institution's sponsoring 
religious congregation? 
 Yes 
 No 
 I don't know 
 
 
Q3.1 Mission Unit Characteristics 
 
Q3.2 Is the mission unit a "committee" structure? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q3.3 What is the official title of the mission unit?Office of ... 
 Mission 
 Mission and Ministry 
 Mission and Identity 
 Mission Integration 
 Mission Effectiveness 
 Other ____________________ 
 
Q3.4 In what year was the mission unit established? (Please estimate if necessary) 
 1980 
 1981 
 1982 
 1983 
 1984 
 1985 
 1986 
 1987 
 1988 
 1989 
 1990 
 1991 
 1992 
 1993 
 1994 
 1995 
 1995 
 1996 
 1997 
 1998 
 1999 
 2000 
 2001 
 2002 
 2003 
 2004 
 2005 
 2006 
 2007 
 2008 
 2009 
 2010 
 2011 
 2012 
 2013 
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Q3.5 Mission Unit Characteristics 
 
Q3.6 How many compensated staff are employed within the mission unit? Please include 
yourself; "professional staff" is defined as those individuals involved in program development, 
implementation, and/or management.   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 or more 
Professional 
Staff Full-time 
              
Professional 
Staff Part-time 
              
Support Staff 
Full-time 
              
Support Staff 
Part-time 
              
Graduate 
Students 
              
Undergraduate 
students 
              
Other               
 
 
Q3.7 Mission Unit Characteristics 
 
Q3.8 Please select the range that accurately reflects the mission leader's base annual salary? 
 0 
 $1 to $9,999 
 $10,000 to $19,999 
 $20,000 to $29,999 
 $30,000 to $39,999 
 $40,000 to $49,999 
 $50,000 to $59,999 
 $60,000 to $69,999 
 $70,000 to $79,999 
 $80,000 to $89,999 
 $90,000 to $99,999 
 $100,000 to $125,999 
 $126,000 to $149,999 
 $150,000 to $174,999 
 $175,000 to $199,999 
 > $200,000 
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Q3.9 What is the annual operating budget for the mission unit?  
 0 
 $1 to $9,999 
 $10,000 to $19,999 
 $20,000 to $29,999 
 $30,000 to $39,999 
 $40,000 to $49,999 
 $50,000 to $59,999 
 $60,000 to $69,999 
 $70,000 to $79,999 
 $80,000 to $89,999 
 $90,000 to $99,999 
 $100,000 to $125,999 
 $126,000 to $149,999 
 $150,000 to $174,999 
 $175,000 to $199,999 
 $200,000 to $249,999 
 $250,000 to $299,999 
 $300,000 to $349,999 
 $350,000 to $399,999 
 $400,000 to $449,999 
 $450,000 to $499,999 
 > $500,000 
 
Q3.10 Please approximate what percentage of the mission unit's budget is funded by outside 
grants? 
 0% 
 1% to 5% 
 6% to 10% 
 11% to 15% 
 16% to 20% 
 20% to 29% 
 30% to 39% 
 40% to 49% 
 > 50% 
 
Q3.11 Mission unit operating budget or initiatives are supported by an endowment with an 
investment principle in the following amount. 
 0 to $9,999 
 $10,000 to $19,999 
 $20,000 to $29,999 
 $30,000 to $39,999 
 $40,000 to $49,999 
 $50,000 to $59,999 
 $60,000 to $69,999 
 $70,000 to $79,999 
 $80,000 to $89,999 
 $90,000 to $99,999 
 $100,000 to $125,999 
 $126,000 to $149,999 
 $150,000 to $174,999 
 $175,000 to $199,999 
 $200,000 to $249,999 
 $250,000 to $299,999 
 $300,000 to $349,999 
 $350,000 to $399,999 
 $400,000 to $449,999 
 $450,000 to $499,999 
 $500,000 to $999,999 
 $1,000,000 to $1,999,999 
 > $2,000,000 
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Q3.12 Mission Unit Characteristics 
 
Q3.13 If any, what departments, institutes, programs, and centers report to the mission leader? 
(Mark all that apply) 
 Center for Spirituality 
 Center for Service 
 Center for Social Justice 
 Campus Ministry 
 Other ____________________ 
 
Q4.1 Mission Unit Activities 
 
Q4.2 To what degree is the mission unit engaged in any phase of the HIRING OR SELECTION 
PROCESS for each of the following campus constituencies?  Not engaged Minimally Moderately Significantly Coordinate 
Faculty           
Administrators           
Staff           
Trustees           
 
 
Q4.3 To what degree is the mission unit engaged is ORIENTATION PROGRAMS for each of 
the following campus constituencies?  Not engaged Minimally Moderately Significantly Coordinate 
Faculty           
Administrators           
Staff           
Students           
Alumni/ae           
Trustees           
 
 
Q4.4 To what degree is the mission unit engaged in CONTINUING MISSION FORMATION 
for each of the following campus constituencies?  Not engaged Minimally Moderately Significantly Coordinate 
Faculty           
Administrators           
Staff           
Students           
Alumni/ae           
Trustees           
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Q4.5 Mission Unit Activities 
 
Q4.6 To what degree is the mission unit engaged in the faculty PROMOTION AND TENURE 
PROCESS? 
 Not engaged 
 Minimally 
 Moderately 
 Significantly 
 Coordinate 
 
Q4.7 To what degree is the mission unit engaged in the ANNUAL REVIEW PROCESS for each 
of the following campus constituents?  Not engaged Minimally Moderately Significantly Coordinate 
Administrators           
Staff           
 
 
Q5.1 Mission Unit Effectiveness 
 
Q5.2 What is the VISION/PURPOSE of your Mission Unit? 
 
Q5.3 What resources (seminal documents, publications, key figures, etc.) inform the 
VISION/PURPOSE of your Mission Unit? 
 
Q5.4 Mission Unit Effectiveness 
 
Q5.5 The following list contains the twelve student outcomes that are most commonly identified 
in the mission statements of Catholic colleges and universities. Please rank the list (drag and 
drop) according to the level of priority of each outcome for your mission unit (1=highest priority, 
12=lowest priority). 
______ Education of the Whole Person 
______ Intellectual Development 
______ International Perspective or Awareness 
______ Leadership 
______ Lifelong Learning 
______ Moral Development 
______ Personal Growth 
______ Professional Competence 
______ Religious or Spiritual Development 
______ Responsible Citizenship 
______ Service 
______ Social Justice/Social Responsibility 
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Q5.6 Mission Unit Effectiveness 
 
Q5.7 You listed ${q://QID82/ChoiceGroup/ChoiceWithLowestValue} as the Mission Unit's 
highest priority student outcome. How do you promote this outcome on campus? 
 
Q5.8 What resources (seminal documents, publications, tools, etc.) inform the 
PROGRAMS/STRATEGIES of your Mission Unit? 
 
Q5.9 Mission Unit Effectiveness 
 
Q5.10 What resources (seminal documents, publications, tools, etc.) inform the 
ASSESSMENT/OUTCOMES of your Mission Unit? 
 
Q5.11 Describe the assessment approach that you use to measure the effectiveness of your 
Mission Unit. 
 
Q5.12 List and describe the specific assessment instruments used. 
 
Q5.13 Mission Unit Effectiveness 
 
Q5.14 What is the most defining program out of all the programs offered by your Mission Unit? 
 
 
Q6.1 Demographics 
 
Q6.2 What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
Q6.3 What is your current age? 
 39 or younger 
 40 to 45 
 46 to 49 
 50 to 55 
 56 to 59 
 60 to 65 
 66 to 69 
 70 or older 
 
Q6.4 What is your race? 
 American Indian or Alaska Native 
 Asian 
 Black or African American 
 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
 White 
 Latino or Hispanic 
 Multi-racial 
 Other 
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Q6.5 Demographics 
 
Q6.6 What is your religious affiliation? 
 Roman Catholic 
 Eastern Rite Catholic 
 Baptist 
 Buddhist 
 Church of Christ 
 Eastern Orthodox 
 Episcopalian 
 Hindu 
 Jewish 
 Mormon 
 Lutheran 
 Methodist 
 Muslim 
 Presbyterian 
 Quaker 
 Seventh Day Adventist 
 United Church of Christ/Congregational 
 Other Christian 
 Other Religion 
 None 
 
Q6.7 What is your current religious status? 
 Layperson 
 Religious sister 
 Religious brother 
 Religious priest 
 Diocesan priest 
 Deacon 
 Other ____________________ 
 
Q6.8 What is your religious formation? 
 Former clergy or member of a religious congregation 
 Member of lay ecclesial movement 
 Oblate or affiliate of a religious congregation 
 Ordained minister in a denomination other than Roman Catholic 
 Other ____________________ 
 
Q6.9 Are you a member of the institution's sponsoring religious congregation? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q7.1 Final Thoughts 
 
Q7.2 Is there anything else you would like to say that was not asked? 
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Q8.1 ACCU Directory Information 
 
Q8.2 The Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities has requested that we collect current 
contact information from mission leaders. For the respondents who complete the questionnaire, 
this information will not be used to identify you in correspondence with any of your survey 
answers. This contact information will be used only to update the ACCU's Mission Leader 
directory. A copy of the directory will be distributed to all participants who complete this 
questionnaire. Thank you for your participation.  
Prefix 
First Name 
Last Name 
Suffix 
Title 
Address 1 
Address 2 
City 
State 
Zip 
Work Phone 
Preferred email address 
Mission unit website 
 
Q9.1 ACCU Directory Information 
 
Q9.2 Thank you for your consideration. If you are not completing the survey, please consider 
completing the directory information below. The Association of Catholic Colleges and 
Universities has requested that we collect current contact information from mission leaders. This 
contact information will be used only to update the ACCU's Mission Leader directory. Thank 
you for your participation.  
Prefix 
First Name 
Last Name 
Suffix 
Title 
Address 1 
Address 2 
City 
State 
Zip 
Work Phone 
Preferred email address 
Mission unit website 
 
 
